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Abstract 
 
This  thesis  examines  the  political  thought  of  Petr  Kropotkin  as  a  site  of  interplay 
between anarchism and science. It explores a dialogue between the diagnostic and 
remedial  aspirations  of  revolutionary  anarchism  and  certain  epistemologies  and 
methodologies of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scientific thought. On the 
one hand, I argue that this meeting led to the scientisation of Kropotkin’s anarchist 
politics,  transforming  conventional  anarchist  ideas  on  the  state,  capitalism,  and 
revolution. On the other hand, I consider how Kropotkin politicised science, that is, 
how he inflected certain scientific theories and concepts and turned them into powerful 
revolutionary devices that equipped his brand of anarchism with new ways to identify 
political problems and solutions. Kropotkin’s bio-political worldview, his enthusiasm 
for statistics as a means to visualise society and social law, and his understanding of 
the ‘social’ as a field for the application of rational and scientific forms of knowledge 
for the improvement of human populations, had far-reaching implications for the ways 
he conceptualised and articulated traditional anarchist notions of power, domination, 
moral corruption, order, and the dissemination of knowledge. I show that in contrast to 
political philosophers who employ scientific ideas metaphorically to represent political 
concepts  such  as  sovereignty,  stability,  and  resistance,  Kropotkin’s  absorption  of 
science was literal. Notions of health, sickness, insanity, degeneration, medicine, and 
hygiene, for example, did not function analogically in his thought, but were, in fact, 
some  of  his  key  political  concerns.  The  intersection  of  anarchism  and  science  is 
presented as an agency stimulating a deep ambivalence in Kropotkin’s thought. This 
thesis  does  not  portray  Kropotkin  as  an  optimist,  but  as  a  thinker  who  wavered 
between fears of decline and hopes for progress. I bring to light Kropotkin’s anxieties, 
uncertainties,  paradoxes,  and  contradictions,  revealing  the  oscillation  between 
pessimism and optimism that haunted his scientific and political modernity. 	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Introduction 
 
What would you prescribe for all these sicknesses?
1 
 
Petr Kropotkin, ‘To the Young’ (1880). 
 
 
Petr Kropotkin’s (1842-1921) political philosophy engaged with the double-sided task 
of  diagnosing  humanity’s  sicknesses  and  prescribing  remedies  to  cure  them.  The 
question from ‘To the Young’ that I have set as an epigraph to this thesis conveys a 
mutuality between problem and solution that was central to the way he thought about 
politics. For roughly half a century Kropotkin worked on discovering threats posed by 
modern political and economic environments to individuals and society as a whole. He 
sought  to  reveal  these  threats,  understand  their  danger,  and  analyse  their  effects. 
Alongside  his  political  diagnoses,  Kropotkin’s  writings  also  attempted  to  identify 
political treatments that could heal and improve humanity’s condition. Showing what 
was wrong with human beings was meaningful to Kropotkin because it suggested to 
him how they ought to be. Once located and known, the problems humanity faced 
could be overcome. 
This thesis examines Kropotkin’s political diagnoses and remedies in relation 
to the forms of knowledge and practices that he believed made them possible. The 
notion that there existed a relationship between these interdependent objectives of his 
political project and knowledge is not my own assumption. Kropotkin was explicit 
about making this connection and he went to great lengths to show which ways of 
knowing  the  world  would  form  the  basis  of  his  political  ideas.  In  1901,  he  gave 
expression to his view of the association: 
 
It is important […] to know the position it [anarchism] occupies among the 
various currents of scientific […] thought that exist at the present time […]. To 
which of them does it turn for support? Which method of research does it make 
use of in order to prove its conclusions?
2 
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1 Petr Kropotkin, ‘To the Young’, in Words of a Rebel, trans. by George Woodcock (Montréal and New 
York: Black Rose Books, 1992), pp. 44-63 (p. 45). Originally appeared in Le Révolté as ‘Aux Jeunes 
Gens’ (1880). 
2 Petr Kropotkin, Modern Science and Anarchism (London: Freedom Press, 1923), p. 6. Originally 
published in Russian as Sovremennaia nauka i anarkhizm (1901). 	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My research seeks to provide answers to these questions. I study how nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century scientific thought interacted with Kropotkin’s understanding of 
what is politically undesirable and desirable. In other words, I examine how the truth 
claims and authority of science supported his attempts to identify political problems 
and  solutions.  Moreover,  this  thesis  analyses  how  Kropotkin  drew  on  scientific 
methodological practices in order to prove the conclusions of his political arguments. 
At the heart of this thesis, then, is an exploration of the interplay between knowledge 
and  politics,  a  reading  of  the  relationship  between  epistemology  and  the  political 
concepts of status quo and transformation. 
  The above quotation from Modern Science and Anarchism (1901) also tells us 
that  Kropotkin  was  combining  scientific  knowledge  and  methods  with  anarchism. 
Although Kropotkin thought of anarchism as an attitude, a state of mind, a way of life, 
and a movement that had existed throughout human history and ‘originated among the 
people’, he was open about his project to connect it with prevalent scientific ideas of 
his time.
3 He understood that science’s role in this meeting was to intercept and steer 
the trajectory of the tradition’s development, providing its guiding political ideas with 
new epistemological and methodological bases. Principal strands of anarchist political 
thought  that  Kropotkin  associated  with  the  work  of  William  Godwin  (1756-1836), 
Pierre-Joseph  Proudhon  (1809-1865),  and  Mikhail  Bakunin  (1814-1876)  would 
somehow  now  rely  on  science  for  their  interpretation,  meaning,  and  articulation. 
Kropotkin was joining the elements of two distinct contexts – the political (anarchism) 
and the scientific – and marking out his thought as the space for their fusion. 
As  a  site  of  intersection  between  revolutionary  politics  and  science, 
Kropotkin’s  thought  represents  a  new  development  in  the  tradition  of  anarchist 
political philosophy. Although his diagnoses of humanity’s problems were distinctly 
anarchist – emphasising the threat of the modern state and capitalism – the ways in 
which he thought about these threats and the means through which he tried to expose 
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3 Ibid., p. 1. Historians of anarchism have explored Kropotkin’s view that the roots of modern anarchist 
political thought exist in pre-modern periods. D. Novak traces anarchism’s origins in certain schools of 
thought in ancient Greece and in medieval heretical religious movements. D. Novak, ‘The Place of 
Anarchism in the History of Political Thought’, The Review of Politics, 3, 20 (1958), 307-29. James Joll 
discusses the anarchist character of the Anabaptists in the Münster Rebellion of 1535. James Joll, The 
Anarchists, 2nd edn (London: Methuen, 1979). Scholars have also examined the idea that anarchism is a 
state of mind. Alex Comfort claims that anarchism is ‘not a programme’, but ‘an attitude’. Alex 
Comfort, ‘Preface’, in Harold Barclay, People Without Government: An Anthropology of Anarchism 
(London: Kahn and Averill, 1990), pp. 7-9 (p. 9). Richard D. Sonn describes anarchism as ‘a faith’ that 
can exercise ‘a powerful hold over the imagination’. Richard D. Sonn, ‘Preface’, in Sonn, Anarchism 
(New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), pp. xi-xv (p. xiii). 	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their danger were transformed by scientific ideas. His remedies to these problems were 
also transformed by science. He offered typical anarchist visions of revolution and far-
reaching social change as political solutions, yet they were intended to bring about 
effects and consequences that made sense to and were measurable in relation to forms 
of scientific knowledge. With its modified forms of diagnosis and remedy, Kropotkin’s 
scientised brand of anarchism provided the tradition with new and different approaches 
to the individual and society, to ideas about power, moral corruption, order, and the 
dissemination of knowledge. 
 
 
Politics and Science 
 
As an introduction to the two central themes of this thesis – anarchist politics and 
science – and to illustrate how they came together in his thought, I would like to draw 
attention to two events that occurred around the time of Kropotkin’s birth in 1842. 
First,  in  his  book  What is Property?  (1840),  Proudhon  declared  himself  to  be  an 
anarchist.
4 This is the first known instance of a political thinker willingly adopting the 
title. Before, particularly during the French Revolution, it had been used as a term of 
negative criticism and abuse levelled at ‘unruly’ political adversaries.
5 Second, in the 
year  of  Kropotkin’s  birth,  English  social  reformer  Edwin  Chadwick  (1800-1890) 
published his classic study An Inquiry into the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring 
Population of Great Britain (1842). As the title indicates, Chadwick’s work was an 
investigation  into  the  state  of  public  health,  a  biological  assessment  of  a  political 
territory’s population that stretched ‘from one end of the island to the other’.
6 
I have chosen to introduce these episodes for their ability to mark out two 
important  developments  within  nineteenth-century  Western  political  and  scientific 
thought that, I believe, became interwoven strands of Kropotkin’s life as a writer and 
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4 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, What is Property? [1840], ed. by Donald R. Kelly and Bonnie G. Smith 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 205.  
5 See George Woodcock, Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1962), pp. 8-9.  
6 Edwin Chadwick, ‘An Inquiry into the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great 
Britain’ [1842], in Literature and Science in the Nineteenth Century: An Anthology, ed. by Laura Otis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 167-71 (p. 167). For more on Chadwick and his ideas on 
public health, see R. A. Lewis, Edwin Chadwick and the Public Health Movement, 1832-1854 (London, 
New York, and Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1952); Steven Davies, ‘Edwin Chadwick and the 
Genesis of the English Welfare State’, Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society, 4, 4 (1990), 
523-36. 	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thinker.  I  am  interested  in  how  the  possibilities  for  thought  represented  by  these 
seemingly unconnected events – both understanding that the term ‘anarchist’ could 
positively identify the creative ambitions of a political thinker and perceiving threats to 
political  populations  biologically  –  became  intimately  connected  currents  of 
Kropotkin’s  ideas.  Each  typified  new  ways  of  looking  at  the  world  that  together, 
interdependently, developed into the core features of his worldview. 
Proudhon’s  self-definition  as  an  anarchist  brought  into  being  the  idea  of 
anarchism as a non-maligned form of political philosophy, establishing a new, positive 
political identity to which Kropotkin would later subscribe. In relating anarchism with 
order, Proudhon engendered the possibility for it to be associated with creative as well 
as destructive political ambitions. Kropotkin grew up in a world where it was possible 
to conceive of the word ‘anarchist’ as a vocation, a calling that implied a desire not 
only to condemn socio-economic and political regimes but also to pursue society’s 
transformation.  
This thesis will argue that what Kropotkin hoped to achieve politically as an 
anarchist – diagnosing and solving social problems – was broadly representative of the 
trend in nineteenth-century scientific thought depicted by Chadwick’s inquiry. I will 
show how his anarchist exposé of the dangers facing humanity had a biological focus. 
Like Chadwick, he was concerned with identifying the threat of disease to human 
populations,  particularly  to  labouring,  or  working  groups,  connecting  their  bodily 
experiences to wider processes of industrialisation and urbanisation. With the support 
of  expert  knowledge,  evidence,  facts,  and  data,  Kropotkin  understood  his  political 
diagnoses to be accurate and exact. He was confident that his anarchist politics could 
scientifically measure the biological threats facing individuals and society. I will also 
contend that because he perceived social problems biologically, Kropotkin’s political 
solutions  were  medical.  His  remedies  sought  to  literally  heal  society  with  the 
application of scientific knowledge and technologies. 
 
 
Anarchism and Science 
 
In 1918, Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) evaluated Kropotkin’s attempt to base a theory 
of  social  organisation  and  production  on  science.  Although  he  acknowledges  that 
Kropotkin ‘exaggerates what is possible with our present scientific knowledge’, he 	 ﾠ 10	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nonetheless  states  that  ‘his  contentions  contain  a  very  large  portion  of  the  truth’.
7 
While Russell’s positive assessment is largely due to his sympathies for the anarchist 
cause, his words depict an uncritical approach to Kropotkin’s thought that has been 
repeated by later studies. Roger N. Baldwin comments that ‘much of [Kropotkin’s] 
work in the social sciences is really scientific’, making part of his analysis an appraisal 
of whether Kropotkin’s ideas really did reach the threshold of science’s investigatory 
rigor, exactness, and accuracy.
8 And to support his argument that Kropotkin developed 
a  ‘ground-breaking’  theory  of  ‘evolutionary  holism’,
9 Brian  Morris  claims  that 
Kropotkin’s psychological conception of ‘the human subject as composite […] has 
been affirmed by recent evolutionary psychology’.
10 Morris’ opinion that Kropotkin 
practised  ‘correct  science’  is  a  value  judgment  of  the  scientific  character  of 
Kropotkin’s  thought.  Such  scholarship  falls  short  of  providing  a  historical 
interpretation  of  the  relationship  between  science  and  Kropotkin’s  anarchism,  but 
merely  reinforces  modern  science’s  epistemological  claim  to  provide  the  exclusive 
gateway to reality and its truths. 
Ruth  Kinna  warns  against  this  uncritical  approach.  She  shows  that  the 
‘scientific’ has been understood as a standard rather than a historically loaded term. 
While some scholars praise Kropotkin’s political ideas for their scientific qualities, 
others  critique  them  for  their  lack  of  objectivity.
11  Either  way,  a  normative 
understanding of the concept of scientific worth applies to both positions. This study 
takes Kinna’s warning seriously. It is not interested in the supposed scientific validity 
of Kropotkin’s politics. Such an approach would take at face value the very ideas that I 
seek to question in relation to his political thought. While ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ are 
clearly loaded terms, when discussing Kropotkin’s scientific anarchism, as well as 
claims by other thinkers to be scientific, I do not intend to make value judgments about 
an  idea’s  proximity  to  truth,  its  rigor,  or  objectivity.  I  invoke  David  Garland’s 
understandings of the term ‘scientific’. First, I use it to discuss political ideas ‘which 
were self-consciously undertaken within a framework derived from natural science’. 
Second, I use it as a term to distinguish certain political ideas ‘from other ones which 
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7 Bertrand Russell, Roads To Freedom: Socialism, Anarchism, and Syndicalism [1918] (London: Allen 
Lane and Unwin, 1933), p. 64. 
8 Roger N. Baldwin, ‘Introduction’, in Kropotkin’s Revolutionary Pamphlets: A Collection of Writings 
by Peter Kropotkin, ed. by Baldwin (London: Dover Publications, 1970), pp. 1-12 (p. 7). 
9 Brian Morris, ‘Kropotkin’s Metaphysics of Nature’, Anarchist Studies, 2, 9 (2001), 165-80 (p. 166). 
10 Ibid., p. 168.  
11 Ruth Kinna, ‘Kropotkin and Huxley’, Politics, 2, 12 (1992), 41-47 (pp. 43-44). 	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were phrased in moral, religious or common-sense vocabularies’. Last, the ‘uncritical 
use  of  the  term  “science”  is  intended  as  an  historical  attribution,  repeating  actors’ 
conceptions,  not  an  epistemological  evaluation’.
12 In  other  words,  I  aspire  to 
understand how Kropotkin understood science, its power, and its potential to improve 
the human condition through its connection to anarchism. 
In Classical Anarchism: The Political Thought of Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, 
and Kropotkin (1991), George Crowder conducts a more sophisticated reading of the 
place of science in anarchist political thought. He argues that the four anarchists are 
united by their nineteenth-century scientism.
13 The book attempts to show how the 
ideas of thinkers such as Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), Auguste Comte (1798-
1857),  and  Charles  Darwin  (1809-1882)  influenced  the  anarchists’  belief  in  the 
possibility of uncovering social laws and achieving moral improvement. Significantly, 
Crowder identifies scientism as a platform for anarchist politics: ‘The belief that the 
methods of empirical science provide a model appropriate to all fields of inquiry, is the 
chief support of the anarchists’ optimism about the possibility of a non-coercive social 
order’.
14 From  this  perspective,  the  political  idea  of  anarchy  is  explained  as  a 
nineteenth-century social science whose methodologies have been transposed from the 
natural sciences.  
Crowder  points  to  the  influence  of  science’s  empiricist  epistemology  on 
anarchist thought. Godwin, Proudhon, and Bakunin each thought human observation 
was capable of reliably encountering reality. Crowder’s sections on Kropotkin are also 
convincing in their treatment of the general role of empiricism in his approach to 
knowledge.
15 He  gives  an  account  of  the  origins  of  Kropotkin’s  opinion  that  one 
should not search for knowledge ‘outside and above the world which is accessible to 
our senses’.
16 Moreover, in drawing attention to the influence of broad and general 
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12 David Garland, ‘British Criminology Before 1935’, The British Journal of Criminology, 2, 28 (1988), 
1-17 (p. 1). 
13 Scientism is one of three themes that Crowder believes unite the political thought of Godwin, 
Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin, constituting a tradition of classical anarchism. The four thinkers’ 
shared understanding of freedom as moral self-direction and their debt to the ideas of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau are also thought to characterise this tradition. 
14 George Crowder, Classical Anarchism: The Political Thought of Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, and 
Kropotkin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 29-30.  
15 Ibid., pp. 119-169. 
16 Petr Kropotkin, Ethics: Origin and Development, trans. by Louis S. Friedland and Joseph R. 
Piroshnikoff (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1993), p. 42. Kropotkin died before completing this work. It 
was originally published in Russian as Etika (1922). The first three chapters of this book are modified 
reprints of Kropotkin’s articles ‘The Ethical Need of the Present Day’ (1904) and ‘The Morality of 
Nature’ (1905), both of which were published in The Nineteenth Century and After. In the main, I refer 	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trends  in  nineteenth-century  scientific  thought,  Crowder  is  able  to  make  some 
historical sense of the intellectual atmosphere in which Kropotkin’s political ideas, in 
particular his theory of mutual aid, were born and drew breath. 
This thesis addresses and complicates Crowder’s study in a number of ways. 
First, not only do I show more extensively that scientific ideas supported Kropotkin’s 
optimism about the possibility of a better future, but that they were also the chief 
support of his pessimism about the decline of humanity. The scientific method not 
only promised Kropotkin the possibility of moral improvement but, overlooked by 
Crowder, the reality of moral sickness. Science’s impact on Kropotkin was not limited 
to stimulating his hope; to the same degree it darkened his despair, fuelled his fears, 
and intensified his anxieties.  
Second, I develop Crowder’s view that general trends in nineteenth-century 
scientism influenced Kropotkin’s thought. Part of my research seeks to enlarge this 
perspective. To the broad atmospheric impact of epistemological empiricism and the 
desire  to  fruitfully  transpose  the  assumptions  of  the  natural  sciences  to  the  social 
sciences, I add the nineteenth-century’s widespread faith in the power of statistics to 
acquire  information  about  human  populations.  Kropotkin’s  political  project 
incorporated science’s growing reliance on statistical measurement. His thought not 
only  reflected  statistics’  growing  public  nature  –  the  communication  of  ideas  in  a 
numerical language which was spoken in the popular press as well as in scientific 
literature – but the shifting interest in what was being measured. Kropotkin’s interest 
in statistical representations of the qualitative concern of social health is indicative of 
the statistical enthusiasm of the nineteenth century. 
Finally, Crowder writes that ‘the influence of scientism on the anarchists is of a 
[…] general, imprecise nature, the transmission not so much of specific arguments 
traceable to particular works as of a general intellectual climate’.
17 While I agree with 
Crowder that general, pervasive trends in nineteenth-century scientific thought can be 
found  in  Kropotkin’s  political  writings,  I  do  believe  that  there  were  a  number  of 
important specific theories, concepts, thinkers, and works that came to play a critical 
role  in  how  he  understood  and  articulated  key  strands  of  the  anarchist  political 
tradition. As well as the general role of scientism, then, I bring to light the role of late 
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nineteenth- and early twentieth-century ideas from disciplines such as criminology, 
psychiatry,  crowd  psychology,  medicine,  and  hygiene  with  reference  to  particular 
works, thinkers, and concepts. Specific arguments about crime, insanity, disease, and 
degeneration,  for  example,  found  expression  in  Kropotkin’s  political  writings.  Of 
course,  these  ideas  were,  as  all  ideas  are,  part  of  what  Crowder  calls  a  ‘general 
intellectual climate’. Nonetheless, individually as well as cumulatively they interacted 
with  Kropotkin’s  conception  of  anarchism  in  powerful  and  creative  ways. 
Furthermore, by engaging with these largely unexplored (in relation to Kropotkin’s 
political thought) areas of knowledge, my thesis rethinks Crowder’s classification of 
Kropotkin as a classical anarchist along with Godwin, Proudhon, and Bakunin. If, as I 
will  argue,  Kropotkin’s  engagement  with  science  was  of  a  far  more  specific  and 
deliberate nature than that of his predecessors, then his affinity with them, to the extent 
that he can be grouped into a canon of classical anarchism, appears contentious. 
  Crowder’s approach has been criticised for reasons other than what I claim is 
its  lack  of  specificity,  its  failure  to  acknowledge  scientism’s  role  in  stimulating 
pessimism, and its unawareness of science’s reliance on statistical methods. Kinna 
argues that Crowder’s emphasis on the scientific provides a presentation of mutual aid 
as  a  theory  of  social  law,  rather  than  an  anarchist  idea  with  desired  political 
implications. She shows how efforts to understand Kropotkin’s scientific thought have 
resulted in mutual aid being ‘stripped of its political content altogether’.
18 Her analysis 
seeks to address this deficiency, demonstrating how Kropotkin recruited science to 
empower his political ideas. Mutual aid was not developed merely as a contribution to 
scientific thought whose political implications for anarchism were secondary. Rather, 
Kropotkin  intentionally  turned  to  biology  to  address  a  set  of  specific  political 
problems:  the  ‘political  aspect  was  primary’.
19 The  theory  of  mutual  aid  sought  to 
reverse the decline of anarchism during the 1890s in the face of the rise of Marxism 
and the theoretical threat of Nietzschean individualism. As a political doctrine based 
on science, mutual aid challenged Marxism’s law of historical development with a 
notion of evolutionary change driven by action and intervention. It was also designed 
to  strike  a  blow  to  Friedrich  Nietzsche’s  (1844-1900)  rejection  of  morality  by 
scientifically  identifying  a  moral  sense  within  humanity,  not  without.  ‘For  all  his 
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passionate  interest  in  science’,  Kinna  argues,  ‘Kropotkin’s  political  aim  was 
paramount’.
20 Science could transform anarchist politics. 
This  thesis  also  treats  Kropotkin’s  anarchist  politics  as  paramount.  My 
commitment to understand his scientific thought is a necessary part of my ambition to 
understand his political ideas. Like Kinna, I examine how Kropotkin drew on scientific 
ideas in order to develop and strengthen anarchist political arguments. Though sharing 
a  similar  approach  to  Kinna,  however,  my  study  explores  the  impact  of  different 
scientific  ideas  on  different  political  dimensions  of  Kropotkin’s  anarchist  political 
thought. For Kropotkin’s attempt to express anarchist politics through science was not 
limited to his theory of mutual aid. While I share Kinna’s opinion that science was 
always ‘tailored to meet [Kropotkin’s] political concerns’,
21 the scientific ideas I am 
primarily interested in are not those of Darwin and Thomas H. Huxley (1825-1895). 
Instead, I consider how Kropotkin inverted, inflected, and manipulated scientific ideas 
about deviance – ideas often used to attack and condemn anarchists and anarchism – in 
order to transform anarchist politics. The disciplines of criminology and psychiatry, for 
example, were important sources of knowledge for Kropotkin whose ideas he also 
tailored  to  meet  his  political  concerns.  Although  the  evolutionary  ideas  of  Jean-
Baptiste  Lamarck  (1744-1829)  are  important  to  this  study’s  interpretation  of 
Kropotkin’s politics, the sciences of evolution constitute only part of the scientific 
context I connect to his anarchism. Moreover, I do not follow Kinna in assessing how 
Kropotkin used scientific thought to build a theory of mutual aid capable of preventing 
the decline of the anarchist movement. I seek to understand how Kropotkin tailored 
biosocial  science  to  meet  the  anarchist  political  ambitions  of  diagnosing  and 
remedying the problems afflicting humanity in the modern world. In other words, I 
identify ways in which scientific ideas helped Kropotkin make sense of and articulate 
some of the core political themes of nineteenth-century anarchist political philosophy: 
a theory of state power, a critique of capitalism, and an idea of revolution. 
While Mutual Aid features in my work, therefore, it does not constitute the 
main textual site in which to study the meeting of politics and science. As Kinna’s 
research indicates, as an example of Kropotkin’s reliance on science to develop the 
politics of anarchism, it has been thoroughly assessed. However, other texts, I believe, 
have not been adequately interrogated as sites of the intersection of anarchism and 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
20 Ibid., p. 279.  
21 Ibid., p. 282. 	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ
science. One of these is In Russian and French Prisons (1887). In this book, Kropotkin 
absorbs  the  insights  of  the  sciences  of  crime  and  insanity  to  sharpen  his  political 
critiques  of  the  state  and  capitalism.  Although  the  scientists  of  deviance  to  whom 
Kropotkin refers in this book are not the usual suspects one finds in explanations of his 
use of science, the ideas developed by these thinkers had a profound impact on his 
political conceptions of oppression, suffering, and resistance. 
I  use  the  term  ‘absorption’  to  describe  my  understanding  of  Kropotkin’s 
relationship to and use of modern scientific ideas. Kropotkin made a career out of 
reading,  conducting,  contemplating,  reviewing,  challenging,  and  promoting 
contemporary scientific research. It was a constant feature of his everyday existence. 
He  managed  to  make  a  living  through  his  scientific  contributions  and  reviews  for 
journals  such  as  Nature  and  The  Nineteenth  Century.
22 In  this  sense,  Kropotkin’s 
absorbent relation to modern science conveys his intellectual practice of staying in 
touch with and learning the newest scientific ideas of his time from a whole range of 
disciplines. Yet, there is another dimension to the term ‘absorption’ that I think of 
when trying to understand Kropotkin’s relationship with science. The process did not 
end with him understanding a new scientific idea. He had a creative interaction with 
scientific thought that involved incorporating new theories into his political arguments. 
In highlighting this interaction I do not attempt to exactly recreate the ‘influence’ of 
scientific thought on Kropotkin’s politics in the style of a genealogical influence study. 
I  study  the  conceptual  interplay  between  politics  and  scientific  knowledge  in  the 
language  and  arguments  of  his  anarchist  writings.  Although  absorbing  science 
bestowed  a  degree  of  authority  and  ‘fashionableness’  onto  Kropotkin’s  brand  of 
anarchism, of more importance, I believe, was that it provided him with a conceptual 
tool kit with which to make sense of the problems in the world that anarchism seeks to 
address. 
Kropotkin’s vast absorption of science did not dilute or bring an end to the 
political in his thought. I do not interpret his vision of a rational social order as a form 
of  Saint-Simonian  technocracy.
23 Questions  about  how  human  beings  should  live 
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politically did not give way in Kropotkin’s thought to a subaltern confidence in expert 
knowledge and administrative or industrial rule. I read his anarchism as a vision of 
mass politics, as an idea about how people might exist en masse in relation to each 
other and their environment. These were political ideas that Kropotkin could express 
through recourse to scientific ideas. As we shall see in part two of this thesis, science 
did not displace, override, or weaken anarchism, but gave it vitality.  
Anarchism remained strong enough an influence in Kropotkin’s mind that it 
altered  the  very  scientific  ideas  that  were  designed  to  support  it.  I  highlight  these 
moments, proving that anarchism could transform science, as well as be transformed 
by it. Particularly interesting in this regard is Kropotkin’s modification of nineteenth-
century criminal psychiatry’s conception of the will into a revolutionary device, as 
well as his inversion of the concept of degeneration in order to characterise the threat 
of  the  bourgeoisie.  It  is  by  marking  these  and  other  developments  in  Kropotkin’s 
thought that this thesis displays its sensitivity to the fact that anarchism’s relationship 
to science was not simply passive. I understand that the relationship was a two-way 
process. Each affected the character of the other. This thesis, then, not only brings to 
light the scientisation of politics, but the politicisation of science. 
Scholars have interpreted the meeting of radical politics and science in the 
work of other anarchist thinkers and movements. John P. Clark and Camille Martin 
assess  the  connection  between  anarchism  and  science  in  the  thought  of  anarchist 
geographer Elisée Reclus (1830-1905), who constructed a critique of the state and an 
ideal of social anarchy with reference to geographical ideas about the history of the 
earth  and  planetary  liberation.
24 Scholars  of  Spanish  anarchism  recognise  major 
scientific themes that I identify in Kropotkin’s thought. Richard Cleminson informs us 
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that in the 1860s the concept of public health arose as a dominant concern for Spanish 
anarchists.
25 The biological notion of social welfare was fed into an anarchist critique 
of  the  state  and  a  theory  for  decentralised  social  arrangement.  Anarchists  attacked 
centralised authority for its inability to prevent social sickness and called for a people-
managed system of welfare to restore social health. Álvaro Girón explores how within 
the  context  of  public  health  concerns,  the  idea  of  degeneration  permeated  Spanish 
anarchism around the turn of the twentieth century. He argues that Spanish anarchists 
‘considered degeneration to be a fact, although establishing both a different diagnosis 
and treatment’.
26 With the threat of degeneracy a seeming reality, anarchists searched 
for  the  causes  of  humanity’s  biological  decline  in  certain  environments.  Anarchist 
politics drew meaning from more generally felt European biomedical fears common to 
the fin-de-siècle.  
My work relates to this trend in the scholarship of anarchism. I demonstrate 
how  the  marriage  of  biomedical  notions  of  public  health  and  social  decline  to 
revolutionary politics came to characterise the political diagnoses and remedies of one 
of the European anarchist movement’s leading figures. I show how this combination 
was arranged on a total scale in Kropotkin’s thought, spanning numerous books and 
articles and informing discussions of diverse topics such as prisons and battlefields. 
For,  as  Girón  points  out,  while  Spanish  anarchists  looked  to  the  environments  of 
capitalism to explain the causes of sickness, Kropotkin also condemned the pathogenic 
environments of state power as sites of infection and pestilence. It is the nuances of 
Kropotkin’s absorption of ideas of health and disease that interest me. I locate these 
absorptions in various areas of his work: in his investigations into political situations in 
different  national  contexts;  in  his  writings  about  individual  bodies,  societies,  and 
species; in his historical studies; in his analysis of literary plots and characters; and in 
his imaginations of the past, present, and future. My study does project Kropotkin’s 
commonality  with  other  anarchist  thinkers  and  movements  who  incorporated 
contemporary scientific ideas into their political projects, but it also reveals the scope 
and peculiarity of his innovations, his unique playfulness and creativity with science.  
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Anarchist Politics 
 
Martin  A.  Miller  declares  that  Kropotkin  ‘vigorously  attempted  to  redefine 
anarchism’.
27 One of the main arguments of this study is that Kropotkin was successful 
in this attempt and that he was able to achieve this process of redefinition by bringing 
key strands of anarchist thought into contact with various scientific ideas and practices. 
Kropotkin’s project was one of continuing and developing a notion of a pre-existing 
anarchism. He thought of his work in this way, orientating his ideas within an already 
established anarchist tradition of political philosophy, a lineage with its own heritage 
and legacies.
28 Kropotkin’s relation to this tradition is also evident in the ideas that 
played  out  in  his  writings:  his  hostility  to  authority,  domination,  and  control;  his 
criticism  of  exploitation;  his  disgust  at  moral  corruption;  his  attempt  to  marry 
destruction and creation; his hopes for the dissemination of knowledge; his concern for 
the free expression of individuality within communal social structures; and his faith in 
the political power of the masses. These are the ideas I trace in Kropotkin’s thought. I 
point out the moments of their meeting with science and analyse the changes they 
undergo as a result. Thus, I treat fundamental aspects of anarchism not as fixed or 
unchangeable, but as loose and malleable ideas, as concepts that can be understood in 
different ways and articulated through new forms of language. It follows that a central 
claim of this thesis is that political ideas, including those of anarchism, rest on certain 
forms of knowledge and technologies. In other words, political ideas are indebted to 
certain epistemological assumptions and beliefs about what methods of investigation 
are best able to make the world knowable. 
Anarchism’s understanding of and opposition to certain forms of power occupy 
a  central  place  in  my  discussion  of  Kropotkin’s  political  diagnoses.  Although  I 
maintain that Kropotkin does oppose certain political and economic forms of power, I 
am  concerned  with  how  he  understood  these  features  of  modern  state  politics  and 
capitalism. In my close reading of his writings on state punishment, warfare, sites of 
work, and places of dwelling, I argue, above all, that Kropotkin developed a biological 
conception of power that highlighted the bodily suffering of human beings at the hands 
of political and economic authority. 
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In revealing that Kropotkin responded to a biologically understood form of 
power, this thesis raises questions about the notion of power in anarchist thought more 
generally. My reading of Kropotkin’s critique of the state and capitalism, therefore, 
contributes to studies that have found that anarchism does not always conceptualise 
power as something that is inflicted upon a victim. Todd May, for example, discusses 
how  the  notion  of  domination  in  the  state’s  coercive,  punitive,  destructive,  or 
exploitative relation to society, cannot only refer to the existence of power in itself, but 
also  to  ‘oppressive  power  relations’.
29 Employing  a  Foucauldian  reading  of  power, 
May suggests that if power ‘is elastic, then its different appearances are irreducible to a 
specific form of domination’, for example, the top-down domination of society by the 
state.
30 From this perspective, the conventional anarchist opposition to state power is 
challenged, as power is removed from its position as something to be wielded, willed, 
imposed, or ‘consciously applied’, and seen rather as operating ‘not only consciously 
but unconsciously and anonymously’.
31 Kropotkin’s conception of biological power 
has similar qualities to those described by May. It is not overtly visible, but can only 
be seen through the special lens of biomedical knowledge. Its movement can be traced 
only by measuring the condition of individual and social health. Kropotkin’s concern 
is not so much with force, but with a power that penetrates human life through social 
environments. In the conditions they create for human organisms to exist, states and 
capitalism set in motion a power that is felt inside the bodies of human beings, whose 
harm  to  society  can  spread  horizontally,  anonymously,  subtly,  yet  no  less 
destructively.  
Anarchism does not simply attempt to understand power, but to challenge it. I 
consider how Kropotkin sought deconstruct, overcome, and demolish power as part of 
his revolutionary remedy.
32 In so doing, I show how his effort to eliminate the threat of 
power relied on a concept of revolution as hygiene. Having located threats to humanity 
biologically  and  identified  power  as  something  that  affects  the  body,  Kropotkin’s 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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introductory anthology of anarchy in the academy, ed. by Randall Amster, Abraham DeLeon, Luis A. 
Fernandez, Anthony J. Nocella, II, and Deric Shannon (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 11-
17 (p. 12). 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., p. 13.  
32 Noam Chomsky sees this as one of anarchism’s fundamental political concerns. He argues that 
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ambition to dismantle the state and capitalism required the authority and knowledge of 
medicine.  To  be  healthifying  and  regenerative  through  hygiene,  the  anarchist 
revolution needed to eradicate the political and economic causes of biological sickness.  
My  approach,  without  seeking  to  create  new  groups  of  anarchist  thinkers, 
speaks to classificatory studies of anarchist thought. I have already mentioned how my 
approach  challenges  Crowder’s  grouping  of  the  classical  anarchists.  Indeed,  by 
showing the nuances of Kropotkin’s development of key anarchist ideas, my study 
rethinks Kropotkin’s affinity with other anarchist thinkers, proving how he could be 
both  politically  ‘in  line’  with  the  tradition,  while  conceptually  innovative  and 
challenging. In this way, my study relates to a style of scholarship whose objective, as 
Benjamin  Franks  notes,  is  to  present  ‘anarchism  spatially,  through  the 
interconnectedness  of  ideas,  rather  than  historically  through  the  interaction  of 
organisation’.
33 In  Anarchism: Exponents of the Anarchist Philosophy  (1900),  Paul 
Eltzbacher (1868-1928) was one of the first scholars to attempt such a classification. 
Eltzbacher’s goal in this project was, as he put it, ‘to get determinate concepts of 
Anarchism  and  its  species’
34 in  order  to  ‘penetrate  its  essence’.
35 Eltzbacher  was 
looking for a connecting thread running through anarchist thought, arranging Godwin, 
Proudhon,  Max  Stirner  (1806-1856),  Bakunin,  Kropotkin,  Benjamin  Tucker  (1854-
1939),  and  Lev  Tolstoy  (1828-1910)  by  way  of  their  commonality.  According  to 
Eltzbacher, these seven thinkers share only one uniting characteristic: ‘they negate the 
State for our future’.
36 
In my connection of Kropotkin’s work with other anarchist thinkers I do not 
attempt to reclassify his thought in order to challenge Eltzbacher over what might be 
the defining feature of anarchism. I attempt to illustrate Kropotkin’s engagement with 
particular themes of anarchist thought, themes I highlight in the work of the leading 
figures of the nineteenth-century tradition. While I draw on oft-cited anarchist thinkers 
from  the  nineteenth  century,  I  do  not  intend  to  construct  or  ‘blast’  canons  in  my 
work.
37 I refer to anarchist writings in order to identify what I believe to be broad but 
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trans. by Steven T. Byington (New York: Chip’s Bookshop Booksellers and Publishers, 1959), p. 4.  
35 Ibid., p. 1. 
36 Ibid., p. 189.  
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key strands of anarchist politics that are evident in Kropotkin’s thought, but that were 
transformed as a result of his absorption of science. In relation to Eltzbacher’s study, 
for example, the approach of this thesis does not question if Kropotkin negated the 
state for our future, whether the seven sages is a fair arrangement of thinkers, and 
whether or not Kropotkin deserves his place amongst them. Instead, my presentation 
of  Kropotkin’s  application  of  science  to  the  study  of  the  state  and  its  power  can 
encourage us to rethink his conceptual relation to other anarchist thinkers. By showing 
that Kropotkin studied the state’s relation to society through the lens of biomedicine, 
and that this relation could be measured using statistics, this study does not dispute 
Kropotkin’s position as an anarchist, but draws attention to his unique interpretation of 
what Eltzbacher calls one of the tradition’s ‘determinate concepts’: the negation of the 
state.  
My  interest  into  how  science  interacted  with  Kropotkin’s  interpretation  of 
political ideas is not limited to the anarchist tradition. I also make a link to a broader 
tradition  of  European  political  philosophy,  not  to  show  how  he  developed  or 
contributed to specific treatises and projects but to bring to light how science modified 
key concepts from that tradition. Visions of both the body politic and the state of 
nature, as well as theories of natural and social law, acquired new significance in 
Kropotkin’s thought as a consequence of his scientised political worldview. 
 
 
Life and Ideas 
 
In the face of an apparent twenty-first-century disaster, Morris prescribes for humanity 
a  reading  of  Kropotkin’s  anarchist  philosophy.  If  taken  seriously,  he  claims, 
Kropotkin’s writings could save modern society from imminent peril:  
 
In an era when corporate capitalism reigns triumphant, creating conditions that 
induce  fear,  social  dislocation,  economic  insecurity,  and  political  and 
ecological crises, and when there is a pervasive mood of “apocalyptic despair” 
among  many  intellectuals  […],  there  is  surely  a  need  to  take  seriously 
Kropotkin’s vision of an alternative way of organizing social life.
38 
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Outlining  a  vision  of  escape,  describing  how  we  might  save  ourselves  from  ruin, 
Morris’ plea reflects what historian of degeneration Daniel Pick would describe as the 
‘interlocking  languages’  of  progress  and  decline.
39 Morris  inserts  Kropotkin  into  a 
delicately balanced oscillation between pessimism and optimism where despair and 
hope challenge, check, and reinforce one another. Anarchism becomes the only way 
out of the present misery. 
Morris’ confidence in Kropotkin’s ability to resolve the present ‘crises’ seems 
a  little  demanding  of  a  man  who  was  embroiled  within  a  different  sense  of  crisis 
distinct to his own time. While the significance of Kropotkin’s work could be said to 
extend further than the context of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the 
particular interwoven dynamic of progress and decline characteristic of that period 
should not be sidestepped if we are to understand the thought of this man believed to 
be so important for our survival.  
A  consideration  of  the  impact  of  the  late  nineteenth-  and  early  twentieth-
century dynamic of ‘progress and decline’ on his anarchist philosophy is a noticeable 
absence in historical studies of Kropotkin. Many scholars interested in the relationship 
between Kropotkin’s thought and the time in which he lived overlook the impact of the 
pessimistic sides of nineteenth-century thought on his brand of anarchism. He is often 
represented as someone resembling the ‘beautiful white Christ’
40 of Oscar Wilde’s De 
Profundis (1905), the eternal optimist with an unbreakable faith in the goodness of 
humanity. He is the product of the supposed positivity of his age, an optimistic thinker, 
according to Paul Avrich, whose ‘whole philosophy implied a faith in human progress 
that was typical of the age in which he lived’.
41 His philosophy has also served as an 
example  of  the  confidence  in  the  technological  and  scientific  advancements  that 
enchanted  the  nineteenth  century.  Thus,  Caroline  Cahm  suggests  his  thought  is 
representative of the ‘optimism of the positivists in the limitless possibilities of the 
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inductive deductive methods of scientific enquiry’.
42 In comparison to some of his 
revolutionary  compatriots,  Kropotkin’s  seemingly  calm,  rational,  and  ‘progressive’ 
mind sets him apart from the shadows where the more mysterious Bakunin and Petr 
Tkachev (1844-1886) are often found lurking. 
But  Kropotkin  had  a  dark  side  too.  His  mind  was  host  to  an  unceasing 
pessimism  that,  when  viewed  in  its  historical  context,  spoke  to  a  number  of 
contemporary anxieties and made sense to the people and the world about him. As I 
will show, he was fearful of a number of scientifically defined problems: diseases, 
crime epidemics, moral contagion, the degeneration of the human species. This is not 
to say that claims for Kropotkin’s optimism are false or unfounded. On the contrary, I 
believe Kropotkin’s optimism was relentless, but that it formed but one side of his 
complicated worldview. Alongside, there existed a deep-seated negativity, continually 
testing,  provoking,  and  stimulating  what  Paul  McLaughlin  terms  Kropotkin’s 
‘excessive  revolutionary  optimism’.
43 His  hopes  responded  to  his  fears;  they  were 
remedial. If Kropotkin’s thought is ‘typical of the age in which he lived’, as Avrich 
puts  it,  then  it  was  not  in  its  unflinching  optimism,  but  in  its  uncertainty  about 
civilisational decay, its anticipation of biological decline, and its oscillation between 
progress and regression. 
This thesis will expose the darker, pessimistic side of Kropotkin’s worldview. 
It seeks to connect his fears to his historical context in which strains of optimism and 
pessimism were delicately poised. Kropotkin’s concerns about the fate of the modern 
world will be approached as particular, inverted expressions of a broader anxiety about 
decline that haunted scientific, cultural, and political discourses of the period. 
Connections between Kropotkin’s lived experience and his ideas, therefore, are 
important  for  this  study.  Part  of  my  approach  involves  exploring  when  and  how 
Kropotkin acquired certain attributes that would later prove essential for his career as a 
revolutionary thinker. This analysis builds on attempts made by other scholars to draw 
lines of causation between aspects of Kropotkin’s life and the development of his 
political views. This practice is particularly interesting when it deals with Kropotkin’s 
formative years: his education in the Corps of Pages and his experiences of travel and 
scientific work in Siberia. 
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Cahm finds a foundation of Kropotkin’s political dissatisfaction with the socio-
economic and political status quo of Russia in his experiences at the Corps of Pages. 
Citing bullying and the punishment of isolation, she writes that ‘Kropotkin’s growing 
alienation  from  his  class  and  distaste  for  the  social  system  was  reinforced  by  his 
experiences as a student’.
44 Such distaste for the social system, she argues, developed 
into a much stronger political opposition during Kropotkin’s time in Siberia. Taking 
their lead from Kropotkin’s memoirs, in which he wrote that ‘I lost in Siberia whatever 
faith  in  state  discipline  I  had  cherished  before.  I  was  prepared  to  become  an 
anarchist’,
45 biographers explain his anarchist politics a result of personal experiences. 
Woodcock and Avakumovic put this case forward, suggesting that ‘it was through his 
lessons in Siberia that he gained the mental outlook which later made him such a 
steadfast  opponent  of  governmental  interference’.
46  Witnessing  first  hand  the 
inefficiency of reform, the Russian state’s brutal punishment of local resistance, and 
the simple workings of ungoverned peoples, Kropotkin is deemed to have undergone 
an emotional change that was later expressed through the ideals of anarchism. In his 
biography of Kropotkin, Miller describes this shift: 
 
Though some years were still to elapse before he finally committed himself to a 
career  in  revolutionary  activity,  the  time  he  spent  as  a  military  officer  in 
Eastern  Siberia  prepared  him  for  that  commitment.  Kropotkin  underwent  a 
serious alteration in his entire world view at this time. He went to Siberia in 
1862 full of enthusiasm for the possibilities of national reform that awaited 
him. He left five years later completely disillusioned.
47 
 
Miller’s  words  depict  the  tendency  in  biographical  scholarship  that  explains 
Kropotkin’s complex and multifaceted political beliefs by reference to the formative 
experiences of his youth. It amounts to an inference as to the effects of Kropotkin’s 
time in the Corps of Pages and Siberia on his psychology. The origins of Kropotkin’s 
political views are ‘found’ in his emotional reactions to real life events that came into 
contact with his lived experience.  
This  study  provides  an  alternative  reading  of  the  connection  between 
Kropotkin’s life and his ideas. Like Cahm, Woodcock and Avakumovic, and Miller, I 
am interested in the relationship between Kropotkin’s youth and his ‘mental outlook’ 
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46 Woodcock and Avakumovic, The Anarchist Prince, p. 59. 
47 Martin A. Miller, Kropotkin (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 70.  	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ
and ‘worldview’. However, my study does not attempt to explain Kropotkin’s political 
thought in terms of psychology as Miller does, but in terms of ways of thinking about 
and perceiving the world. In short, I am concerned with how these experiences were 
epistemologically and methodologically formative, not emotionally. I want to know 
which forms of knowledge, skills, and techniques he acquired during his schooling in 
the Corps of Pages and his military service in Siberia that made the expression of his 
anarchist political thought possible. I assess what methods of social investigation he 
learned  and  trace  examples  of  their  usage  across  many  of  his  political  writings.  I 
believe that both periods of Kropotkin’s life were important in terms of educating him 
about what to study. These inclinations played out in productive ways in his anarchist 
project.   
As well as subjecting him to strict discipline, officialdom, and authority, the 
Corps  of  Pages  trained  Kropotkin  in  the  skills  he  would  later  use  to  convey  the 
arguments of his political project. It was in this military academy of the state where he 
learned to measure social reality, a practice indispensible for mass political ideas. He 
was taught the value of bestowing order onto nature so as to standardise and make it 
legible to scientific research. Kropotkin’s enthusiasm for statistics, a method of the 
natural and social sciences his anarchist writings relied so heavily upon when dealing 
with  mass  human  populations  or  the  complex  flow  of  economics,  began  at  the 
academy. It became possible for him to think that he could count reality statistically 
and, crucially, to lift from the data certain patterns, correlations, and social laws. His 
ability to see society was acquired in this period, a power that allowed him to cast his 
eyes over rural, urban, national, and even global contexts, diagnose their problems, and 
provide them with (anarchist) remedies.  
Kropotkin’s time in the Cossack regiment was also a formative experience, 
encouraging him to apply his new knowledge and skills out in the field. It gave him a 
chance to represent reality in maps and to think about populations ethnographically. 
Moreover, it provided him with his first opportunity to imagine the total application of 
transportation and communication technology to rural areas, an idea that would later 
form the backbone of his design of social anarchy. In Siberia he began to criticise 
government officials not for using statistics to measure local conditions and peoples, 
but for the inaccuracy and inexactness of their figures. In part two of this thesis I give 
other  examples  of  this  anti-authoritarian  tactic  that  he  used  when  comparing  his 
anarchist ideas to government policy. 	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Methodology 
 
I  critically  examine  a  number  of  Kropotkin’s  published  works,  engaging  with  an 
oeuvre spanning roughly half a century from the 1870s to his death in 1921. My goal is 
not to judge the feasibility of Kropotkin’s ideas, to debate whether they worked in the 
nineteenth century or whether they would work today. My research into his thought 
works at the interface of anarchist politics and science, searching for the moments 
when  the  two  contexts  meet,  interact,  and  form  a  dialogue  with  one  another.  I 
investigate the relationship between anarchist politics and broad themes in European 
scientific and social thought, as well as more specific theories, ideas, concepts, and 
practices. Kropotkin’s work is treated as a site of intersection in which there exist the 
possibilities for anarchism to be expressed in new ways, possibilities for strands of 
nineteenth-century anarchist thought to take on new meaning. 
My  analysis  of  anarchism’s  dialogue  with  science  looks  at  Kropotkin’s 
language. I trace scientific discursive strands in his writings and evaluate their role 
within  his  political  ideas.  Fundamental  to  this  approach  is  an  appreciation  of  how 
Kropotkin employs images and tropes in his work that are borrowed straight from 
modern science, but takes them literally and makes them real in a radical political 
framework. Kropotkin did not use biomedicine’s rich arsenal of themes about health 
and sickness to represent political ideals and problems; they were, in reality, political 
ideals  and  problems.  I  come  to  this  position  as  a  result  of  two  processes.  First,  I 
approach Kropotkin’s scientific language with a willingness to take it literally, that is, 
to  take  seriously  the  lifelong  trust  he  placed  in  scientific  knowledge  as  a  literal 
language.  Second,  I  provide  evidence  of  his  literal  interpretation  of  science  as  a 
foundation  of  his  political  beliefs.  To  Kropotkin,  the  state  and  capitalism  literally 
posed a ‘pestilential’ threat to humanity. In his mind, prisons were in fact ‘nests of 
infection’, where men’s physical and psychological health was weakened as a result of 
disease, not simply places where men were corrupted. We will see that Kropotkin did 
not refer to crime, suicide, and insanity as social diseases to indicate their political 
undesirability, but because they were thought of as actual illnesses with biological 
causes, effects, and remedies. And it will be made clear that revolution, by removing 
the state and destroying the foundations of capitalism, would in reality sweep away 
miasma and cleanse society. Biomedical science was not merely a form of language 
that allowed Kropotkin to express traditional anarchist motifs through metaphor. It was 	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an expert form of knowledge that literally identified political problems and solutions. 
It was this literal incorporation of science into his political thought, not simply its 
images and language for metaphorical use, that had the transformative impact on the 
way Kropotkin understood anarchism. 
This feature of Kropotkin’s thought, what I term his ‘literalism’, is a recurring 
theme that runs throughout my study. It is a serious point that defines my approach. 
For  Kropotkin’s  literalism  –  his  attempts  to  flip,  twist,  reverse,  and  invert  ideas 
towards the service of his politics – is not limited to his use of scientific thought. I 
draw attention to a number of ways that he altered political concepts. In biologising 
notions of sovereignty, human nature, and political instability from a non-anarchist 
tradition  of  European  political  philosophy,  Kropotkin  was  trying  to  make  real  the 
abstract  and  metaphorical.  Paradoxically,  the  scientisation  of  politics  (including 
anarchism), though having the effect of ‘grounding’ his ideas in the material world, 
gave  his  thought  a  particular  fluidity  and  transience.  He  was  able  to  make  new 
connections between ideas and provide new interpretations of political concepts.  
I take a keen interest in Kropotkin’s use of binaries. His writing often revolves 
around  two  (though  not  always  explicitly  stated  as  such)  antagonistic  oppositions. 
These  stand-offs  do  not  necessarily  lead  to  a  ‘synthesis’;  a  balance  is  found  or, 
alternatively, one side gains supremacy over the other. I read Kropotkin’s binaries as 
indicators of the intensity with which science interacted with his political ideas. For on 
the  one  hand,  his  thought  is  indicative  of  the  anarchist  tendency  to  bring  into 
opposition the desirable and the undesirable. On the other hand, however, Kropotkin 
employs medical binary oppositions in his thought. I seek to convey how anarchist 
oppositions, for example between society/state, remained important for Kropotkin, but 
that they took on qualitatively different aspects as they were superimposed onto new 
scientific dichotomies. The popular scientific binaries we find in Kropotkin’s thought 
–  healthy/sick,  regular/defective,  normal/pathological  –  still  represented  what 
Kropotkin  believed  to  be  politically  desirable  and  undesirable.  Moreover,  they 
continued to relate to the traditional anarchist tension between society and state. They 
also signify, however, the forms of knowledge through which Kropotkin interpreted 
anarchist politics, the ways in which he understood the threat of the state and the 
goodness  of  society,  and  the  scientific  character  of  corruption  that  occurs  at  their 
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I search for patterns in Kropotkin’s thought as it is expressed throughout his 
life’s work. I find some important consistencies that help us understand his political 
ideas: a biological conception of state power, of the threat of capitalism, and of the 
purpose  of  revolution;  a  statistical  conception  of  society  and  social  law;  and  an 
ambition  to  rationally  alter  the  social  realm  through  the  application  of  scientific 
knowledge  and  practices.  However,  Kropotkin  was  by  no  means  a  neat  and  tidy 
thinker (though I think he would have liked to have been thought of in this way). This 
is particularly evident in his attempt to base anarchism on science. One can notice 
similar scientific tropes being employed towards a critique of the state in one place, 
and used to support a theory of revolution in another. Nineteenth-century psychiatry’s 
reworking of the passions, for example, is found in Kropotkin’s pessimistic discussion 
of prisons as well as in his optimistic portrayal of the revolutionary power of crowds. I 
do not ignore these inconsistencies simply because they fail to add up to a coherent 
and watertight whole. They were part of his thought and part of what makes him such 
an  intriguing  thinker  to  study.  While  I  offer  explanations  for  Kropotkin’s 
contradictions,  I  do  not  become  slave  to  the  ambition  of  solving  them.  Indeed, 
Kropotkin’s  ambivalence  is  a  major  theme  of  this  study.  His  ambivalence  is  a 
consequence, I believe, of his vast absorption of scientific thought. It is evident in the 
tension between the pessimism of his diagnoses and the optimism of his remedies, in 
his  simultaneous  quest  for  freedom  and  order,  and  even  in  his  conception  of  the 
universe  and  reality  more  generally.  Kropotkin’s  uncertainties,  insecurities,  and 
ambiguities will not be hidden by this study, but illuminated. 
 
This thesis is split into two parts, a framework that I believe is most conducive to 
revealing  the  interplay  between  the  anarchistic  and  scientific  dimensions  of 
Kropotkin’s  thought.  Part  one  examines  Kropotkin’s  epistemological  and 
methodological worldview. I unpack a number of key instruments from Kropotkin’s 
conceptual toolkit, exploring the scientific theories, categories, and ideas on which he 
relied to understand and explain natural and social reality. This section is not directly 
concerned with Kropotkin’s anarchism, but with the forms of knowledge, systems of 
thought, and methodological techniques that allowed him to gain access to, interact 
with, talk about, and see the world that his political ideas sought to affect. Part two 
analyses Kropotkin’s anarchist politics in light of the scientific ideas and technologies 
outlined in part one. It displays the nature of his political diagnoses and remedies. Part 	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two is focused, therefore, on the moments of intersection between the two contexts of 
anarchism  and  science,  pointing  out  when  Kropotkin’s  underlying  scientific 
assumptions modified key strands of anarchist political theory, and when anarchist 
political  ideas,  in  turn,  modified  science.  Thus,  part  one  and  part  two  provide  a 
dialogue  between  knowledge  and  politics.  The  arrangement  of  this  thesis,  then,  is 
designed not only to lay bare what Kropotkin described as ‘a basis for [anarchism’s] 
principles in the natural sciences of the time’, but to understand the effects of that 
epistemological base on the political structure itself.
48 This allows my study to mark 
out a new route through Kropotkin’s political ideas which has until now remained 
untrodden  –  a  pathway  that  provides  new  perspectives  from  which  to  survey  the 
landscape of Kropotkin’s anarchism.   
Chapter one explores forms of knowledge to which Kropotkin looked for truth 
about political phenomena. It outlines his bio-political perspective of societies and 
individuals.  I  argue  that  the  main  concern  for  Kropotkin  within  this  bio-political 
framework was social and individual health. A Lamarckian perspective of biological 
metamorphosis was central to the ways he thought about human health. It allowed him 
to look to environments for explanations of health and sickness, to read in human 
bodies the effects of socio-economic and political surroundings. The chapter discusses 
how Kropotkin’s absorption of Lamarckism stimulated the pessimistic realisation that 
evolution was not normatively progressive. It ushered in the possibility for regression 
and  degeneration.  I  claim  that  Kropotkin  assumed  the  reality  of  biological  decline 
within  species  and  individual  organisms.  An  area  of  life  where  Kropotkin  located 
degeneracy  was  morality.  Criminal  psychiatry  provided  him  with  medical 
interpretations of moral health and sickness, a scientific understanding of deviance that 
no longer relied on notions of sin and evil, but on theories of madness, insanity, and 
mental pathology. 
Forms of knowledge are dependent on methodological practices that grant them 
access to reality. Chapter two exposes which of these practices Kropotkin employed to 
reach out and touch the world. I analyse the measuring and counting skills he learned 
in his youth and I argue that they later proved indispensible to his political attempts to 
quantify social space and populations. His anarchist claim to know and understand the 
life  of  the  peasantry,  for  example,  relied  on  vast  amounts  of  classified  statistical 
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evidence. Similarly, he shared the assumption of criminologists and psychiatrists that 
patterns of behavioural and psychological deviance could be ‘lifted out’ of the data of 
social statistics. The act of reading information ‘off’ statistics was akin to making 
large-scale, abstract processes visible to political sight. The ability to visualise society 
was central to Kropotkin’s approach to populations. Finally, I explain the character of 
social  laws  Kropotkin  believed  could  be  uncovered  by  statistics.  These  were  not 
deterministic  laws  of  human  nature,  but  laws  of  chance  and  probability  that 
empowered  politics.  If  social  laws  were  conditional  and  dependent  on  a  range  of 
factors, then, like a scientific experiment, politics could alter the variables within the 
social milieu and improve the state of society and the human condition. 
Chapter three looks at the implications of the meeting of scientific knowledge 
and statistical measurement for Kropotkin’s conception of society. I explain his view 
of society as a reified entity, an object with measurable qualities that could be known 
and made sense of scientifically. Moreover, I contend that Kropotkin conceived of 
politics as a practice that could intervene into society in order to alter and improve its 
biological condition. This chapter claims that one of the responsibilities Kropotkin 
demanded of science was to tame nature. I discuss this idea through the metaphor of 
gardening  (the  artificial  creation  and  maintenance  of  a  natural  environment)  and 
suggest that Kropotkin thought of politics’ relation to society in these terms. I explain 
this with reference to Foucault’s idea of the ‘art of government’: a political practice 
designed to govern human life not by political laws and legislation, but through the 
tactical management and arrangement of the conditions in which life plays out.  
Chapter four deconstructs Kropotkin’s critique of the state. I argue that his 
brand of anarchism developed a biological understanding of the state’s threat to society 
and the individual. I explore his writings on state punishment to illustrate this point. Of 
particular interest is the manner in which Kropotkin redefines the notion of state power 
in  anarchist  thought,  shifting  the  emphasis  from  infliction  to  infection.  I  cite  and 
analyse  examples  where  Kropotkin  identifies  and  tracks  the  epidemiological  and 
transmissible threat of the state with the technology of statistics. As part of his broader 
bio-political critique, Kropotkin was also fearful of the psychological threat of the 
state.  It  could  cause  insanity  and  generate  moral  contagion.  Crime  was  seen  as  a 
symptom of this negative psychological impact. With recourse to criminological ideas, 
Kropotkin medicalised the anarchist idea of moral corruption and displacement. Last, I 
consider how Kropotkin fed the idea of the state’s psychological threat into his reading 	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of the battlefield. Unlike other anarchists who were concerned with the loss of liberty 
or physical destruction, the thrust of Kropotkin’s critique comes from his belief that 
the state turns soldiers mad, inducing in human beings a degenerate regression.  
Kropotkin’s bio-political theory of state power is carried over into his critique 
of  capitalism.  I  explore  this  critique  in  chapter  five.  First,  I  examine  Kropotkin’s 
analysis of capitalist environments and argue that what registered most for him was not 
exploitation, but the biological harm caused to workers. Kropotkin’s writings about 
factories modify anarchist critiques of machinery and drudgery. While these aspects of 
capitalist production remained important for him, the most condemnable feature of the 
workshop was the weakening of human health. I argue that Kropotkin’s understanding 
of the values of capitalism was medical. He equated greed and avarice with psychiatric 
illness.  The  capitalist  class  –  the  bourgeoisie  –  also  came  under  attack  from  a 
biological  angle.  Here,  Kropotkin  reversed  the  charge  of  degeneracy  ascribed  to 
certain social groups in society by conservative scientists and social commentators. 
Instead of using themes of moral depravity, monstrousness, and biological sickness to 
condemn alcoholics, criminals, the insane, or anarchists, Kropotkin used these images 
to target the middle classes.  
Chapter  six  presents  Kropotkin’s  revolutionary  responses  to  the  state  and 
capitalism  as  medical  solutions  to  bio-political  danger.  I  explain  how  Kropotkin 
politicised science and radicalised medicine: he turned a medicalised concept of the 
will into a weapon of political resistance and drew on themes from crowd psychology 
when expressing his idea of ‘the spirit of revolt’. I argue that Kropotkin understood the 
main purpose of anarchist revolution to be biological regeneration. The removal of the 
state and capitalism was thought of as a hygienic response to the threat of sickness: the 
revolution would neutralise the possibilities of disease by eradicating its political and 
economic causes. The chapter then looks at Kropotkin’s projections for the state of 
anarchy that would follow revolution. I argue that his conception of a desirable future 
relied  on  ideas  and  methods  from  the  scientific  contexts  outlined  in  part  one.  For 
example, the typical anarchist argument that anarchy will bring order, not disorder, to 
the  world  was  transformed  by  Kropotkin’s  statistical  enthusiasm.  The  statistical 
mapping of social space, provisions, and people would bring order to the revolutionary 
process  and  the  post-revolutionary  context.  The  anarchist  vision  of  knowledge 
dissemination took on a different form in Kropotkin’s thought. I point out that he did 	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not simply call for the general levelling of science, but for the wide popularisation of 
specific sciences of deviance.  
I conclude by reflecting on other ways in which science affected Kropotkin’s 
thought.  I  explore  how  the  absorption  of  science  provoked  oscillations  between 
pessimism and optimism, despair and hope, decline and progress. The application of 
biomedical knowledge to anarchist politics produced tensions between degeneration 
and  regeneration,  sickness  and  health,  the  fear  of  death  and  the  promise  of  life.  I 
highlight  contrasting  images  of  surface  and  façade,  of  light  and  darkness.  My 
conclusion ends with a discussion of an ambivalence experienced by human beings 
living  in  a  scientific  world,  an  ambivalence  maximised  by  Kropotkin’s  anarchist 
project. He was aware that science simultaneously lowers and raises human beings, 
ascribing  to  them  the  status  of  material  creatures  while  empowering  them  as  the 
masters  of  nature.  In  Kropotkin’s  political  thought,  this  contradiction  had  serious 
implications for the place of power and the possibility of freedom. I suggest that his 
scientific thinking gave birth to an anarchism which made humanity both master and 
subject of its own knowledge. 	 ﾠ 33	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Part One 
 
Scientific Thought, Statistics, and the Social 	 ﾠ 34	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1 Forms of Knowledge  
 
The strength of anarchy lies precisely in that it understands all human faculties and all 
passions, and ignores none.
49 
 
Petr Kropotkin, The Conquest of Bread (1892). 
 
 
Kropotkin  was  born  into  an  age  where  the  scientific  study  of  human  beings  was 
widespread and intense. During the course of the nineteenth century, scientific forms 
of knowledge came to scrutinise people and societies as empirical entities. In 1888, 
evolutionary biologist George John Romanes (1848-1894)
50 expressed the commonly 
held belief that by studying human beings scientifically humanity could come to know 
itself as part of the natural world: 
 
After  centuries  of  intellectual  conquest  in  all  regions  of  the  phenomenal 
universe, man has at last begun to find that he may apply in a new and most 
unexpected manner the adage of antiquity – Know thyself. For he has begun to 
perceive a strong probability, if not an actual certainty, that his own living 
nature is identical in kind with the nature of all other life.
51 
 
Ramones identified a new quality to science. As well as looking outward to explain the 
world  in  which  we  live,  it  should  also  peer  inward  to  study  ourselves.  A  great 
possibility  appeared  to  open  up  before  humanity  in  the  nineteenth  century  –  the 
possibility to ‘know thyself’ scientifically. 
A  wide  range  of  scientific  ideas  appeared  that  produced  knowledge  of 
humanity  from  a  variety  of  viewpoints.  By  the  time  Kropotkin  became  an  adult, 
biological explanations for the origins and processes of life had emerged, studies of 
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society were claiming the discovery of social laws and beginning to provide answers 
for the character of social life, and human thought, emotion, feeling, and even morality 
had become subject to the illuminating gaze of psychology. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Kropotkin surveyed the development and 
consequences  of  nineteenth-century  scientific  thought  in  Modern  Science  and 
Anarchism. He argued that such dramatic changes to the ways and means with which 
people thought about themselves and the world they inhabited represented nothing less 
than a profound revolution in knowledge: 
 
The  sudden  appearance  of  this  wonderful  constellation  [of  knowledge] 
produced  a  complete  revolution  in  the  fundamental  conception  of  science. 
Science  immediately  ventured  into  new  paths.  Whole  branches  of  learning 
were created with prodigious rapidity. The science of life (biology), that of 
human institutions (anthropology and ethnology), that of understanding, will 
and passions (physical psychology) […], soon grew up under our very eyes, 
striking the mind by the boldness of their generalisations and the revolutionary 
spirit of their conclusions. What were mere general guesses in the eighteenth 
century  now  became  facts,  proved  by  the  scales  and  the  microscope,  and 
verified by thousands of observations and experiments.
52 
 
Kropotkin lived in this new atmosphere of epistemological possibility described in 
Modern Science and Anarchism. This was a world that dealt in the measurements of 
‘man’  and  the  empirically  verifiable  facts  of  life.  Later  he  reflected  that  such 
possibilities had been unique to the time in which he had lived and ‘could not be 
dreamt of in antiquity, or in the Middle Ages, or even in the early portion of the 
nineteenth  century’.
53 Kropotkin  felt  keenly  that  his  age  was  on  the  threshold  of 
establishing an understanding of human existence unrivalled by earlier generations; 
people  were  becoming  knowable,  their  consciousness  penetrable,  their  morality 
explainable, and their societies intelligible. In this chapter I am going to explore this 
context  of  nineteenth-century  scientific  thought.  I  will  analyse  four  key  forms  of 
knowledge and argue that epistemologically they were central to Kropotkin’s thought. 
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Bio-politics 
 
At the beginning of his thirty-year stay in Britain, Kropotkin immediately set out to 
show  his  new,  British  audience  which  forms  of  nineteenth-century  scientific 
knowledge would support his political ideas. He chose the article ‘The Scientific Basis 
of Anarchy’ (1887) as the vehicle for this exposition. Kropotkin’s initial concern lay 
with explaining anarchism’s hybrid character: a political philosophy combining the 
emerging nineteenth-century tendencies of anti-statism and anti-capitalist, working-
class-centric  socialism.  After  describing  how  anarchism  merges  both  tendencies, 
recognising ‘the dangers of a centralized government’
54 as well as the ‘chasm between 
the modern millionaire […] and the pauper’,
55 he moved on to a presentation of the 
core components of its worldview. In contrast to the ‘metaphysical conceptions’ of the 
utopian  state-socialists,
56 these  were  based  on  scientific  truths.  The  conception  of 
anarchism’s  fundamental  outlook  was  a  scientific  approach  to  human  existence. 
Kropotkin declared that anarchism stood apart from other schools of political thought 
by being in accordance with evolution’s method of ‘studying human society from the 
biological point of view’.
57 In this revealing article, Kropotkin wanted to show that the 
basis of his political project was biological. His first meaningful act as an anarchist in 
British intellectual society was to place the body at the centre of politics.  
Before the nineteenth century the body had long been part of the language of 
politics. The individual human body was often used as a template for political design. 
The ‘body politic’ establishes a corporeal form for politics that represents and at the 
same  time  comprises  political  relations,  structures,  and  functions.
58 One  thinks  of 
French Artist Abraham Bosse’s (c. 1602-1676) famous engraving for Thomas Hobbes’ 
(1588-1679) Leviathan (1651) in which atomised individuals are absorbed together to 
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form a colossal, supra-personal political being. In her study of corporeal metaphors in 
late eighteenth-century France, Antoine de Baecque describes this image as the best 
illustration of the ‘royalist body’.
59 Hobbes’ corresponding literary description of the 
political body is given on the opening page of his book: 
 
That great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE […] is but 
an Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for 
whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the Soveraignty is 
an  Artificiall  Soul,  as  giving  life  and  motion  to  the  whole  body;  The 
Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution, artificiall Joynts; 
Reward and Punishment […] are the Nerves, that do the same in the Body 
Naturall; The Wealth and Riches of all the particular members, are the Strength 
[…];  Counsellors, by whom all things needfull for it to know, are suggested 
unto  it,  are  the  Memory;  Equity  and  Lawes,  an  artificiall  Reason  and  Will; 
Concord, Health; Sedition, Sickness; and Civil war, Death.
60  
 
Michel Foucault explains the role of the body in Leviathan as a ‘juridico-political 
metaphor’.
61 It acts as an image by which to represent the purposes of the political 
state’s different parts and how they relate to one another through their operation. Yet, 
the body politic does more than describe the functionality of the state. In Hobbes’ case, 
the body image conveys the unity necessary for the success of his idea of the civil state 
and the contractual binding it demands of its authors. Moreover, in its mortality, the 
body suggests the finiteness of the political, that is, the very real possibility of its 
dissolution.  
Over  a  century  later,  Jean-Jacques  Rousseau  (1712-1778)  employed  the 
juridico-political metaphor of the body politic in The Social Contract (1762): 
 
The principle of political life resides in the Sovereign authority. The legislative 
power is the heart of the state, the executive power is its brain, which gives 
movement to all the parts. The brain may become paralyzed and the individual 
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still live. A man can remain an imbecile and still live: but as soon as the heart 
has stopped to function, the animal is dead.
62 
 
The metaphor of the body politic performs similar roles for both thinkers. It enables 
them,  for  example,  to  articulate  their  key  political  belief  about  the  primacy  of 
sovereign power: the sovereign bestows life on the state and, without it, the political 
existence  of  human  beings  disappears.  A  more  general  overlap  between  the  two 
thinkers’ portrayal of the body politic, however, is that the ‘body natural’, as Hobbes 
puts it, serves to represent the artificial body of the political state. The health of the 
state points not to the prolongation of life as it does in the natural body, but to the 
perpetuation of an artifice. The sickness and possible death of the state are not akin to 
processes in the human body but, conversely, signify the disintegration of the political 
and a worrying, anti-political return to the natural.  
The declaration in ‘The Scientific Basis of Anarchy’ that anarchism studies 
society from a biological perspective could be mistaken as an example of Kropotkin 
using the juridico-political metaphor of the body politic in his late nineteenth-century 
political philosophy. But Kropotkin was not referring to the artifice of politics. With 
what  he  retrospectively  described  as  the  ‘rapid  development  of  biology’  in  the 
nineteenth  century,  the  idea  of  the  body  in  Western  political  thought  underwent  a 
profound transformation that manifested itself in his political project.
63 The adjective 
and the noun of the body politic replaced one another. The imagery of the body politic, 
depicting a body of a political nature, gave way to the reality of a politic of a bodily or 
biological nature.  
Kropotkin was less concerned with explaining the sovereign, legislative, and 
executive power of political systems through metaphors of the body politic, than with 
the biological nature of society. He understood civil societies not as artificial structures 
bound  together  to  provide  human  beings  with  political  security,  but  as  biological 
entities, as populations constituted by living organisms. Kropotkin made it clear that 
his engagement with the political employed a method suitable for the purpose: ‘a new 
[biological] method of investigation for the better understanding of […] the life and 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
62 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, ed. by Victor 
Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 109. On Rousseau’s political thought, 
see Timothy W. Luke, ‘On Nature and Society: Rousseau versus the Enlightenment’, History of 
Political Thought, 2, 5 (1984), 211-43; Francis Moran, ‘Between Primates and Primitives: Natural Man 
as the Missing Link in Rousseau’s Second Discourse’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 1, 54 (1993), 37-
58. 
63 Kropotkin, Ethics, p. 1. 	 ﾠ 39	 ﾠ
evolution  of  societies’.
64 The  idea  that  political  states  and  human  societies  did  not 
represent the body natural but were, in reality, biological phenomena underpinned his 
life’s  work.  He  framed  his  political  ideas  within  an  ontology  that  saw  ‘all  the 
agglomerations of matter in the universe […] as something living’.
65 
To use again the words of Foucault, who traces the shifting place of the body in 
Western political thought from the juridico-political body politic to the organic social 
body: when Kropotkin conceived of society, he saw a ‘biological reality’.
66 With his 
respect  for  evolutionary  theory’s  assignment  to  man  of  its  status  as  a  species, 
Kropotkin’s view of political populations concerned itself with an evolving, adapting, 
mutating living mass. He argued that biological science from 1856 to 1862, especially 
Darwin’s  On  the  Origin  of  Species  (1859),  had  brought  about  ‘so  complete  a 
revolution in all our ways of looking at Nature, at life in general, and at the life of 
human societies that no similar revolution has ever taken place in the whole history of 
science  in  the  last  twenty  centuries  [my  emphasis]’.
67 Pinpointed  historically  by 
Kropotkin as a distinct feature of the post-Darwinian world, and proudly adopted as 
the starting point for his own political thought, this new way of looking at human 
societies that arose in the nineteenth century was bio-political. He recognised the far-
reaching  implications  of  the  theory  of  evolution  for  political  thought.  Its  impact 
extended beyond understandings of the animal world and completely transformed how 
politics perceived the social life of humans. The political co-existence of people was 
no longer about structures, but about living beings. 
Alongside  the  political  vision  of  the  social  body,  Kropotkin’s  underlying 
biological assumptions about politics were indicative of new ways of thinking about 
the individual living in political societies. As John Marks discusses, the growth of 
biology in the nineteenth century provoked redefinitions of the idea of political ‘man’ 
and the citizen. Marks describes how ‘the legal subject [was] overlaid with the crucial 
figure of the “living being” and the fact of existing as a living being in a particular 
environment  began  to  register  as  a  political  preoccupation’.
68 For  Kropotkin,  an 
individual’s political existence represented a biological fact. He considered ‘society as 
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an aggregation of organisms’,
69 with each ‘human being […] a compound of nervous 
and cerebral centers’.
70 He thought about the individual as a biological complex. ‘Each 
individual is a cosmos of organs, each organ is a cosmos of cells, each cell a cosmos of 
infinitely smaller ones’.
71 Kropotkin’s individuals are ‘overlaid’, as Marks says in the 
above quotation, with the identity of organisms whose bodies are the main concern of 
his political thought.
72  
The  empirical,  living  reality  of  individuals  also  registered  for  Kropotkin’s 
contemporaries as a political preoccupation. Russian Populist Nikolai Mikhailovskii 
(1842-1904),  for  example,  viewed  the  project  to  transform  the  socio-economic 
landscape of late Imperial Russia through the lens of the individual’s body. In 1869, he 
centred his criticism of Herbert Spencer’s (1820-1903) view of social progress on the 
disproportionate physiological development it would cause in the individual organism 
inhabiting such a political setting: 
 
[Spencer’s] society has taken a step from homogeneity toward heterogeneity, 
but  the  individuals  who  make  it  up  have  moved,  on  the  contrary,  from 
heterogeneity to homogeneity. With some, the muscular system has begun to 
develop at the expense of the nervous system, and with others, vice versa.
73 
 
Mikhailovskii’s  theory  of  a  homogenous  social  organism,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
designed to have the opposite effect on its constituent members, enabling them to live 
with their ‘whole [biological] being’.
74 He conceived of political progress biologically, 
as the ‘fullest possible and the most diversified division of labor among man’s organs 
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and the least possible division of labor among men’.
75 Though sharing a number of 
political aspirations, Kropotkin’s affinity with Russian Populist thinkers existed on a 
more general level where the success of socio-economic and political transformation 
could be measured in the body of the human being. 
Kropotkin’s political thought is a lucid example of how life became the object 
of  politics  in  the  nineteenth  century.  Owing  to  this  development  and  the  fact  that 
politics seemed to deal exclusively in the natural, he based his methodology on that of 
the natural sciences: 
 
As  man  is  a  part  of  Nature,  as  his  personal  and  social  life  is  a  natural 
phenomenon, just as the growth of a flower, or the evolution of life in societies 
of ants or bees – there is no reason why we should, when we pass from the 
flower  to  man,  or  from  a  village  of  beavers  to  a  human  city,  abandon  the 
method which till then has been so useful.
76 
 
Kropotkin was adamant that no method other than the empirical method of the natural 
sciences was suitable for a politics that engaged with the biological.  
Within  this  bio-political  framework,  the  main  concern  for  Kropotkin  as  he 
apprehended human societies and their individual constituents was health. He believed 
that the final goal of politics was the improvement of the health of the individual and 
social  body.  Through  his  address  to  the  British  public  in  ‘The  Scientific  Basis  of 
Anarchy’, he confirmed that anarchism’s concern was ‘for the welfare of the [human] 
species’.
77 Later, in The Conquest of Bread, Kropotkin implied that the purpose of 
politics is to provide welfare to human populations. He understood this concept in 
biological  terms.  The  political  problem  on  which  the  book  seeks  to  act  is  that  of 
providing ‘everyone […] before everything, the right to live’.
78 The book’s designs 
and  plans  for  social  reconstruction  are  directed  towards  improving  the  health  of 
communities. Although a biological concern, there is a sense of dignity acquired from 
healthy living. Kropotkin compared the ‘right to live’ to the ‘the right to work’, which 
he believed had misled the people during the 1848 European revolutions. By contrast, 
his  biological  conception  of  the  political  mission  aimed  to  meet  the  real  needs  of 
people: the needs of the organism. He saw politics as a device ‘to satisfy all wants, to 
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meet all needs […] to ensure to society as a whole its life’.
79 Rather than wealth, 
politics for Kropotkin was primarily about health.  
The principle aspiration of politics to improve social health and administer life 
was  far  from  unique  to  Kropotkin.  His  work  reflects  a  more  general  development 
taking  place  across  the  nineteenth-century  Western  political  landscape  whereby 
government officials, politicians, and scientists came to view healthy societies as the 
final end of the political process. As I alluded to in the introduction to this thesis, 
Chadwick’s classic study on Britain’s sanitary condition was indicative of this new 
way  of  thinking  about  populations  of  political  territories  that  emerged  during 
Kropotkin’s lifetime. Chadwick’s study was a biological assessment of a human mass, 
finding political significance in its health, sicknesses, and in the communication of 
disease. Nineteenth-century planning projects of some of Europe’s major cities were in 
many  ways  medical  reactions  to  pathogenic  environments.  Physician  and 
epidemiologist John Snow (1813-1858) and engineer Joseph Bazalgette (1819-1891) 
played crucial roles in official responses to the Soho cholera outbreak (1854) and the 
Great Stink of London (1858). Their scientific knowledge was critical to the political 
task of improving the health of the capital’s inhabitants through fundamental changes 
to  its  water  and  waste  systems.
80 In  France,  one  of  the  political  demands  Louis 
Napoléon Bonaparte (1808-1873) placed on Georges-Eugène Haussmann (1809-1891) 
and his project to ‘renovate’ Paris between 1850 and 1870 was to clean and purify the 
urban  space  with  new  sewers  and  aqueducts.
81 Cleansing  social  environments  and 
improving health became part of a modern state’s political responsibility.  
Foucault shows that it was in the nineteenth century when phenomena such as 
‘health,  sanitation,  birth-rate,  longevity  [and]  race’  became  political  problems  for 
European  states,  occupying  an  ‘expanding  place’  among  their  political 
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responsibilities.
82 Politics no longer dealt simply ‘with legal subjects over whom the 
ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings […] and would have to be applied 
at the level of life itself’.
83 This represented a significant change to the task of politics 
that  shifted  its  attention  away  from  traditional  notions  of  sovereignty  and  military 
might towards a biological conception of collective welfare. James C. Scott describes 
this development: 
 
This new conception […] represented a fundamental transformation. Before 
then, the state’s role had been largely confined to those that contributed to the 
wealth  and  power  of  the  sovereign  […].  The  idea  that  one  of  the  central 
purposes of the state was the improvement of all the members of society […] 
was quite novel. [Although] a state that improved its population’s skills, vigor, 
civic  morals,  and  work  habits  would  increase  its  tax  base  and  field  better 
armies  […],  in  the  nineteenth  century,  the  welfare  of  the  population  came 
increasingly to be seen, not merely as a means to national strength, but as an 
end in itself.
84 
 
Kropotkin shared these broad bio-political aspirations of nineteenth-century politics. 
He explained that the population’s right to live does not simply grant the possibility of 
a  society  becoming  more  efficient  or  more  powerful;  the  right  to  live  ‘means  the 
possibility of living like human beings’.
85 As was the case for the states of Europe in 
the nineteenth century, the health of populations for Kropotkin was an end in itself. 
In order for bio-politics to be effective it had to enlist the curative powers of 
medicine. Because politics was a matter of life, it was common for political thinkers to 
call on the medical expertise of doctors, physicians, and other medical professionals 
when developing their theories of how human beings could and should live. In ‘The 
Connection of the Biological Sciences with Medicine’ (1881), for example, Huxley 
argued that the goal of politics to improve and maintain the health of living political 
subjects required the expertise of medical knowledge. ‘“Medicine” not merely denotes 
a kind of knowledge’, he claimed, ‘but it comprehends the various applications of that 
knowledge  to  the  alleviation  of  the  sufferings,  the  repair  of  the  injuries,  and  the 
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conservation  of  the  health,  of  living  beings’.
86 For  some  later  nineteenth-century 
Russian thinkers, medicine had the same applicable, bio-political qualities identified 
by Huxley. During the 1860s, a new generation of radical political thinkers in Russia 
sought  to  apply  the  rational  science  of  medicine  to  the  social  problems  of  a 
modernising empire. In the changing cultural and social atmosphere of what Susan 
Morrissey describes as Russia’s ‘new world’, where ‘science and openness became 
catchwords  of  the  era’,
87 men  such  as  Nikolai  Chernyshevskii  (1828-1889),  Ivan 
Turgenev (1818-1883), and Dmitrii Pisarev (1840-1868) lauded the political power of 
medicine to cure the social body of disease in their literary, political, and philosophical 
writing.  
Later,  as  Kropotkin  began  to  write  extensively  for  Le  Révolté,  he  often 
advocated a similar connection between medicine and politics that had inspired his 
compatriots during the 1860s. In ‘To the Young’, he argued that any political approach 
to the individual and to human populations required the authority of biological science 
if they were to stay healthy: ‘Take a look at what science has done to elaborate the 
rational foundations of physical and moral hygiene. It tells you how we must live to 
preserve  our  bodily  health,  how  we  can  maintain  in  good  condition  our  human 
collectivities’.
88 Kropotkin thought about politics as the application of expert medical 
knowledge  to  biologically  conceived  social  problems.  He  believed  that  biomedical 
science  should  not  merely  make  suggestions  about  how  individuals  and  societies 
should live; but that it should dictate to politics, that is, ‘tell’ human beings how to 
organise their affairs. The implications for Kropotkin’s anarchist political ideas of this 
scientific imperative will be explored in part two of this thesis, when I examine how 
his conception of medicine’s political utility interacted with his critique of the status-
quo and the task of its modification. 
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Evolutionism 
 
As  I  have  shown,  ‘The  Scientific  Basis  of  Anarchy’  presented  the  bio-political 
perspective  of  Kropotkin’s  anarchism.  His  description  also  involved  showing  that 
politics was a practice that dealt with living beings whose individual bodies and social 
existence  were  liable  to  metamorphosis.  From  this  political  outlook,  the  anarchist 
‘follows […] the course traced by the modern philosophy of evolution’.
89 Politics was 
concerned with an idea of humanity’s natural biological state and which features of 
that state cause changes to occur in the individual and the species over time. Kropotkin 
insisted that the anarchist ‘studies human society as it is now and was in the past, 
[trying]  to  discover  its  tendencies,  past  and  present’.
90 Kropotkin’s  bio-political 
approach required an appreciation of what is natural in man alongside an explanation 
for the transformations that may occur in his constitution. 
Political thought has often endowed humanity’s relation to nature with political 
significance.
91 Political  thinkers  developed  ideas  about  the  natural  state  of  human 
existence and how, from this original state, it has developed. The seventeenth century 
is host to two of the most well known relationships established between natural and 
political  man.  In  Two  Treatises  of  Government  (1689),  John  Locke  (1632-1704) 
argued that in order to ascertain how man developed into a political being his natural 
condition must first be laid bare: ‘To understand Political Power right, and derive from 
it its Original, we must consider what State all Men are naturally in’.
92 Earlier in the 
century Hobbes envisaged a nightmarish original state of man:  
 
Where there is no [political] power […men…] are in that condition which is 
called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man […]. 
Whatsoever is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to 
every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other 
security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish 
them withall. In such a condition […] the life of man [is] solitary, poore, nasty, 
brutish, and short.
93 
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Hobbes’ conception of humanity’s state of nature was the driving force behind its 
development as a political being. Although man made, the commonwealth owed its 
existence to the fundamental character of our nature. The raison d’être of politics was 
to  eradicate  the  uncertainty  plaguing  the  natural  life  of  men  and  rid  them  of  the 
constant  fear  of  death.  This  process  of  change  in  human  life,  from  a  lawless, 
uncivilised existence to a political, civilised state, was a product of Hobbes’ axiomatic 
view of ‘original man’: our nature propels our transformation.  
At the turn of the twentieth century, Kropotkin set out in Mutual Aid: A Factor 
of Evolution (1902) those features of humanity’s natural state he believed were behind 
its metamorphosis. By this time a new element had been injected into the discussion: 
evolutionary  science.  As  he  wrote  in  the  chapter  entitled  ‘Mutual  Aid  Among 
Savages’, ‘science has made some progress since Hobbes’s time, and […] we have 
safer  ground  to  stand  upon  than  [his]  speculations’.
94 This  safer  ground  was 
represented by the recently developed knowledge of humanity’s biological evolution 
as a species. Kropotkin believed this knowledge had given a new, rigorous means of 
investigation  to  the  study  of  life  so  distinct  in  its  empirical  prowess  to  Hobbes’ 
speculative mind. Hobbes’ largely hypothetical state of nature was replaced by expert 
knowledge emanating from ‘zoology and palaeo-ethnology’ which was uncovering the 
‘unmistakable  traces  of  [humanity’s]  previous  existence’.
95 Evolutionary  science 
offered to political philosophy fresh, verifiable theories of humanity’s original state of 
nature  within  which  it  supposed  to  find  the  factors  impelling  our  individual  and 
collective transformation. Ideas about ‘civilised man’s’ origins, the character of his 
natural  existence,  and  the  triggers  of  his  modification  posed  questions  which  now 
looked to evidence accumulated from empirical science.  
As Kropotkin entered into late nineteenth-century evolutionary discussions, the 
political idea of a state of nature, which had concerned Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau 
in  previous  centuries,  had  become  scientised.  His  ideas  about  the  biological 
metamorphosis  of  individuals  and  societies  were  formed  in  an  atmosphere  where 
Hobbes’ vision of humanity’s anarchic, lawless, and dangerous natural condition was 
being  expressed  as  a  posited  empirical  reality  driving  society’s  mutation.  Popular 
images and metaphors of natural man – Spencer’s ‘survival of the fittest’, Darwin’s 
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‘struggle for existence’, Huxley’s ‘gladiator’s show’
96 – were offered as the products 
of scientific research. 
It is well documented that although Kropotkin’s ideas about the natural state of 
humanity were developed within this climate of late Victorian evolutionary discussion, 
he rejected the notion that intraspecific struggle was the dominant factor of human 
evolution.
97 One explanation for this difference is that Kropotkin’s ideas were formed 
in  the  different  national,  cultural,  and  geographical  environment  of  the  Russian 
Empire. Daniel P. Todes explores how Darwinism was received in Russia.
98 He shows 
that although scientists and radicals in the 1860s and 1870s were generally enthusiastic 
about  the  scientific  quality  of  Darwinism,  they  tended  to  reject  Darwin’s 
Malthusianism and his emphasis on intraspecific struggle in favour of interspecific 
struggle and intraspecific cooperation.
 99 According to Todes, before Huxley’s ‘The 
Struggle  for  Existence  in  Human  Society’  (1888)  had  appeared,  Kropotkin’s 
experiences in Siberia in the 1860s had already led to his opinion about humanity’s 
natural state that was common to the Russian context. Kropotkin’s Siberian travels 
between 1862 and 1867 differed greatly from those of Darwin in the 1830s. In the 
Siberian wilderness he saw no sign of struggle within species, but cooperation. He did 
not  witness  the  overcrowding  Darwin  had  seen  in  the  tropics,  but  saw  only  the 
sparseness of nature.
100 
A second interpretation holds that while Kropotkin’s ideas on evolution may 
have taken shape during his formative experiences in Siberia, the theory of mutual aid 
was part of a broader political response to what he saw as the decline of revolutionary 
anarchism. Kinna shows that although Kropotkin made contributions to evolutionary 
theory, his purpose in turning to biology in the 1890s was to challenge the ascendency 
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of Marxism and anarchism’s growing obsession with individualism.
101 As part of a 
defensive  but  also  revitalising  political  project,  Kropotkin’s  evolutionism  was  not 
simply a scientific idea, but a response to particular political challenges. 
  Kinna brings to light the fact that Kropotkin’s ideas on evolution opened up 
political  possibilities  for  anarchist  thought.  Although  Todes  provides  important 
insights  into  the  influence  of  the  Russian  context,  as  well  as  analysing  Petr’s 
correspondence with his bother, Aleksandr, his work neglects the political implications 
of Kropotkin’s biological thought.
102 For Kropotkin’s views about humanity’s nature 
and its propensity to transform biologically were intimately connected to his political 
thought. He never lost sight of the applicability of evolution to anarchism.  
  A  fundamental  aspect  of  Kropotkin’s  evolutionary  thought  that  had  serious 
ramifications for his political ideas was an emphasis on ‘conditions’ and ‘environment’ 
as powerful forces affecting an organism’s biological make-up. As I will explore in 
part  two,  Kropotkin’s  scientific  interpretation  of  the  environment  as  an  agent  was 
crucial to how he thought politically about the state, capitalism, and revolution. His 
fascination  with  interactions  between  body  and  surroundings  owed  a  debt  to  the 
biological  thought  of  Lamarck,  in  particular  his  two  premises  on  adaptation  and 
inheritance.
103 The  first,  ‘Direct  Action’,  argued  that  individual  organisms  could 
acquire  characteristics  during  their  lifetime  as  a  result  of  an  adaptation  to  their 
environment. The second, ‘The Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics’ stressed that 
such  adaptations  could,  and  often  were,  visited  upon  progeny  through  inheritance, 
provided  the  features  were  present  in  both  parents.  In  Zoological Philosophy:  An 
Exposition with Regard to the Natural History of Animals (1809) Lamarck stated this 
theory: 
 
All the acquisitions or losses wrought by nature on individuals, through the 
influence of the environment […], are preserved by reproduction to the new 
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individuals which arise, provided that the acquired modifications are common 
to both sexes, or at least to the individuals which produce the young.
104  
 
Kropotkin’s  thought  is  in  tune  with  Lamarck’s  view  that  ‘The  influence  of  the 
environment as a matter of fact is in all times and places operative on living bodies’.
105 
As we shall see, Kropotkin’s argument was not one that favoured nurture over nature, 
but one that looked to an organism’s surroundings when explaining biological change. 
The environment could be ‘read’ in the body. 
These  beliefs  helped  Kropotkin  think  about  political  environments.  He  saw 
political  existence  as  a  process  in  which  organisms,  individual  and  social,  could 
respond  and  adapt  to  their  socio-economic,  cultural,  and  political  settings.  ‘Direct 
Action’ suggested that people, as living beings, would undergo modifications as a 
result  of  an  interaction  with  man-made  external  conditions.  In  ‘Anarchism:  Its 
Philosophy and Ideal’ (1896), he showed his belief in ‘Direct Action’ and presented it 
as a scientific fact: 
 
The zoologists and botanists study the individual – his life, his adaptations to 
his surroundings. Changes produced in him by the action of drought or damp, 
heat  or  cold,  abundance  or  poverty  of  nourishment,  of  his  more  or  less 
sensitiveness to the action of exterior surroundings will originate a species; and 
the variations of species are now for the biologist but resultants – a given sum 
of variations that have been produced in each individual separately. A species 
will be what the individuals are, each undergoing numberless influences from 
the surroundings in which they live, and to which they correspond each in his 
own way.
106 
 
In ‘The Response of Animals to their Environment’ (1910), Kropotkin stressed that 
adaptation occurred during an individual’s lifespan and produced definite results. As a 
force  operating  on  living  bodies,  the  environment  is  responsible  for  the  detailed 
changes experienced in biological structures:  
 
This […] is due to the influence of the new surroundings upon the cells, the 
tissues  […]  or  the  blood  of  the  animals  placed  in  these  surroundings.  It 
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produces  definite  changes  of  form,  colours,  habits,  and  so  on,  and  these 
changes are so substantial as to affect even those fundamental characters which 
were formerly considered unchangeable.
107 
 
With these ideas, Kropotkin could interpret the political existence of human beings as 
an on-going biological process. As the environments in which people lived were often 
political  settings  –  created  and  modified  spaces  accommodating  human  life  – 
Kropotkin  understood  political  environments  as  the  physical  settings  that  induced 
changes in the human organism. This meant that political settings could be judged by 
studying the biology of the individual organisms inhabiting them.  
A political environment’s influence on people, however, did not end with its 
capacity  to  produce  changes  of  a  physiological,  psychological,  and  behavioural 
character. Not only could organisms undergo adaptations to environments during their 
lifetime, but these acquired characteristics could be passed down hereditarily to their 
offspring.  Kropotkin  summarised  this  opinion  in  ‘Inherited  Variation  in  Animals’ 
(1915).  ‘They  [acquired  characteristics]  are  transmitted  from  the  parents  to  their 
offspring, and the doubts are now only about the mode of transmission of the changes 
from one generation to the next – not about the fact itself’.
108 Again, the emphasis on 
the power of the environment to shape life was a view of a natural, biological process 
that, once applied to human existence, became explicitly political. Not only could the 
effects of social environments sink deeply into the intimate structure of the human 
being, but their characteristics could be inscribed on the bodies and traits of progeny 
and, thus, perpetuated through the future ages of the human species.  
Somewhat  paradoxically,  the  brute  biological  qualities  Kropotkin  saw  in 
humanity’s natural condition allowed him to argue for a fluid, changeable, and unfixed 
description of human nature. If, as he believed, a fundamental human quality was a 
necessity to adapt to its environment and a capacity to bestow these adaptations to 
progeny, then its nature, habits, and biological structure at any time were not inherent 
qualities, but resultants. As he stressed in ‘Anarchism: Its Philosophy and Ideal’, ‘man 
is nothing but a resultant, always changeable’.
109 Nathan Jun argues that other than 
biological qualities, there is no essentialism to human nature in Kropotkin’s thought. 
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He  is  always  becoming.
110 It  is,  in  fact,  Kropotkin’s  basic  Lamarckian  reading  of 
humanity’s constant biological qualities of adaptation and inheritance that allows for 
his  position.  The  condition  of  society  could  ‘not  be  crystallized  into  certain 
unchangeable forms, but will continually modify its aspect, because it will be a living, 
evolving organism’.
111 That a consistent part of humanity’s biology should stimulate 
its biological metamorphoses is an ambivalence at the heart of Kropotkin’s political 
ideas. Jesse S. Cohn also recognises this contradiction: ‘Kropotkin holds our enduring 
nature  to  be  our  changeability’.
112 It  meant  that,  as  a  species,  there  was  no 
deterministic pattern to humanity’s evolution. Life changed, but followed no inevitable 
route of progress.  
 
 
Degeneration 
 
In Russian Literature: Ideals and Realities (1905), Kropotkin’s interpretation of Fedor 
Dostoevsky’s  (1821-1881)  ‘psycho-pathological’
113 novel  Crime  and  Punishment 
(1866)  developed  the  idea  that  the  environment  could  inscribe  its  effects  into  the 
biology of the human being. Analysing the murders of the sisters Alyona and Lizaveta, 
he rejected the notion that ‘materialist ideas could in reality bring an honest young man 
to act as Raskólnikoff did’. ‘Raskólnikoffs’, he insisted, ‘do not become murderers 
under the influence of such theoretical considerations.’
114 Instead, Kropotkin looked 
for the causes of the murders in the relationship between Raskolnikov’s body and the 
conditions of its existence. Kropotkin implied that Raskolnikov was a victim, a man 
led to crime by ‘some mental affection – a sort of half-lucid lunacy’.
115 This ‘psychical 
disease’
116 was  a  resultant  that  was  brought  on  and  exacerbated  by  ‘the  lowest 
imaginable depths of destitution – such as can only be found in a large city like St. 
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Petersburg’.
117 In Kropotkin’s view, Raskolnikov is typical of Dostoevsky’s favourite 
themes:  ‘the  lowest  sunken  inhabitants  of  the  slums’,
118 the  ‘men  who  have  been 
brought so low by the circumstances of their lives’, the ‘sufferings, moral and physical, 
of the downtrodden’ – whose desperate poverty has led to a ‘broken-down condition of 
human  nature  […]  characteristic  of  neuro-pathological  cases’.
119 Raskolnikov’s 
condition represented to Kropotkin not only the extreme influence of the environment 
on  the  biology  of  the  human  being,  but  the  possibility  that  it  could  produce  in 
individuals defective and diseased effects. The human organism’s propensity to adapt 
to  external  conditions  did  not  guarantee  evolutionary  progress,  but  could  produce 
lower, degenerate beings.  
Seven  years  later,  at  the  First  International  Eugenics  Congress  (1912), 
Kropotkin stressed his fear about the worrying process of degeneration afflicting the 
human race. His speech to the conference began by affirming his concern about the 
reality of humanity’s biological descent: 
 
First  of  all  I  must  express  my  gratitude  to  Professor  Loria  and  Professor 
Kellogg for having widened the discussion about the great question which we 
all have at heart – the prevention of the deterioration and the improvement of 
the human race by maintaining in purity the common stock of inheritance of 
mankind.
120 
 
Alongside  the  biological  degeneration  of  human  individuals  he  had  seen  in 
Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov, Kropotkin expressed his disconcerting view that humanity 
as  a  species  exhibited  signs  of  collective  deterioration.  The  causes  of  biological 
deterioration, as well as the solutions to its worrying threat, lay in the environment. 
Kropotkin criticised those at the conference who advocated sterilisation as a solution to 
degeneration for overlooking the impact of the environment on the future character of 
the human race. The ‘separation of surroundings and inheritance is impossible’ he 
said.
121 Alternatively, by altering the environment in which people lived, by shifting 
the political parameters of social existence, the biological stock of the human race 
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would be enhanced. And then, he stated, and not with sterilisation, ‘you will have 
improved the germ plasm of the next generation’.
122  
Pick  points  out  that  ‘the  notion  […]  of  things  getting  worse,  degenerating 
culturally, racially universally, punctuates Western philosophy, politics and religion 
from  […]  Plato  to  Rousseau  to  Hegel’.
123 The  language  of  sickness  has  provided 
political thinkers throughout the ages with warnings about the liability of political 
structures to become unstable and collapse. In chapter three of The Prince (1532), for 
example, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) looked to the fragility of the human body 
and  its  tendency  to  suffer  mortally  from  disease  as  a  useful  image  to  explain  the 
potential disintegration of the body politic: 
 
For if the first signs of trouble are perceived, it is easy to find a solution; but if 
one lets trouble develop, the medicine will be too late, because the malady will 
have become incurable. And what physicians say about consumptive diseases 
is also true of this matter, namely, that at the beginning of the illness, it is easy 
to treat but difficult to diagnose but, if it has not been diagnosed and treated at 
an early stage, as time passes it becomes easy to diagnose but difficult to treat. 
This also happens in affairs of state; for if one recognises political problems 
early […] they may be resolved quickly, but if they are not recognised, and left 
to develop so that everyone recognises them, there is no longer any remedy.
124 
 
Like a wasting disease eating away at the life of the body, internal political disorders, 
if undetected, will consume the body politic from within and cause its destruction. 
Politics is likened to medicine in so far as it attempts to locate and cure internal threats 
to existence. The task of the political ruler, therefore, bears resemblance to that of the 
doctor. Degeneracy has metaphorical qualities for Machiavelli’s political thought. It 
allows  him  to  highlight  the  necessity  of  a  ruler’s  foresight  to  political  stability. 
Sickness provides him with a vision of political mortality, a sense of disaster with 
which to encourage the prince to prepare for storms in calm weather. 
In  Kropotkin’s  bio-political  world,  however,  sickness  was  not  simply  a 
metaphor  for  political  problems,  but  had  become  a  political  disorder  in  itself.  No 
longer resembling biological life, but a biological reality, the social body could fall ill 
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and suffer from disease. As politics increasingly orientated its powers towards the 
health  of  populations,  illness  shed  its  metaphorical  meaning  and  took  on  a  literal 
threat. Kropotkin’s thought reflects this development. His literalism and tendency to 
make metaphor real led not only to the optimistic possibility of improving society’s 
health, but also to the pessimistic realisation of its mortality. 
 The fearful sense of emergency we find in Kropotkin’s speech at the First 
International  Eugenics  Congress  is  reflective  of  what  Pick  terms  a  ‘specific  later-
nineteenth-century  language  of  degeneration’.
125 This  way  of  talking  and  thinking 
about decline differed from earlier uses both quantitatively and qualitatively. The late 
nineteenth  century  produced  an  unprecedented  array  of  inter-referential  texts 
concerned  with  discussing,  dramatising,  locating,  defining,  and  solving  a  problem 
called  degeneracy.  The  issue  crossed  political  allegiances,  scientific  disciplines, 
literary forms and genres. From the novels of Émile Zola (1840-1902) to the science of 
Huxley to the politics of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Frederick Engels (1820-
1895), a fear and fascination of degeneration pervaded the imagination of Western 
culture.
126 Moreover, as Richard G. Olson argues, contemporaries fearful of the threat 
of degeneration tended to see it ‘not as a primarily economic or ethical or religious or 
philosophical problem, but as a problem that had its roots in medical and biological 
facts’.
127 Those who wrote about degeneracy claimed an authority for their work that 
derived from the truth claims of biological science. That things were getting worse 
ceased to be a matter of opinion and became a scientific claim whose legitimacy, it 
was believed, could be tested and verified by research, data, and facts. Organs, minds, 
thoughts, bodies, races, and of course, entire species were all scrutinised in this period 
as biological entities liable to degenerate. 
Owing to his identity as an anarchist, Kropotkin had a complicated relationship 
with  the  idea  of  degeneration.  His  politics  seemed  to  represent  the  threat  of 
degeneracy.  During  his  years  as  a  political  theorist,  anarchism  became  intimately 
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connected with degeneration, often occupying the passive side of the contemporary 
lens  of  analysis.  Ideas  of  degeneracy  in  a  number  of  scientific  and  literary  forms 
portrayed anarchism as both cause and symptom of humanity’s assumed social and 
biological decline. With its threat to Europe’s political stability seemingly reaching 
epidemic  proportions  during  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century,  anarchism 
became the object of a public discourse that attempted to understand and explain a 
wave of anarchist terrorism that swept across the continent.
128 
The  image  of  the  ‘degenerate’,  popular  in  criminological  and  medical 
discourses of the period, was smoothly superimposed onto the figure of the ‘anarchist’. 
Following the fatal stabbing of French President Carnot by the Italian anarchist Sante 
Geronimo Caserio (1873-1894) in 1894, for example, criminologist Cesare Lombroso 
(1835-1909)  conducted  a  scientific  study  of  incarcerated  anarchist  delinquents.
129 
Claiming  the  criminality  of  anarchism  to  be  hereditary,  betrayed  by  physiognomic 
traits,  he  located  the  signs  of  degeneracy  in  the  anarchist  body  itself.
130 In 
Degeneration (1892),  dedicated  to  his  ‘dear  and  honored  master’  Lombroso,  Max 
Nordau (1849-1923) continued to scrutinise the anarchist ‘type’. His study biologised 
anarchism’s  political  dimensions  and  saw  in  its  confrontation  to  existing  socio-
economic and political conditions a sign of worrying organic deficiency: 
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In view of Lombroso’s researches, it can scarcely be doubted that the writings 
and  the  acts  of  […]  anarchists  are  also  attributable  to  degeneracy.  The 
degenerate  is  incapable  of  adapting  himself  to  existing  circumstances.  This 
incapacity indeed, is an indication of morbid variation in every species, and 
probably  a  primary  source  of  their  sudden  extinction.  He  therefore  rebels 
against conditions and views of things which he necessarily feels to be painful, 
chiefly because they impose upon him the duty of self-control, of which he is 
incapable on account of his organic weakness of will.
131 
 
Understood biologically, the politics of the anarchist became more than a threat to 
political order: the degenerate’s incapacity for physiological adaptation, a particular 
deficiency  of  the  organism,  placed  the  future  evolution  of  the  human  species  in 
danger.
132  
Alongside the image of the anarchist as degenerate, the notion of anarchism as 
a movement, a set of ideas, or an attitude, was also linked to degeneration. Metaphors 
of monstrousness, representing anarchism’s beastly deviation from the human realm, 
were commonplace in the anti-anarchist German press of the fin-de-siècle. As Elun 
Gabriel  shows,  the  hydra  emerged  as  a  recurring  warning  of  anarchism’s  supra-
personal,  self-replenishing  threat  to  civilised  society  of  which  individual  acts  of 
terrorism  were  merely  the  epiphenomena.
133 Sections  of  the  British  press  also 
presented  anarchism  as  a  source  of  social  and  cultural  disintegration.  In  the  early 
1890s,  newspapers  represented  the  European  anarchist  movement  as  an  ‘epidemic 
disease  originating  outside  Britain’,  infecting  the  British  social  body  from  the 
continent.
134 In 1901, the Saturday Review likened anarchism to contagion, spreading 
across Europe ‘as hydrophobia is transmitted from one mad dog to another’.
135 To 
many contemporaries, the irrepressible force of anarchism confirmed the contradictory 
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nature of the modern era: criminality and immorality were on the rise in the most 
civilised parts of the world. Anarchism appeared symptomatic of a deadly paradox 
identified by Huxley: ‘the tendency of the social organism to generate the causes of its 
own destruction’.
136 
Historians  of  degeneration  are  generally  united  about  its  pervasiveness, 
ubiquity, and fluidity in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Western political 
culture. Pick argues that the notion of degeneracy ‘can be found across the political 
spectrum’.
137 Stuart C. Gilman traces degeneration’s political promiscuity in texts of 
political  philosophy,  arguing  that  thinkers  ‘often  assumed  degeneracy  and  tried  to 
argue around it or incorporate in into their theories. In other cases political thinkers 
would  adapt  and  even  transmogrify  degeneracy’.
138  Even  nineteenth-century 
proponents  of  degeneration  seemed  to  recognise  the  ubiquity  of  degeneration’s 
contemporary appeal. In his dedication to Lombroso, Nordau stated proudly that ‘the 
notion of degeneracy [has] already shown itself extremely fertile in the most diverse 
directions’.
139  
Kropotkin provides an interesting case of a thinker attempting to feed the idea 
of degeneration into a political project. While being an anarchist whose ideas were 
often  subject  to  the  charge  of  degeneracy,  he  was  nonetheless  one  of  the  many 
contemporary thinkers who assumed it to be a fact. Moreover, as Gilman says of other 
political thinkers of the period, Kropotkin tried to incorporate degeneration into his 
political theories. As I will explore in part two, Kropotkin’s inversions and reversals of 
degeneration theory, a process representative of his playful and creative relationship to 
scientific ideas, came to form the basis of some of his strongest critiques of the state 
and capitalism, as well as support his conception of the purpose of revolution. 
From very early in his political career a deep pessimism about processes of 
degeneration permeated his writings. In the spring of 1880, after moving from Geneva 
to the tranquillity of Clarens on the advice of his doctor, he wrote a number of articles 
whose  quality  he  later  reflected  upon  in  Memoirs  of  a  Revolutionist  (1899).  He 
remembered that period fondly, writing that in Clarens he ‘produced the best things 
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that [he] wrote for “Le Révolté”, among them the address “To the Young”’.
140 It is 
telling that Kropotkin should look back with such pride on an article whose tone of 
anxiety contrasted so sharply with the serenity of his retreat. Indeed, ‘To the Young’ is 
infused with fears of contamination and death, of biological degeneracy. It is an article 
that describes ‘a society in decline’.
141 Kropotkin’s unease about degeneration was not 
a passing phase, but persisted in his thought during the coming years. It is important to 
note that Kropotkin thought about his time in Clarens as a formative experience. He 
identified the ideas that he had developed there, including the pessimistic vision of 
social decline, to be foundational to his work in the fin-de-siècle. In Memoirs of a 
Revolutionist, he declared that ‘I worked out [there] the foundation of nearly all that I 
wrote later on’.
142  
Much of what he wrote later on exhibited his belief that processes of biological 
decay existed as facts in the world. As we have seen from his speech at the First 
International Eugenics Congress, this concern could be expressed in terms of social, 
collective regression. Yet, he also located biological processes of defective deviation 
in the individual human body. This was a worrying political realisation. Believing the 
end of politics to be the maintenance and improvement of health, it was imperative that 
Kropotkin should understand the tendency of organisms to deviate from a healthy state 
and produce what he called ‘defects of human nature’.
143 He explored their capacity to 
undergo  regressive  modifications  in  certain  social  environments.  Exhibited  in  his 
analysis of Raskolnikov’s criminality, these changes in constitution were often framed 
in terms of moral degeneracy. Indeed, one of the interesting things about Kropotkin’s 
discussions of prisons and punishment, a part of his thought that will be examined in 
chapter four, is his attempt to grapple with immorality as a form of mental illness.  
 
 
Moral Sciences 
 
Kropotkin required a science of morality if he was to understand the causes of moral 
sickness. For he was not only interested in the political implications of the desirable 
features of human morality – the origins of cooperative instincts and the causes of the 
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spirit of mutual aid – but in undesirable behaviour and immorality. Crime of all sorts – 
murder, assault, theft, sexual violence – were social problems that his political ideas 
would need to understand and overcome with the aid of scientific knowledge.  
  Reflections made in ‘The Ethical Need of the Present Day’ (1904) reveal that 
Kropotkin believed a science of morality was possible. While he conceded that moral 
science ‘lags behind’ as a ‘branch of knowledge’,
144 he was sure it would catch up with 
other scientific advancements:  
 
That such a science is possible lies beyond any reasonable doubt. If the study 
of Nature has yielded the elements of a philosophy which embraces the life of 
the Cosmos, the evolution of the living beings, the laws of psychical activity, 
and the development of society, it must be able to give us the rational origin 
and the sources of the moral feelings.
145 
 
Kropotkin’s idea about how the moral sciences would replicate the achievements of 
evolution and physics was straightforward: ‘Even in this domain, the darkest of all’, 
moral  science  could  shine  a  light  ‘by  following  the  lines  of  research  indicated  by 
physiology’.
146 The view that morality was not yet completely known, but that it could 
become  so  scientifically,  was  a  popular  theme  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Mill,  for 
example, lamented the lack of exactness in the study of morality in comparison to ‘the 
considerable  body  of  truths’  accumulated  by  biology.  In  The  Logic  of  the  Moral 
Sciences (1843), he described this defective state of moral investigation as ‘a blot on 
the face of science’.
147 According to Mill, the solution was also simple: ‘The backward 
state of the moral sciences can only be remedied by applying to them the methods of 
physical science, duly extended and generalised’.
148 
Kropotkin’s approach to morality, however, cannot be adequately explained as 
a  manifestation  of  nineteenth-century  scientism’s  general  assumption  that  the 
empirical methods of the natural sciences could be transposed to the social and human 
realm.  As  always,  when  attempting  to  deal  with  important  political  questions, 
Kropotkin looked to up-to-date and authoritative research in contemporary science and 
engaged with its specific ideas. In order to find answers to the political question of 
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147 John Stuart Mill, The Logic of the Moral Sciences [1843] (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., 
1988), p. 20. 
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morality,  Kropotkin  looked  to  knowledge  produced  by  the  emerging  discipline  of 
psychology, a discipline he praised for abolishing the dualism between body and mind 
and showing how mind, intelligence, emotions, and passions ‘may all be reduced to 
physical and chemical phenomena’.
149 He respected psychology’s scientific authority, 
heralding  what  he  described  as  ‘the  progress  made  in  the  study  of  human  […] 
psychology’  in  the  nineteenth  century.
150 By  extension,  because  Kropotkin  was 
particularly interested in questions of immorality and moral sickness, he saw medical 
psychology, or psychiatry, as an invaluable discipline for moral science.
151 In 1887, he 
expressed his enthusiasm for the medical approach to immorality, thanking Lombroso 
for ‘having devoted his attention to, and popularized his researches into, the medical 
aspects of the question’.
152 At the heart of Kropotkin’s thought, then, was a medical 
understanding of morality that viewed individual and social moral health as the objects 
of psychiatry.
153 
Such an interpretation relied on an array of knowledge produced by nineteenth-
century  medical  studies  of  deviance.  It  was  to  the  professional  psychologists, 
psychiatrists,  and  criminologists  working  in  this  area  of  research  that  Kropotkin 
enthusiastically  looked  for  expert  knowledge  about  moral  questions.
154 He  cited  a 
number of leading scientists of deviance, including Italian criminologists Lombroso 
and  Enrico  Ferri  (1856-1929),
155 the  renowned  mid-century  French  psychologist 
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Prosper  Despine  (1812-1892),
156 German  psychiatrist  Wilhelm  Griesinger  (1817-
1868),
157 and Austro-German psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1840-1902).
158 
These  thinkers  provided  medical  interpretations  of  immorality  and  criminality  that 
made sense to Kropotkin’s bio-political approach to populations and individual human 
beings.  Their  willingness  to  explore  the  human  body  and  its  relationship  to  the 
environment for the causes of moral thoughts and behaviour seemed to him an exciting 
new development that could have serious political consequences.  
British psychiatry also interacted with Kropotkin’s understanding of morality. 
Henry  Maudsley  (1835-1918)
159 and  J.  Bruce  Thomson  (1810-1873)
160 appear  as 
authoritative  references  in  his  writings.  Both  men  had  been  labelling  deviants  as 
‘morally insane’ and ‘degenerate’ in a scientific capacity since the 1860s.
161 Kropotkin 
was particularly interested in the way these men understood how the ‘moral sense’ or 
‘moral faculty’ of human beings becomes impaired and how it could be healed. Again, 
it was their medical approach that appealed to him the most: the way they linked 
mental illness and insanity with crime and their consideration of the effects of bodily 
defects and disease on morals.  
Some of the key assumptions of medical psychology helped shape Kropotkin’s 
political understanding of morality. First, moral judgment should no longer rely on 
notions  of  sin  and  evil,  but  on  the  medical  facts  of  sickness.  Kropotkin  was 
enthusiastic  about  how  Maudsley,  in  particular,  sought  to  wrestle  the  domain  of 
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morality from the hands of religious doctrine and claim it for psychiatric medicine. In 
1872, Maudsley made this point to the British Medical Association: ‘When we come 
to deal with examples of moral degeneracy […] we perceive at once that it is not 
sufficient to ascribe immorality to the devil; that we must, if we would not leave the 
matter a mystery, go on to discover the cause of it in the individual.’
162  
Kropotkin  supported  Maudsley’s  stance  on  this  matter.  He  quoted  the 
psychiatrist at length in In Russian and French Prisons, building his idea about the 
delicate proximity between immorality and madness on Maudsley’s conception of the 
murky  borderland  between  crime  and  insanity.  Having  followed  ‘Mr  Maudsley’s 
researches into insanity’ and ‘seriously read his works’,
163 Kropotkin supported the 
idea that ‘most of those inmates of our jails who have been imprisoned for attempts 
against persons are people affected with some disease of the mind’; more often than 
not, he agreed with the psychiatrists, the criminal is ‘irresponsible for his acts’.
164 
Kropotkin also referred to French physician Philippe Pinel (1745-1826) to illustrate 
this  shift  from  sin  to  illness.  Pinel’s  decision  to  remove  the  chains  from  asylum 
patients,  Kropotkin  argued,  demonstrated  to  the  public  that  ‘lunatics’  were  not 
‘possessed  by  the  devil’,  but  were  people  ‘whose  intelligence  was  darkened  by 
disease’.
165 No longer was it necessary to summon God or the devil to understand the 
causes  of  immorality;  what  was  required  was  a  medical  investigation  into  the 
individual’s mind. In 1896, Kropotkin identified psychological analysis as the proper 
means to make this investigation: 
 
The  modern  psychologist  sees  in  a  man  a  multitude  of  separate  faculties, 
autonomous tendencies, equal among themselves, performing their functions 
independently,  balancing,  opposing  one  another  continually  […].  All  are 
related so closely to one another that they each react on all the others, but they 
lead their own life without being subordinated to a central organ – the soul.
166 
 
Kropotkin’s thought reveals an understanding of morality that saw significance not in 
actions, but in conditions or states of the body. People could not be judged from a 
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moral  standpoint  with  reference  to  their  behaviour  alone,  but  by  being  studied 
psychologically. He was less interested in what people do, than he was with their 
bodies and states of mind.   
  Many  of  the  medical  conditions  explored  by  the  nineteenth-century 
psychiatrists  that  appear  in  Kropotkin’s  work  were  explained  within  a  conceptual 
opposition between the will and the passions. This distinction was not new to medical 
psychology, however, but had been part of European political thought in the eighteenth 
century.
167 A tension between the will, often associated with reason, constraint, the 
power to ‘check’ oneself, and the weight of conscience, and an endemic group of 
inclinations, impulses, appetites, and desires, was important for both Rousseau and 
Immanuel Kant (1824-1904). It was particularly evident in the way they discussed the 
political problem of morality. For Rousseau the politically desirable moral quality of 
virtue could be attained if one listened ‘to the voice of one’s conscience in the silence 
of the passions’.
168 An individual’s morality – his virtue or moral evil – was a result of 
an internal conflict between reason and desire. To be virtuous and good, then, ‘consists 
not only in being just, but in being so by triumphing over one’s passions, by ruling 
over one’s heart’.
169 This bodily conflict, of course, found expression in the broader 
opposition between the myopic personal interests of individuals and the enlightened 
general will of the community. Kant also thought of moral self-determination as a 
victory of rational man over his irrational nature. To be morally right meant to will 
one’s  actions  by  recourse  to  reason,  and  in  doing  so,  overcome  the  ‘self-seeking 
animal inclinations’.
170  
By the time Kropotkin came to work on the subject of morality, however, this 
set  of  oppositions  had  become  medicalised  within  the  authoritative  language  of 
empirical science. They were still very much in play, but related to a qualitatively 
different conception of morality. No longer did the conflict between the will and the 
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passions result in either virtue or moral evil, as Rousseau imagined they would, but in 
moral health and moral sickness, in sanity and insanity. The balance, or imbalance, of 
the  will  and  the  passions  became  a  scientific  codification  of  medical  conditions. 
According to Maudsley, one distinctive feature of individuals from the criminal class, 
that ‘degenerate or morbid variety of mankind’, is that ‘in the presence of temptation 
they have no self-control’.
171 An imbalance between reason and inclination was typical 
of moral insanity. In such cases, ‘the reason has lost control over the passions and 
actions, so that the person can neither subdue the former nor abstain from the latter’.
172 
The morally insane yield to ‘impulses and desires […] without check’.
173 Krafft-Ebing, 
when examining in Psychopathia Sexualis (1886) the state of delusion that commonly 
accompanies  sexually  deviant  acts  such  as  sadism  and  exhibition,  declared  that 
‘particular stress should be laid upon the fact that the act emanated from an irresistible 
impulse’.  Additionally,  it  is  ‘of  psychical  importance  […]  that  the  will  power  is 
impaired and quite impotent in the presence of the delusion’.
174  
In his codification of morality, Kropotkin’s arrangement of the will and the 
passions  broadly  reflects  the  analysis  of  the  experts  to  whom  he  referred  for 
knowledge. He was working on the same opposition as Rousseau and Kant, but in a 
new scientific, medical territory. He was in tune with the psychiatrists in his belief that 
a  strong  will  was  required  for  an  individual  to  ‘find  the  strength  to  resist  the 
temptations which […] suddenly arise before him’.
175 Moreover, Kropotkin used this 
opposition to try and make sense of behaviour he considered to be immoral. As for 
many psychiatrists in the nineteenth century, the criminal provided an interesting case: 
 
All transgressions against the established principles of morality can be traced to 
a want of firm Will. Most of the inmates of our prisons are people who have 
not had firmness enough to resist the temptations that surround them, or to 
master a passionate impulse that momentarily overpowered them.
176 
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Kropotkin  was  using  psychiatry’s  conceptual  tool  kit  to  make  sense  of  political 
deviancy. He was making the argument that crime and acts considered to be immoral 
can  be  explained  in  medical  terms,  as  having  their  causes  in  mental  states  and 
conditions. The causes of crime could be scientifically ‘traced’ to a mental imbalance. 
As Kropotkin’s words imply, in order to avoid moral transgression the will must be 
strengthened  to  control  the  passions.  The  will  for  Kropotkin  was  thus  a  medical 
deterrent to moral sickness.  
It must be pointed out that the role of the passions in Kropotkin’s thought is 
multidimensional and far from simplistic. They are not intrinsically dangerous and do 
not  always  lead  to  insanity  or  crime.  Indeed,  alongside  Kropotkin’s  depictions  of 
negative passions or base impulses, we find him speaking of ‘noble passions [and] 
great  impulses’.
177 This  seeming  contradiction  can  be  explained  by  showing  two 
processes that Kropotkin believed led to the passions becoming dangerous to the point 
at which they can affect moral health. First, as I have described, in the absence of the 
will, or with a weak will, individuals become engulfed by the appeal of their human 
instincts and urges. In this case, as Kropotkin’s words in the above quotation make 
clear, the passions can be dangerous. Like Mill, however, Kropotkin thought that with 
a strong will in place to restrain, control, and direct the influence of the passions and 
desires, they could lead individuals to noble, creative, and socially useful ends. In 
chapter three of On Liberty (1859), Mill writes that if an individual’s ‘impulses are 
strong, and are under the government of a strong will, he has an energetic character 
[my  emphasis]’.
178 This  is  a  positive  outcome  for  Mill.  Second,  as  I  shall  explore 
further  in  part  two,  the  environment  can  be  a  determining  factor  in  whether  the 
passions are positive or negative features of an individual’s psychology. As Kropotkin 
wrote in Modern Science and Anarchism, ‘even the passions of men, which under the 
present structure of society often become a nuisance and a danger […], can be a source 
of progress, if their exercise be recognised, and a reasonable social outlet for them be 
given’.
179 As we shall see in chapter four when I explore the idea of state morality, 
Kropotkin thought environments could corrupt, that is, sicken and make morbid human 
impulses:  they  could  be  made  dangerous  by  external  conditions.  Moreover,  as  I 
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consider  in  chapter  five,  Kropotkin  believed  dangerous  passions,  desires,  and 
temptations were intrinsic to certain social environments and could be learnt, acquired, 
and inherited by the beings inhabiting them.  
Like the moral scientists he read, Kropotkin’s discussions of morality have a 
keen  interest  in  abnormality.  Once  medicalised,  immorality  could  represent  the 
occurrence  of  a  deviation  in  the  individual  from  a  healthy  to  a  pathological  state. 
Severing morality from the soul and securing it within the body rendered demarcations 
between  ‘good’  and  ‘sinful’  largely  meaningless  in  the  face  of  a  biomedical 
appreciation of ‘moral health’ and ‘moral sickness’. The ‘psychopate’ was not sinful or 
morally bad, but ill.
180 As a form of political deviance, crime was often caused by 
forms of biological deviation in the individual’s body: 
 
The causes of the violence […] must be sought long years before. And if we 
push  our  analysis  deeper,  we  discover  that  this  state  of  mind  is  itself  a 
consequence  of  some  physical  disease  either  inherited  or  developed  by  an 
abnormal life; some disease of the heart, the brain, or the digestive system.
181 
 
Such a reading of criminality is indicative of the forms of knowledge constituting 
Kropotkin’s broader bio-political worldview that I have outlined in this chapter. He 
explained  the  political  problem  of  violence  by  studying  illness  in  the  body  of  the 
criminal, and in doing so, medicalises deviant behaviour. As a form of degeneration, 
moral sickness confirmed to Kropotkin the existence of processes of biological decay 
lurking  in  societies  and  operating  on  individuals.  The  victim  of  this  disease,  as 
Kropotkin makes clear in the passage above, has come to their deprived state as an 
organism  capable  of  biological  metamorphosis,  either  inheriting  its  deviation  or 
acquiring it through adaptation to an abnormal life. 
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2 Mapping, Measurement, and Statistics 
 
I cannot avoid mentioning something about the general situation to you. Living in a 
great center – in Moscow – it is impossible to know the true condition of the country. 
To know the truth about current experiences, one must live in the provinces, in close 
contact with daily life, with its needs and misfortunes, with the starving.
182 
 
Petr Kropotkin, ‘Letter to Lenin’ (1920). 
 
 
As the Russian Revolution descended into the horrors of civil war, Kropotkin wrote to 
Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924) from the small village of Dmitrov in a desperate attempt 
to exert what remained of his declining political influence. At the heart of Kropotkin’s 
critique of the Bolshevik leader was a suspicion of the accuracy of his political sight, 
his ability to ‘see’ the state. Lenin’s perspective of the objects of his party’s politics – 
the country and the life of the population – was obscured behind the walls of the 
Kremlin.  Kropotkin’s  political  message  thus  revolved  around  an  epistemological 
problem: the Bolsheviks’ struggle stemmed from their deficient knowledge of reality. 
Lacking in empiricism, the centralised politics of Bolshevism would remain detached 
from and ignorant about the society it sought to improve. Access to truth, to what 
Kropotkin described in the letter as the ‘true condition of the country’, and the real 
existence of the people could come only through experience and observation. Contact 
with life held the key to political success.  
Kropotkin’s advice to Lenin was the offering of a man whose life extolled the 
virtues of empirical scientific practice. He had tried to gain knowledge about the world 
in which he had lived through observation and experiment, supported by evidence and 
facts.  This  was  common  to  his  age.  From  Kropotkin’s  birth  in  the  mid-nineteenth 
century, knowledge had increasingly come to be seen as objective information about 
the properties of material reality, and with the rise of statistics in Europe and Russia in 
the nineteenth century, truth claims about that reality relied further and further on the 
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authority of enumeration.
183 Striving to acquire knowledge through empirical methods 
of inquiry, the natural and social sciences looked to numbers to describe, represent, 
and explain the myriad processes of life.  
In  Modern  Science  and  Anarchism,  Kropotkin  recognised  the  great  impact 
made by the development of nineteenth-century numerical empiricism on humanity’s 
understanding of reality. If before, humans peered at the world through the frames of 
abstract  conceptions,  now  they  could  explain  it  through  neutral  observation  and 
enumeration: 
 
In the same way as the metaphysical conceptions of a Mind of the Universe, a 
Creative Force of Nature, a Loving Attraction of Matter, an Incarnation of the 
Idea, an Aim of Nature, a Reason for its Existence, the Unknowable, and so 
forth  were  gradually  abandoned  by  the  materialist  (mechanical,  or  rather 
kinetic) philosophy, and the embryos of generalisations found hidden behind 
these  words  were  translated  in  the  concrete  language  of  facts,  so  do  we 
endeavor now to proceed when we approach these facts of life in societies.
184 
 
The quantification of life led to a new conception of society in the nineteenth century. 
The idea of social life came into being, a plane of reality transcending the lives of 
individuals,  whose  characteristics  could  be  measured,  counted,  classified,  and 
correlated.  Patterns  emerged  in  the  biological  traits  of  mass  human  behaviour  and 
society  began  to  exhibit  regularities  that  relied  on  the  language  of  statistics  –  a 
‘concrete  language  facts’  –  for  their  presentation  and  comprehension.  Kropotkin 
recognised  this  development.  ‘It  is  only  nowadays’,  he  boasted  of  his  historical 
moment,  ‘that  the  conception  of  society  deduced  from  the  observation  of  social 
phenomena is rid of its swaddling-cloths.’
185 The nineteenth century had seemingly 
attained a mature conception of society, an image of social reality made possible by 
the empirical method. 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
183 For an introduction to the rise of statistics in the nineteenth century, see Ian Hacking, The Taming of 
Chance (Cambridge, New York, and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 1-10. 
184 Kropotkin, Modern Science, p. 39.  
185 Kropotkin, ‘Anarchism: Its Philosophy and Ideal’, p. 124. 	 ﾠ 69	 ﾠ
Learning to Measure 
 
Kropotkin acquired the techniques and enthusiasm for the collection and analysis of 
information  during  his  schooling  at  one  of  Russia’s  most  prestigious  military 
academies: the Corps of Pages. This was when he learned what, how, and why to 
measure. Like other military institutions of the Russian Empire in the mid-nineteenth 
century – the Military-Scientific Committee, the General Staff Academy, the Corps of 
Military Topographers – the Corps of Pages taught young men the skills required for 
producing the knowledge of physical and social phenomena deemed essential for the 
political, socio-economic, and military success of the state. The curricula of these army 
organs were broadly similar, focusing on instruction in the natural sciences, alongside 
military  science  (tactics,  strategy,  fortifications),  statistics,  geography,  cartography, 
and  surveying.  Such  an  education  sought  to  create  human  beings  with  a  mind  for 
scientific  investigation  and  a  faith  in  systems  of  knowledge.  More  specifically,  as 
David Rich shows, it aimed at rearing men of the state who would deal with ‘the 
collection, classification, and discussion of facts bearing on the condition of the state 
or community’.
186 The Corps of Pages was an integral component of a state crying out 
for descriptive data about its physical and human resources. If unknown regions were 
to become governed, if processes of modernisation, urbanisation, and industrialisation 
were to be effectively managed, and if the causes and character of social problems and 
political unrest were to be understood and eradicated, then the state had to see. The 
Corps of Pages was but one optical instrument in this political quest for knowledge.  
As a formative experience, Kropotkin’s education at the Corps of Pages from 
1858 to 1862 was an intense training in the epistemological rationale of a modernising 
empire. He recognised that its agenda was to prepare him for ‘a brilliant career in the 
service of the state’.
187 To that end, it furnished him with an ensemble of disciplinary 
knowledge and technologies necessary for generating information about the spaces and 
inhabitants of the empire. Alongside instruction in the natural sciences and ‘formidable 
courses of military science, – tactics, military history […] artillery and fortification’, 
Kropotkin learned and developed an enthusiasm for statistics as a means to collect and 
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examine  the  findings  of  social  scientific  investigation.
188 Following  a  course  on 
‘comparative statistics’,
189 he eagerly put his new sociological skills into practice and 
conducted  a  numerical  study  of  the  peasant  life  of  a  nearby  village  market  fair. 
Kropotkin noted this study as a ‘statistical description’ of popular life.
190 It was one of 
the first times he had experienced the possibility of generating qualitative knowledge 
about the peoples of the empire through quantification. 
Other  aspects  of  his  education  encouraged  Kropotkin  to  provide  form  to 
uncharted  and  unknown  physical  reality.  In  Memoirs  of  a  Revolutionist,  he 
remembered the school’s summer camping trips with fondness due to the opportunity 
the pupils received to try their hand at surveying and cartography: 
 
After a few preliminary exercises we were given a reflecting compass and told, 
“Go and make a plan of, say, this lake, or those roads, or that park, measuring 
the angels with the compass and the distances by pacing.” Early in the morning 
[we] would go out for four or five hours in the parks, miles away, mapping 
with this compass and paces the beautiful shady roads, the rivulets, and the 
lakes. [Our] work afterwards was compared with accurate maps, and prizes in 
optical  and  drawing  instruments  […]  were  awarded.  For  me,  these  surveys 
were a deep source of enjoyment.
191 
 
Mapping the countryside with instruments of measurement was an activity designed to 
bestow  readable  coherence  to  nature.  Such  an  opportunity  to  impose  order  on  the 
world gave Kropotkin a thrill. As he recalled in his memoirs, the activity of mapping 
he  experienced  in  the  Corps  of  Pages  ‘left  deep  traces  on  [his]  mind’.
192 The 
enthusiasm for creating geometric order stuck. 
Following his graduation from the Corps of Pages, Kropotkin rejected a life in 
St. Petersburg and a possible apprenticeship at the imperial court. His decision was 
based on a longing for a ‘field of action’ in which he could test his newly acquired 
knowledge  of  military  science.
193 In  search  of  unexplored  social  and  physical 
phenomena,  Kropotkin  volunteered  to  serve  in  a  Cossack  regiment  in  the  remote 
provinces of the Russian Empire. From St. Petersburg he thought of these borderlands 
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as ‘an immense field for […] application’ where the undefined and unknown might be 
given names and made knowable.
194  
In taking this decision Kropotkin was following a well-beaten track. Many men 
graduating from Russian military schools or academies in the mid-nineteenth century 
saw in the colonies an opportunity to practice the military-scientific training they had 
been taught by the state and since the 1840s Russian military men had been data-
gathering and mapping on the frontiers of the empire.
195 Moreover, as Peter Holquist 
argues, the Russian experience was characteristic of the practice of European empires 
more  generally,  to  whom  ‘colonies  provided  a  crucial  testing  ground’  for  the 
application of science to space and populations.
196 
During  his  military  service  from  1862  to  1867,  Kropotkin  would  learn  the 
indispensible connection between information and politics. Indeed, when he entered 
into Russia’s military ranks on the frontiers of its empire he took up a position in what 
Rich  describes  as  a  ‘state  in  overreach’:
197 an  empire  desperate  for  standardised 
knowledge of its vast territories and diverse inhabitants as a basis of its will to govern. 
During  the  mid-nineteenth  century,  with  knowledge  understood  to  precede  the 
effective distribution of political power, the Russian government believed that ‘the 
recording  of  empire  was  tantamount  to  controlling  it’.
198 Information  about  the 
empire’s frontiers was essential for political power’s claim to authority.
199 
  Kropotkin collected a lot of information. He set out on data gathering missions. 
He undertook ethnographical studies of local populations in which he saw ‘at work all 
the complex forms of social organization which [have been] elaborated far away from 
the influence of any civilization’.
200 He examined economic conditions and sketched 
‘the  different  forms  of  economic  life  [of  local  people]  which  ought  to  prevail  in 
different physical regions’.
201 ‘Each region of the Russian Empire’, he declared when 
enthusiastically remembering the imperialist rationale of his military service, ‘ought to 
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be treated in the same scientific way’.
202 Statistics were invaluable to this scientific 
enterprise.  They  provided  the  form  in  which  local  information  was  collected  and 
analysed  by  reformers.  Kropotkin  also  had  faith  in  statistics  as  the  technology  of 
knowledge suitable for representing local life. In 1865, when the pace of reform in 
Chita  moved  slower  than  he  desired,  his  put  the  blame  on  the  local  statistical 
committee  for  collecting  false  figures.
203 Kropotkin’s  frustration  surfaced  not  from 
suspicion with the method of statistics as such, but from his belief that the committee’s 
information gathering fell behind the required level of exactitude. He was beginning to 
form the opinion that for politics to be effective, data about its object must be precise. 
The  practice  of  mapping  was  central  to  this  political  context.  Kropotkin’s 
training in how to make maps in the Corps of Pages was part of a broader drive on 
behalf of the Russian state towards the mass production of cartographic knowledge. 
Since the establishment of the Imperial Russian Geographic Society (IRGO) in 1845, 
to  whom  Kropotkin  would  later  send  geographical  reports  and  findings  from  his 
travels in Siberia and Asia, mapping became an activity that was deemed essential for 
the realisation of the state’s political ambitions. Steven Seegel shows that the work of 
the IRGO in the mid-nineteenth century ‘was far from a simple scholarly endeavor’, 
but  a  process  of  political  information-gathering  closely  linked  to  the  Ministry  of 
Internal  Affairs  (MVD).
204 The  responsibilities  of  statecraft  –  territorial  expansion, 
transportation construction, establishing lines of communication, military mobilisation, 
defence, and above all, governance – were seen to be dependent upon accurate maps 
for their fulfilment.
205 
Kropotkin  became  a  collector  and  producer  of  this  political,  cartographic 
information. In so doing, he helped the state see the far-away spaces it desired to reach. 
His  geographical  and  cartographical  reports  supplied  St.  Petersburg  with  crucial 
information about the terrains, climates, weather patterns and other environmental and 
topographical details with which its modernising projects would have to contend. He 
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was good at his job. He wanted to render unmapped spaces of the empire readable. The 
‘immense  region’  of  Manchuria,  for  example,  seemed  ‘provoking’  to  him:  the 
existence  of  an  unknown  space  appeared  to  mock  his  cartographically  orientated 
mind.
206 As he stated in ‘Russian Explorations in Manchuria’ (1898), the purpose of 
exploring this area was ‘to give a full idea of this formerly unexplored region’.
207  
The value of providing a full idea, or a complete view of formerly unknown 
regions, existed in describing the canvas of nature on which the plans for extensive 
transportation and communication networks were to be sketched by the Russian state. 
Under  the  auspices  of  the  IRGO,  Kropotkin’s  geographical  work  provided  St. 
Petersburg  with  warnings  about  how  the  wildness  of  nature  might  impede  the 
construction  of  these  civilisational  wonders.  In  his  descriptions  of  Manchuria, 
Kropotkin considered the obstacles to communication inherent in the land: 
 
Between  the  southeastern  corner  of  Transbaikália  (New  Tsurukháitu)  and 
Blagovéschensk on the Amúr, the distance west to east is only five hundred 
miles;  but  along  the  Argun  and  the  Amúr  it  is  over  a  thousand  miles,  and 
moreover,  communication  along  the  Argun,  which  is  not  navigable,  is 
extremely difficult. In its lower parts there is nothing but a mountain track of 
the wildest description.
208 
 
The success of his explorations was measured by the extent to which he had shown 
that nature could be tamed, and thus, how clearly he had highlighted the possibilities 
for  transportation  and  communication  in  far  away  lands.  ‘Our  aim,  however,  was 
fulfilled’, he told of his trip up the Sungari in Manchuria, ‘we had ascertained that the 
river is navigable, and an excellent map of it was made’.
209 
In  his  discussions  of  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway  in  ‘The  Great  Siberian 
Railway’ (1895), Kropotkin’s writing focuses on the difficulties that may obstruct its 
further  construction.  Construction  had  been  underway  for  roughly  four  years,  but 
difficulties  were  expected  as  the  line  moved  east.  The  article  provides  numerous 
graphic  descriptions  of  the  natural  world  through  which  the  tracks  of  modern 
civilisation would have to pierce: 
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The  third  section,  between  Krasnoyarsk  and  Irkutsk,  will  offer  more 
difficulties.  First  of  all,  the  railway  will  have  to  cross  the  broad  and  rapid 
Yenisei,  which  flows  at  a  level  of  410  feet  only  at  Krasnoyarsk,  and 
immediately after that it will have to rise again to a level of over 1000 feet – 
that is, to the level of the high undulating plains that fringe the great plateau of 
East Asia. The spurs of the Sayan Highlands reach here to 2029 feet, while the 
rivers  are  deeply  cut  into  the  wide  plains.  Of  course,  such  conditions  are 
nothing which would much differ from the usual conditions of railway building 
in Middle Russia itself, but in East Siberia the laying down of the rails certainly 
will not progress with the same rapidity as it has hitherto progressed in West 
Siberia, while the cost of construction will be considerably increased.
210  
 
Geography served to paint a landscape image that showed in intimate detail the parts 
of nature that might thwart the threading of the railway. Kropotkin’s aim here is to be 
scientific, yet his concerns are political: how the wildness of nature could put the 
breaks on civilisational progress.  
What excited Kropotkin most of all in this process of political mapping was the 
production  of  the  simulacrum  itself.  He  took  great  pleasure  in  creating  simplified 
models of complex reality. These models would come to provide politics with a view 
of  the  terrains  under  its  political  jurisdiction.  The  demanding  work  of  finding 
generalised form in an array of empirically gained facts was a challenge he relished. 
This was the moment when science offered its substantial rewards: a completed map 
corresponding to the world ‘out there’. After returning to St. Petersburg in 1867 he 
began  the  long  process  of  making  sense  of  data  and  observations  acquired  on  the 
empire’s frontiers: 
 
Beginning, then, with the beginning, in a purely inductive way, I collected all 
the barometrical observations of previous travellers, and from them calculated 
hundreds of altitudes; I marked on a large scale map all geological and physical 
observations that had been made by different travellers, – the facts, not the 
hypothesis; and I tried to find out what structural lines would answer best to the 
observed realities. This preparatory work took me more than two years; and 
then  followed  months  of  intense  thought,  in  order  to  find  out  what  all  the 
bewildering  chaos  of  scattered  observations  meant,  until  one  day,  all  of  a 
sudden, the whole became clear and comprehensible, as if it were illuminated 
with a flash of light.
211 
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Kropotkin’s joy lay in the activity of making sense of an otherwise chaotic reality. He 
longed to draw out and expose the hidden meaning lurking in an ensemble of scattered 
observations.
212 The map was an invention owing its existence to the measurements, 
data, descriptions, and facts (not hypotheses!) collected by explorers out in the field of 
the Russian colonies. Although with the map political power remained distant from the 
phenomena observed, they now had an image onto which it could project its designs: 
 
There are not many joys in human life equal to the joy of the sudden birth of a 
generalization, illuminating the mind after a long period of patient research. 
What has seemed for years so chaotic, so contradictory, and so problematic 
takes at once its proper position within an harmonious whole. Out of a wild 
confusion of facts and from behind the fog of guesses, – contradicted almost as 
soon as they are born, – a stately picture makes its appearance, like an Alpine 
chain suddenly emerging in all its grandeur from the mists which concealed it 
the moment before, glittering under the rays of the sun in all its simplicity and 
variety, in all its mightiness and beauty. And when the generalization is put to a 
test,  by  applying  to  it  hundreds  of  separate  facts  which  had  seemed  to  be 
hopelessly  contradictory  the  moment  before,  each  of  them  assumes  its  due 
position, increasing the impressiveness of the picture [my emphasis].
213 
 
These  beautiful  pictures  were  the  rewards  reaped  by  the  Russian  state  from  its 
educational programs in military science. Alongside other military men wrapped in the 
culture of knowledge acquisition, Kropotkin was intimately and enthusiastically part of 
the political impetus to bring unseen reality to life. He was not able to show reality 
directly  to  the  eyes  of  politics,  but  could  give  birth  to  new  versions  of  reality, 
reproductions of the world that were considered more than adequate to direct political 
decisions. As I will show in part two, Kropotkin’s education in the apparatus of the 
Russian state, a formative experience that began in the Corps of Pages, became crucial 
for  the  ways  in  which  he  went  about  constructing  the  diagnostic  and  remedial 
dimensions  of  his  anarchism.  Like  the  political  ambitions  of  the  Russian  Empire, 
Kropotkin’s political ideas came to rely on statistical information, on measurements of 
reality, on maps and simulacra. 
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Politics by Numbers 
 
Kropotkin’s education in the Corps of Pages and his military service on the frontiers of 
the  Russian  Empire  prepared  him  for  a  political  career  that  would  play  out  in  a 
numerical  world.  He  became  intellectually  active  in  a  political  culture  that  had 
developed,  as  Ian  Hacking  shows,  in  the  aftermath  of  ‘an  avalanche  of  printed 
numbers’.
214 During the nineteenth century, nation-states began to count, classify, and 
tabulate their subjects in ways that were both quantitatively and qualitatively different 
from  earlier  forms  of  political  enumeration.  Not  only  did  the  volume  of  printed 
numbers rapidly grow, but what was counted began to change. No longer was politics 
primarily interested in its subjects for taxation and military purposes, but with their 
bodies, lives, habits, morals, and behaviour.
215 Owing to his training Kropotkin was 
well suited to this environment, able to discuss political, social, and economic issues 
within this new language of knowledge and he was equipped to think politically about 
a notion of society that by the mid-nineteenth century had become statistical. 
The  pervasiveness  of  the  technology  of  statistics  in  the  nineteenth  century, 
alongside the widely held belief that numbers could provide descriptive, qualitative 
analysis of social phenomena, made Kropotkin’s scientific politics possible. His view 
that  ‘we  know  of  no  region  in  which  it  would  be  impossible  for  us  to  find  an 
explanation  of  the  phenomena’  relied  on  scientific  thought  with  statistics  as  its 
method.
216 The forms of knowledge he used to understand human beings – medicine, 
evolution,  theories  of  degeneration,  sciences  of  moral  deviance  –  often  relied  on 
statistics to generate the data required for scientific investigation. This connection of 
science and statistics in Kropotkin’s politics proved a fruitful alliance for nineteenth-
century thought in general. Hacking describes the influence of statistics on the human 
sciences as ‘immense’,
217 determining the ‘character of social facts’
218 to be studied 
and  often  providing  the  concepts  and  data  required  for  the  birth  of  theory  itself. 
Stephan M. Stigler argues that the use of statistics spread across many disciplines of 
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nineteenth-century scientific thought, ‘from astronomy to geodesy, to psychology, to 
biology, to the social sciences’.
219 Statistical enthusiasm was politically promiscuous: 
the appeal of its apparent power to illuminate the politico-social realm transcended 
ideological positions, seducing socialists, liberals, and conservatives alike. 
The  nineteenth-century’s  broad  statistical  faith  is  evident  in  Kropotkin’s 
approach to political and social issues. A lucid example of this can be noticed in his 
approach  to  the  Russian  peasantry.  An  introduction  to  this  important  part  of  his 
thought should begin with describing the problem that he thought the peasantry posed 
–  a  problem  that  statistics  would  seemingly  solve.  In  a  discussion  of  nineteenth-
century Russian ‘folk-novelists’ in Russian Literature: Ideals and Realities, Kropotkin 
considered the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and identified the difficulty facing Russian 
society:  
 
Here was a mass of nearly fifty million people, whose manners and life, whose 
creed, ways of thinking, and ideals were totally different from those of the 
educated classes, and who at the same time were as unknown to the would be 
leaders of progress as if these millions spoke a quite different language and 
belonged to a quite different race [my emphasis].
220 
 
The problem Kropotkin identifies is one of ignorance: the emancipation of the serfs 
had engendered an entire population about which nothing was known. He describes 
how this predicament rose ‘before every thinking Russian’.
221 A barrier stood between 
educated Russia and the peasantry. The ‘thinking’ Russian’s experience of this social 
development was one of blindness and detachment.  
Kropotkin was looking back to a real problem of the post-emancipation era. As 
Esther  Kingston-Mann  discusses,  the  emancipated  serfs  caused  anxiety  for  ‘a 
government in dire need of statistical data’: it simply did not have enough information 
about the newly constituted subjects it was supposed to govern.
222 As her study also 
shows,  however,  emancipation  generated  concerns  among  sections  of  Russia’s 
educated society with ‘radical’ hopes for social reconstruction. For different reasons, 
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therefore, both the government and radical social reformers desired that the peasantry 
be known. Both believed statistics could solve the problem. Although contrasting in 
scope and objectives, conservatives and radicals pursued projects to gather and analyse 
empirically acquired statistical information about the lives of the unknown mass. Thus, 
statistics  became  what  Kingston-Mann  describes  as  a  ‘contested  terrain’, 
accommodating the efforts of disparate political actors.
223 The autocracy longed for 
neutral, ‘professional’ data to underpin modernisation and inform policies ensuring 
social order, while radical students and members of the intelligentsia looked for the 
damning facts of social inequality, exploitation, and repression that could undermine 
the government and ignite revolution. All participants, however, pursued this practice 
with the understanding that it could cure their political myopia. 
In the early 1870s the government enacted a policy of far-reaching statistical 
research into the peasant population, employing numerous local authorities and field 
researchers. Although fearful of ‘the dangers that might be inherent in the data itself, 
the data-gatherers, and the data-gathering process’, the Russian authorities’ pressing 
need for information about the peasantry was too great to ignore.
224 During the decade, 
however,  the  largely  fiscal  concerns  of  the  government  were  exceeded  by  the 
ambitions of the cohort of local statisticians, known as the zemstvo statisticians, many 
of whom understood their task as a scientific mission designed to lay bare the intimate 
details  of  local  life.  They  produced  a  vast  amount  of  detailed  information  on  the 
peasantry. The zemstvo statistics were exhaustive: according to Kingston-Mann the 
zemstvo statisticians ‘produced the largest database on a peasant population before the 
second half of the twentieth century’.
225  
If we turn back to Kropotkin and the problem he raised in Russian Literature: 
Ideals and Realities, we can begin to appreciate his enthusiasm for statistics as an 
enlightening technology. In his view, the zemstvo statisticians had eradicated Russia’s 
ignorance  about  the  peasantry.  He  described  it  as  ‘extensive  research’,  an 
‘ethnographical  exploration  of  Russia  on  such  a  scale  that  nowhere  in  Europe  or 
America do we find anything similar’.
226 Statistics had shed light on the once dark 
world of the emancipated serfs, transforming them from an unknown mass into an 
illuminated population. Kropotkin’s faith in the reliability of the zemstvo statistics was 
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so  strong  that  he  based  one  of  his  most  important  anarchist  political  ideas  on  the 
knowledge it had produced of the peasantry. In Mutual Aid, zemstvo statistical data is 
given  as  the  foundation  of  his  knowledge  about  communal  life  and  his  claims  to 
understand its morality: 
 
Moreover,  in  dealing  with  the  village  community  in  Russia  we  have  the 
advantage of possessing an immense mass of [statistical] materials, collected 
during the colossal house-to-house inquest which was lately made by several 
zemstvos  (county  councils)  and  which  embraces  a  population  of  nearly 
20,000,000 peasants in different parts of the country.
227 
 
The shift in Kropotkin’s presentation of the peasantry is dramatic. On one level this is 
a  transition  from  unknown  to  known:  of  enlightenment.  Yet,  the  significance 
Kropotkin invests in statistics is not simply about knowing or not knowing. As his 
words  above  from  Mutual  Aid  reveal,  the  zemstvo  statisticians  had  given  him  a 
political ‘advantage’. It added epistemological solidity and accuracy to his political 
ideas.  The  numbers,  their  classifications  and  tabulations,  their  revelations,  had 
produced a depth and breadth of knowledge capable of supporting a political assertion 
as bold as mutual aid: a theory about life and humanity in general.  
  For Kropotkin, the value of the zemstvo statistics lay in the kind of knowledge 
they  produced.  The  zemstva  did  not  simply  count  taxable  units,  but  generated 
ethnographic  data.  This  is  what  Kropotkin  means  when  he  says  that  the  material 
‘embraces’ a population. From out of the data could be lifted knowledge about 
 
the common law of different parts and nationalities of the Empire; the religious 
beliefs  and  the  forms  of  worship,  and  still  more  the  social  aspirations 
characteristic of the many sections of the dissenters; the extremely interesting 
habits and customs which prevail in the different provinces; the economical 
conditions of the peasants; their domestic trades [and] the thousands of forms 
taken by the popular co-operative organisations.
228 
 
Kropotkin supported a form of statistics whose aspiration was not merely to count, but 
to  penetrate.  As  Kropotkin  implies,  the  ethnographic  data  reached  far  into  social 
structures and relations: into justice, production, organisation, and exchange; it could 
reveal the traces left by previous generations in present day habits, customs, and forms 
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of  worship;
229 and  it  was  able  to  access  the  thoughts  of  individuals  and  the 
consciousness  of  communities  as  expressed  in  their  religious  beliefs  and  social 
aspirations.  
Kropotkin argues that statistics helped solve the post-emancipation-era problem 
of the unknown peasants. Within this story of enlightenment, however, there is another 
narrative  about  social  unification.  Statistics  had  broken  down  the  barrier  between 
educated  Russia  and  the  peasantry.  Ethnographic  knowledge  had  shortened  the 
distance between social groups and allowed for their interaction: 
 
Russian educated society, which formerly hardly knew the peasants otherwise 
than from the balconies of their country houses, was thus bought in a few years 
into a close intercourse with all divisions of the toiling masses; and it is easy to 
understand the influence which this intercourse exercised.
230  
 
Again,  Kropotkin  arranges  a  contrast  between  the  situation  before  and  after  the 
zemstvo statistics. In the above contrast, however, their achievement has taken on a 
new meaning: they not only enlighten, but unify. Here, Kropotkin is hinting at an 
important  belief:  as  well  as  being  able  to  overcome  geographical  distance, 
epistemological  intimacy  can  overcome  distances  created  in  society  by  wealth  and 
social standing. It is in this way, I believe, that we should understand Kropotkin’s 
critique of Lenin that I used as an epigraph to this chapter. His argument that to know 
society one must be ‘in close contact with daily life’ needs to be qualified and shown 
that it appeals to statistics. Simply living with the peasants could not eliminate the void 
between the balconies of the educated and the fields of peasant life; one had to go to 
the  people  and  collect  large  quantities  of  data  –  information  that  could  later  be 
classified,  catalogued,  and  serve  as  the  basis  of  ethnographical  representation.  As 
Kropotkin indicated in a footnote to his prose in Mutual Aid: the ‘facts concerning the 
village community’ were useful because they had been ‘classified and summed up’. As 
a result, he argued, ‘the modern village community question for the first time emerges 
from the domain of generalities and is put on the solid basis of reliable and sufficiently 
detailed facts’.
231 
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The  case  of  the  zemstvo  statisticians  demonstrates  that,  as  a  device  to  penetrate 
problematic areas of social life, statistics was a pervasive political tool in late Imperial 
Russian politics and one Kropotkin eagerly employed in his work. But its scope was 
not limited to revealing the secrets of the peasant commune. As Morrissey writes, ‘this 
respected and popular scientific method could seemingly illuminate any issue, ranging 
from  birth,  marriage,  and  death  to  the  material  conditions  of  the  urban  working 
class’.
232 One issue to which the statistical method was frequently applied in Russia 
and  Europe  was  deviance.  Hacking  portrays  the  ‘statistics  of  deviance’
233 as  a 
nineteenth-century fixation, being the striking feature of the avalanche of numbers. 
What  Ferri  termed  the  ‘painful  trinity’  of  nineteenth-century  social  diseases  – 
‘insanity,  suicide  and  crime’  –  were  forms  of  bio-political  deviance  considered 
knowable through statistical study.
234 Ferri dedicated much attention to the numbers of 
crime, devoting a large chapter of Criminal Sociology (1884) to the facts of criminal 
statistics. He thought statistics were important to understand crime’s social aspects: 
‘The science of criminal statistics is to criminal sociology what histology is to biology, 
for it exhibits, in the conditions of the individual elements of the collective organism, 
the factors of crime as a social phenomenon.’
235 Scholars of the nineteenth century 
have  explored  the  tendency  to  understand  suicide  –  the  second  of  Ferri’s  social 
diseases – statistically. Morrissey shows how statistics emerged in Russia as a science 
and state practice that searched for the causes of suicide in the city, the moral condition 
of the nation, even in civilisation itself.
236 Howard I. Kushner provides analysis of this 
development in Europe and America, exploring the contemporary belief that statistics 
showed suicide to be an illness intrinsic to modernity.
237 Insanity, the third disease of 
Ferri’s painful trinity, was also analysed numerically as a social disease. In Book 2 of 
Mental Pathology and Therapeutics (1845), entitled ‘The Cause and Mode of Origin 
of  Mental  Disease’,  for  example,  Griesinger  presented  statistics  as  a  technology 
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indispensible  to  social  medicine:  ‘The  study  of  the  predisposing  causes  of  mental 
diseases  embraces  […]  the  consideration  of  those  more  distant  relations  which 
influence whole communities, and can only be shown by statistics, their mode of action 
on individuals being quite uninvestigable’.
238 Statistics was an important part of the 
nineteenth-century’s medical response to its perceived array of social sickness. 
Kropotkin also took part in the mapping of deviance, commonly using statistics 
to illuminate what he took to be social diseases. A good example of this approach is 
found  in  The  Terror  in  Russia:  An  Appeal  to  the  British  Nation  (1909).  While 
Kropotkin  is  concerned  with  suicide  in  this  book,  presenting  lists  showing  ‘an 
epidemic of suicides in the prisons of Russia’, his main focus is on crime.
239 In a 
chapter  on  ‘executions’,  Kropotkin  relied  on  official  statistics  to  represent  the 
regularity of murders committed in the Russian state from year to year. By creating his 
own  tabulated  representation  of  murders  and  executions  in  European  Russia  and 
comparing it with government figures, he aimed to prove that crime rates had not risen 
since the 1905 Revolution:  
 
In order to get any correct idea, these [government] figures must be compared 
with  the  numbers  of  murders  and  persons  wounded  in  ordinary  times;  and 
when this is done, it appears that in the numbers that are mentioned in the 
above  [government]  figures  there  is  absolutely  no  extraordinary  increase 
which might in any way excuse the suspension of ordinary justice, and the 
surrender of Russia to the laws that prevail in times of war and to the summary 
justice of Military Courts.
240 
 
The conclusions he reached were political. By enumerating social deviance Kropotkin 
was  able  to  construct  a  political  argument  denouncing  ‘extraordinary’  government 
measures against crime by pointing out the ‘ordinariness’ of crime rates. Using figures 
from 1874 to 1908, he describes a pattern of regularity in the murder rates of the 
Russian state. After 1905, he argued, there was no change to a regular number of 
murders committed from one year to the next. The numbers told no ‘extraordinary’ 
story about increased social unrest that might warrant the suspension of ‘ordinary’ 
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justice.  According  to  Kropotkin,  the  statistical  facts  reveal  no  deviation  from  the 
regular, annual patterns of political deviance.  
Kropotkin used statistics as method that could allow him to make claims about 
the activity of society. In order to make his claim authoritative, his enumerations of 
society had a distinctly public tone. His work professed to be transparent: the sources 
of information supporting his arguments were laid bare in footnotes and citations. In 
The Terror in Russia he cites the Russian newspapers and journals in which he found, 
counted,  and  tabulated  incidents  of  deviance.  Ryech  (The  Speech),  Sovremennoye 
Slovo (The Modern Word), Novoye Vremya (The New Times), and The Warsaw Echo 
are but some of the public sources of information from which Kropotkin’s claim to 
depict the field of social reality derived its authority. In this claim to objectivity, the 
statistical element in Kropotkin’s thought was typical of the public nature of statistics 
emerging in the nineteenth century. As Silvana Patriarca argues in her discussion of 
nineteenth-century  statistics  in  Italy,  ‘the  appropriation  by  the  “public”  of  this 
language of power is perhaps the most distinctive trait of statistics in the nineteenth 
century’.
241 Kropotkin’s was one of the many nineteenth-century public voices able to 
appropriate the language of statistical fact in support of political argument.  
 
 
Visualising Society 
 
Kropotkin used numbers to uncover and make visible certain patterns and phenomena 
that he believed to be ‘real’, but invisible to the naked eye. This was important for a 
thinker who wanted to make political arguments about problems and processes that 
were  ‘social’  and  transcended  individuals.  Patriarca  explains  this  particular  lure  of 
statistics as a claim to offer politics an instrument of ‘“scientific” observation’.
242 With 
this visual aid, politics could bring society into view. 
Kropotkin’s ideas about society relied on the visual possibilities opened up by 
statistics. Often he outlined society’s ‘economic activity’ (a plane of reality entirely 
based on numbers for its conception) statistically before making political arguments. In 
chapter seventeen of The Conquest of Bread, he apologised for the absence of hard 
evidence in support of his views about the importance of agricultural production. To 
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compensate, however, he pointed his readers to where they could find the necessary 
data: ‘It would be impossible to quote here the mass of facts on which we base our 
political assertions. We are therefore obliged to refer our readers who want further 
information  to  another  book,  Fields,  Factories, and Workshops  [my  emphasis]’.
243 
Turning to this book in search of the facts, the reader finds an array of statistical 
information. Figures, equations, calculations, and tables in the appendix are designed 
to make visible and illustrate qualitative ideas such as progress, power, growth, and 
value. The extent to which Kropotkin saw in statistical data a trustworthy image of 
reality is also shown in the prefaces to the first and second editions of Fields, Factories 
and  Workshops  (1899).  The  preface  to  the  first,  written  in  1898,  declares  that 
arguments contained in some parts of the book ‘have been confirmed during the last 
ten years by such a mass of evidence that a very considerable amount of new matter 
had to be introduced, while the chapter on agriculture and the small trades had to be 
written anew’.
244 In 1912, Kropotkin wrote the preface to the second edition, by which 
time  he  once  more  had  at  his  disposal  ‘an  immense  mass  of  new  [statistical] 
materials’.
245 This  information,  he  argued,  verified  the  economic  forecasts  he  had 
made fourteen years earlier. Kropotkin’s political ideas needed to catch-up with newly 
emerging  images  of  reality  presented  by  rapidly  accumulating  statistical  evidence. 
New sets of numbers illustrated new realities to which his politics had to correspond.  
Nowhere was Kropotkin more enthusiastic about counting society than in his 
response to the 1897 imperial census of the Russian Empire. Taking his lead from the 
director of the Russian state’s Central Statistical Committee, Petr Semenov (1827-
1914), Kropotkin wrote ‘The Population of Russia’ (1897) in which he discussed the 
significance  of  the  census.
246 He  was  incredibly  enthusiastic  about  the  census, 
describing how it had collected and classified, by the work of ‘an army of 15,000 
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enumerators’,
247 the  ‘most  valuable  data’
248 necessary  for  visualising  society.  He 
shared the view of Semenov and the Central Statistical Committee that, compared with 
earlier  fiscal-minded  censuses  measuring  individuals  for  purposes  of  taxation,  a 
statistical-ethnographic study was a scientific undertaking indispensable to politics. 
‘The earlier censuses of Russia were not censuses at all’, he wrote. ‘They were mere 
enumerations  of  the  “tax-paying”  peasant  and  small  artisan  population,  which 
enumerations – as P. P. Semenoff remarked in his report – “supplied almost no data for 
science,  were  of  little  value  for  the  administration,  and  were  hateful  to  the 
population”’.
249  
That Kropotkin saw eye-to-eye with the Central Statistical Committee about 
the aspirations of social measuring is striking. In 1897, Kropotkin was a committed 
anarchist whose writing commonly denounced the state and its relation to its subjects. 
Yet, we find him here in full support of a government body founded by the MVD and 
in agreement with the state about how politics should relate epistemologically to its 
subjects. This tension, I believe, can only be explained by the fact that, for Kropotkin, 
statistics was the only means by which to know, think, and write about the social 
realm. He did not accept the political authority of the state, but supported its use of 
statistics as a technology for the production of knowledge.  
The census seemed to promise Kropotkin a new and exciting development in 
social mapping. Just as a cartographical map of the empire’s borderlands could give 
birth to an immense picture of inanimate reality, holding in its simplicity ‘the key to 
the structure of the mountains’,
250 the information provided by the census, he thought, 
could bring about a new and simplified way for politics to cast its eyes over the human 
beings  inhabiting  a  territory.  Indeed,  the  census  was  a  map  of  human  terrain.  It 
simplified reality into a condensed and easily comprehendible form. That the census 
was a mere representation of a complicated world was not a default, but one of its 
virtues. Society could only become visible through such a simplification, could only be 
‘read’ by the imposition of legibility into reality. The reductive nature of the census, its 
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inescapable  tendency  to  generalise,  was  not  a  flaw,  but  the  desirable  effect  of  a 
technique designed to create numerical signs of society on paper.
251 
The statistical art of giving numerical form to reality, a political act that was 
inherent in the 1897 census (or in any census for that matter), had creative qualities 
that  are  important  if  we  are  to  understand  Kropotkin’s  thought  and  his  basic 
conception of society. Kropotkin believed that the census shed light on reality as it 
existed independently of the methods used to represent it. Yet, the census did not 
simply reflect, it produced. It gave birth to new ways of thinking, to new objects for 
scientific study and new fields for political intervention. One idea that came into being 
from  this  project  of  large-scale  counting  was  that  Russia’s  disparate  inhabitants 
constituted  a  ‘population’.  Kropotkin’s  tabulation  of  Russia’s  inhabitants,  ordered 
within various categories relating to particular regions, had the effect of transposing 
individuals and groups into elements, whose meaning resided in their relation to the 
whole. As Holquist shows, the holistic reading of human existence was a common 
product of statistical counting during this period, whereby the classification of the 
Russian Empire’s inhabitants ‘transformed them from hitherto amorphous “people” 
into a well-defined “population”’.
252 Statisticians catalogued individuals according to 
ethnic categories and, once arranged into readable tables and lists, ‘established a grid 
of ethnicity for the Russian Empire’.
253 Moreover, not only were undefined peoples 
converted into definite populations visible to political power, but having been lifted 
from the data, populations came to be seen as being comprised of discrete (ethnical) 
elements.  
Kropotkin recognised the creative power of social mapping. He stated that the 
census could bring into existence a view of the empire’s social terrain that had never 
been  seen  before.  The  tabulated  data  from  the  1897  census,  he  promised,  ‘will 
evidently make it possible […] to compile at last a reliable ethnographic map of the 
Russian  Empire’.
254 Although  Kropotkin  considered  the  ethnographic  mapping  of 
Russia’s territory to be a revealing practice, he acknowledges that this would be a new 
view,  a  possibility  that  had  been  produced.  In  this  way,  statistics  generated  what 
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Patriarca calls ‘“reality effects”’ at the centre of his worldview.
255 As a method in his 
political discourse it had important ‘cognitive implications’, making it possible for him 
to think of human existence in terms of populations and their constituent parts.
256 
 
 
Laws of Chance 
 
Part of the desire to visualise society in the numbers of statistical data stemmed from a 
belief that they could uncover the underlying laws that governed it. Just as the natural 
sciences, equipped with material gained from observation and experiment, sought to 
lay bare the laws governing physical reality, the social sciences too, with statistics 
providing and arranging data about social phenomena, pursued in their numbers the 
laws  governing  social  life.  Numerical  information  about  mass  social  existence, 
therefore, seemed to reflect truths about a social whole that transcended the individuals 
by whom it was constituted. As Theodore M. Porter points out, nineteenth-century 
statisticians  ‘persuaded  their  contemporaries  that  systems  consisting  of  numerous 
autonomous individuals can be studied at a higher level than that of the diverse atomic 
constituents’.
257 ‘Using  statistics’,  Porter  continues,  ‘it  seemed  possible  to  uncover 
general truths about mass phenomena even though the causes of each individual action 
were unknown and might be wholly inaccessible.’
258 Statistics claimed to look down 
on an already constituted social field that was supra-individual and governed by social 
laws. 
Leading statisticians in the nineteenth century had popularised the idea that the 
enumeration  of  human  populations  could  reveal  hidden  social  laws.  The  Belgian 
astronomer  Lambert  Adolphe  Jacques  Quetelet  (1796-1874)  was  one  of  the  most 
influential  voices  making  this  optimistic  claim.  That  Kropotkin  cites  him  as  an 
authority in the field of social measurement makes his ideas important for this study. 
During the middle third of the nineteenth century, Quetelet’s work, as well as his 
organisation of international statistical congresses, was instrumental in propagating the 
view that ‘social physics’ could repeat the successes of ‘natural physics’: statistics 
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could explain social reality in terms of invisible laws and the pressure they exert on 
individuals. As Quetelet implied in ‘Notice on Periodical Phenomena’ (1842), with 
statistical research it was thought possible to ‘determine the laws by which [social 
phenomena] are governed’. It was a practice directed towards the ‘discovery of the 
general connection which exists among all periodical phenomena’.
259 The view that 
social laws existed independently of the methods used to study them, and that they 
revealed themselves in numbers, were core assumptions of Quetelet’s worldview.  
Quetelet’s quest for a science of society had as its leading goal the illumination 
of the laws of deviance.
260 He was particularly interested in counting crime, beginning 
his research in the immediate years following the French government’s publication of 
official crime statistics in 1827. This kind of information made his work possible. 
Quetelet wanted to explain what he found to be regularities in the number of recorded 
crimes that were committed from year to year. Statistics, he believed, could locate the 
factors, like age and sex, which largely determined the likelihood of an individual 
committing crime.
261 They could also make visible the forces outside the individual, 
the forces of the social milieu to which people seemed inextricably bound and whose 
laws appeared to operate on their lives. Quetelet’s influence on nineteenth-century 
social thought was considerable. Statistically minded criminologists, including Ferri, 
to whose statistical work I referred earlier in this chapter, would embrace the task set 
by Quetelet, finding in the labyrinths of criminal statistics not only the causal laws of 
crime, but the clues about how to prevent it. 
Kropotkin,  like  Quetelet,  thought  the  findings  of  statistical  research  gave 
exclusive access to the causal laws of social deviance. In ‘Law and Authority’ (1882), 
he claimed that statistics could reveal the patterns of crime and explain its appearance 
in society: 
 
Statisticians  and  legists  know  that  when  the  severity  of  the  penal  code  is 
lessened there is never an increase in the number of attempts against the lives 
of citizens. On the other hand, when the crops are abundant, when bread is 
cheap and the weather is good, the number of murders decreases at once. It is 
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proved by statistics that the number of crimes increases and declines in relation 
to the price of necessities and to good or bad weather.
262 
 
In  Kropotkin’s  mind,  statistics  undoubtedly  showed  the  correlation  between  the 
occurrences of crime, the price of goods, and the weather. He set the political problem 
of crime within a causal dynamic, whereby it appears subject to certain laws depicting 
the relationship between social behaviour and the environment. 
In In Russian and French Prisons, Kropotkin continued to praise statistics for 
their ability to reveal the laws of crime. When his discussions about the social causes 
of  crime  and  the  ‘predictability’  of  annual  crime  rates  are  viewed  in  relation  to 
Quetelet’s,  the  shared  statistical  interest  of  both  thinkers  becomes  clear.  In  1869, 
Quetelet boasted about the level of exactitude reached by the statistical enumeration of 
crime, implying that the social laws revealed by the figures can be used to predict 
future events: 
 
We are able to enumerate in advance how many individuals will stain their 
hands with the blood of their fellow creatures, how many will be forgers, how 
many poisoners, pretty nearly as one can enumerate in advance the births and 
deaths which must take place.
263 
 
In a remarkably similar passage, Kropotkin claimed that future crime rates could be 
predicted using existing statistical data: 
 
We can predict with great approximation the number of murders that will be 
committed next year in each country of Europe. And if we should take into 
account the disturbing influences which will increase, or diminish, the number 
of  murders  committed,  we  might  predict  the  figures  with  a  still  greater 
accuracy.
264 
 
The confidence both men show in statistics’ ability to predict future crime rates is a 
consequence of their belief that statistical research reveals the laws governing social 
behaviour: such laws make that behaviour regular and repeatable.  
That Kropotkin uses the phrase ‘predict with great approximation’, falling short 
of  claiming  access  to  the  definite,  determined  truth  of  future  events,  depicts  the 
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character of the social laws that he, Quetelet, and others believed statistical research 
was uncovering. The laws that appeared to leap out of nineteenth-century statistics 
were  not  the  universal  laws  of  nature  described  in  eighteenth-century  European 
Enlightenment thought, determining a world of preconceived aims and hidden plans, 
but  laws  of  probability.  As  Hacking  describes,  ‘during  the  nineteenth  century  it 
became possible to see that the world might be regular and yet not subject to universal 
laws of nature. A space was cleared for chance.’
265 The laws of chance were the sum 
effect  of  measurable  variables  existing  in  any  given  environment  that  exerted  an 
influence on social life. Far from showing the unchangeable laws to which social life 
must always submit, the laws of probability claimed to make accurate predictions of its 
activity, events, and behaviour that were most likely to occur under certain prevailing 
conditions. 
Compared  to  nineteenth-century  laws  of  probability,  the  eighteenth-century 
notion of deterministic natural law allows no room for the operation of chance. In 
‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1784), Kant argued that 
individuals  are  ‘unwittingly  guided  in  their  advance  along  a  course  intended  by 
nature’.
266 His idea of natural law was equal to a ‘definite plan of nature’. When Kant 
imagines historical development severed from the explanatory construct of natural law, 
he foresees a chaotic, worrying situation: ‘If we abandon this basic principle, we are 
faced not with a law-governed nature, but with an aimless, random process, and the 
dismal reign of chance replaces the guiding principles of our reason [my emphasis]’.
267 
Kant’s theory of natural law is typical of the Age of Reason, where, as Hacking says, 
‘chance had been the superstition of the vulgar’.
268  
By  Kropotkin’s  late  nineteenth-century  context,  the  notion  of  causation  in 
social law relied on the ideas of probability and chance that were made visible by 
population statistics. In ‘Anarchism: Its Philosophy and Ideal’, Kropotkin was clear 
about this new understanding of natural and social law, framing probability against the 
idea of determinism characteristic of Kant and the Enlightenment Age of Reason: 
 
As  to  the  harmony  that  the  human  mind  discovers  in  nature,  and  which 
harmony  is  on  the  whole  but  the  verification  of  a  certain  stability  of 
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phenomena, the modern man of science no doubt recognizes it more than ever. 
But he no longer tries to explain it by the action of laws conceived according to 
a certain plan pre-established […]. What used to be called “natural law” is 
nothing but a certain relation among phenomena which we dimly see, and each 
“law”  takes  a  temporary  character  of  causality;  that  is  to  say:  If  such  a 
phenomenon is produced under such conditions, such another phenomenon will 
follow.
269 
 
In  contrast  to  Kant,  Kropotkin  allowed  for  ‘nothing  preconceived  in  what  we  call 
harmony  in  Nature’.  Harmony,  regularity,  and  repeatability  in  social  activity  were 
merely forms of ‘momentary equilibrium’, the result of a particular arrangement of 
conditions.
270 In  Modern  Science  and  Anarchism,  Kropotkin  reiterated  that  natural 
laws were not fixed forever, but conditional: ‘every natural law always means this: – 
“If such and such conditions are at work, the result will be this and that […].” Always, 
there is an if – a condition to be fulfilled’.
271 Kropotkin’s thought is a philosophical 
space where determinism has given way to chance. 
  An area of Kropotkin’s thought where we can notice the laws of chance having 
full  reign  is  that  of  his  biological  evolutionism.  Hacking  argues  that  evolutionary 
theorising from the mid-nineteenth century ‘was to import chance into biology’.
272 
Kropotkin recognises the significance of this historical development. In ‘The Theory 
of  Evolution  and  Mutual  Aid’  (1910),  he  acknowledges  Quetelet  for  making  this 
import  and  bringing  statistical  thinking  to  the  biological  sciences:  ‘Quetelet’,  he 
pointed out, ‘had extended these laws [of probability] to facts of organic life; now we 
see  that  they  fully  apply  to  variation’.
273 With  nineteenth-century  statistics  and 
Darwinian  biology,  the  fearful  image  of  a  chaotic,  accidental,  and  random  world 
outlined  by  Kant  in  the  eighteenth  century,  where  the  ‘dismal  reign  of  chance’ 
threatened the basis of rational knowledge, became a reality for Kropotkin which was 
inherent in the most fundamental conception of life itself. Evolution was a ‘multitude 
of variations which appear in every generation of plants and animals without any pre-
conceived plan, as a consequence of the multitude of forces acting in all directions’.
274 
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For Kropotkin, evolution was a typical example of conditional causes and effects, a 
life process governed by the laws of chance. 
It is important to understand this meaning of ‘law’ in Kropotkin’s thought. 
Often  scholars  rightly  point  out  Kropotkin’s  belief  and  interest  in  laws,  but  rarely 
examine their character, how they could be seen, how they are caused, and how they 
operate on human beings. Crowder, for example, writes that as a classical anarchist, 
Kropotkin  ‘assume[s]  the  existence  of  an  objective  moral  law  of  nature’  without 
explaining how Kropotkin thought this law worked.
275 If we are to properly appreciate 
Kropotkin’s ideas about social change and revolutionary transformation (ideas that I 
will  explore  in  part  two),  the  conditional,  environmental,  and  potentially  alterable 
nature  of  social,  moral,  and  natural  law  in  his  thought  needs  to  be  recognised  as 
something distinct from an Enlightenment conception of law that Crowder identifies as 
a central influence on classical anarchism. Of course, as I have shown, Kropotkin’s 
political  ideas  did  not  look  upon  a  social  world  that  was  fixed  by  deterministic, 
Kantian laws of nature. The only task remaining for politics in the face of such laws is 
to gain knowledge of them and conform. But because Kropotkin saw human existence 
as subject to conditional laws, an ensemble of causes and effects that were literally 
dependent on socio-economic, political, and environmental conditions, politics could 
not only hope to know social laws, but to alter them by through the revolutionary 
rearrangement of the conditions of life. Owing to the fact that the social laws of crime, 
suicide, insanity, death, birth, and a whole range of social phenomena were identified 
by statistics to be the sum effect of conditional factors, their character, and thus their 
effects, could be changed by political revolution. This possibility for intervention is 
explored in the following chapter, where Kropotkin’s desire to interfere with nature is 
treated as a political ambition. 
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3 Transforming the Social  
 
If you apply to the study of the social question the severe inductive standards of the 
naturalist, you will end up in our ranks.
276 
 
Kropotkin, ‘To the Young’. 
 
 
As the epigraph to this chapter indicates, as an object for politics, Kropotkin thought 
society constituted a distinct, singular entity that should be treated from the standpoint 
of natural science. He perceived the existence of a social body, an organism with 
visible  and  measurable  qualities.  Society  existed  in  tables  of  catalogued  and 
categorised data, in charts, graphs, and maps. He literally saw its characteristics: its 
ages, occupations, births, deaths, productive output, crime rates, health, sicknesses, 
progress,  and  decline.  Kropotkin  required  evidence  to  believe  in  the  existence  of 
society.  
  Kropotkin could conceive of society as ‘people in the aggregate’.
277 In so far as 
the individual was bound to society, it remained so not through bonds of political law, 
but by regulatory and self-governing social laws. The individual became a particular 
expression of the character of the social realm, its actions corroborating or defying 
social law, its hardships and tribulations part of broader social problems, its life an 
indicator of the broader quality of social health. Within this context, descriptions of 
society’s character did not come to Kropotkin from the depths of political philosophy, 
but were accessible to him in the shape of scientific reports, in ethnographical and 
anthropological research, in sociology, criminology, and psychology. Society became 
an  artefact  subject  to  the  gaze  of  scientific  knowledge:  it  could  be  analysed, 
understood, and explained. Kropotkin’s idea of society, then, was a reified entity made 
knowable by science and social counting. Owing to the fact that he ‘recognises no 
method of research [for politics] but the scientific’, the only way for Kropotkin to 
acquire knowledge of this entity was by studying it scientifically.
278 As he wrote in 
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‘Anarchism: Its Philosophy and Ideal’, ‘our first task is to find out by an analysis of 
society its characteristic tendencies’.
279 For Kropotkin, the notion of society came into 
being as a result of the production of scientific knowledge about a biological entity. 
 
 
Taming Nature 
 
In  a  chapter  of  Fields,  Factories  and  Workshops,  entitled  ‘The  Possibilities  of 
Agriculture’, Kropotkin described a new relationship of science to plants: 
 
New  horizons  are  continually  unveiled.  For  the  last  fifty  years  science  – 
especially chemistry – and mechanical skill have been widening and extending 
the industrial powers of man upon organic and inorganic dead matter. Prodigies 
have  been  achieved  in  that  direction.  Now  comes  the  turn  of  similar 
achievements with living plants. Human skill in the treatment of living matter, 
and science – in its branch dealing with living organisms – step in with the 
intention of doing for the art of food-growing what mechanical and chemical 
skill have done in the art of fashioning and shaping metals, wood and dead 
fibres  of  plants.  Almost  every  year  brings  some  new,  often  unexpected 
improvement.
280 
 
Kropotkin represented this relationship as the next step in science’s conquest over 
nature: science had progressed from wielding its power over dead matter to affecting 
living entities. What captivated Kropotkin most about developments in agriculture was 
the apparent ease with which science could modify life. The description of this effect 
was one of intervention, a form of interference whereby science ‘steps in’ with the 
intention of causing a change in nature. Kropotkin marvelled at how, in the hands of 
humanity, science’s intervention into nature was a ‘treatment’ of life. The application 
of  science  was  a  form  of  ‘art’,  he  wrote,  a  way  of  ‘fashioning’  living  things:  the 
shaping of nature in order to improve it. 
Kropotkin thought that politics should occupy a similar position in its relation 
to society: it ‘must take, with regard to human societies, a position analogous to that 
which is occupied by Physiology with regard to plants and animals’.
281 Just as the 
physiologist moves from an analysis of a plant to an attempt to refashion and shape its 
life, politics must, after scientifically and statistically describing society, ‘step in’ and 
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transform it. If, as Kropotkin made clear, ‘the purpose of each science being prediction 
and application to the demands of practical life’, then science was not only necessary 
to know society, but the means through which politics could modify it.
282 Kropotkin’s 
epistemological and methodological assumptions I outlined in chapters one and two 
gave  society  content,  character,  and  form.  Together,  they  led  to  another  important 
aspect of his outlook on reality: the idea that society was a malleable material which 
politics could alter and improve scientifically. 
Kropotkin’s view that the relationship of politics to society is analogous to that 
of the physiologist to plant life is an apt metaphorical conception. Zygmunt Bauman 
and  Scott  both  find  the  metaphor  of  gardening  useful  for  their  explorations  and 
explanations of modernity. Bauman describes the coming of modernity as ‘a process of 
transformation of wild cultures into garden cultures’.
283 The role of politics, he argues, 
increasingly took on the responsibility of the gardener to his garden, who continually 
tends,  treats,  and  shapes  a  natural,  though  artificially  constructed  and  intentionally 
ordered environment according to his instrumental and aesthetic views. The life of the 
garden is part of nature, but the conditions, limits, and purpose of its existence have 
been externally imposed and prescribed by the scientific norms of horticulture. Scott 
considers the project of the gardener as ‘an appropriate parallel’ to nineteenth-century 
visions  of  sweeping  social  transformation.
284 The  belief  of  the  gardener  that  his 
technologies, tools, and botanical knowledge will maintain and improve garden life is 
illustrative of political designs for society. He not only has the task of administering 
life, through correct watering, choice of soils and composts, and allowance of light, but 
also bears the responsibility of taming its latent wildness. He must prune, cut, and 
weed out recalcitrant elements. Though levelled at individuals, his intervention always 
has as its main priority the health and beauty of the whole garden.   
The gardening metaphor is appropriate as a way to understand Kropotkin’s 
conception of the relationship of politics to society. Indeed, his own reference to the 
analogy  encourages  us  to  think  about  his  political  approach  to  society  as  bearing 
resemblance  to  a  physiologist  peering  down  the  microscope  at  a  plant.  Yet,  for 
Kropotkin, the ideal relationship between politics and the social should not simply be 
comparable to plant physiology, but identical: 
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We are [able] to undertake the study of the most arduous social questions in 
exactly the same way as the gardener on the one hand, and the physiologist on 
the other hand, study the most favourable conditions for the growth of a plant – 
let us do so!
285 
 
The relationship was not analogous. The responsibility of politics is identical to that of 
the  gardener:  to  manufacture  the  environment  in  which  life  will  be  best  able  to 
develop. Again, Kropotkin takes metaphor and makes it real. The role of politics was 
to create the social conditions most favourable for the healthy life of human beings. 
Politics should condition the very existence of individuals and societies. Kropotkin’s 
literalism sheds light on the connection between diagnosis and remedy in his political 
thought: the most pressing social problems should be identified and overcome with the 
same knowledge and method. 
  In this seamless transition from a faith in science’s ability to explain, to an 
application of its power to transform, Kropotkin’s thought moves along what Scott 
terms ‘the path from description to prescription’ that characterises his portrayal of 
high-modernist  ambition.
286 This  broad  theme  of  nineteenth-  and  twentieth-century 
political and social thought presupposes that far-reaching improvements to human life 
were possible if societies, like gardens, could be rationalised according to scientific 
knowledge: 
 
[High modernism] is best conceived as a strong […] version of the beliefs in 
scientific and technical progress that were associated with industrialization in 
Western Europe and in North America from roughly 1830 until World War I. 
At its center was a supreme confidence about continued linear progress, the 
development  of  scientific  and  technical  knowledge,  the  expansion  of 
production,  the  rational  design  of  social  order,  the  growing  satisfaction  of 
human  needs,  and,  not  least,  an  increasing  control  over  nature  (including 
human  nature)  commensurate  with  scientific  understanding  of  natural  laws. 
High modernism is thus a particularly sweeping vision of how the benefits of 
technical and scientific progress might be applied […] in every field of human 
activity.
287 
 
Scott presents high modernism as a fluid ideology that could inform projects for social 
change conceived on the left, the right, and the centre of the political spectrum. It 
inspired revolutionary and non-revolutionary, state- and non-state-driven schemes to 
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improve the human condition. ‘Its main carriers and exponents’, he writes ‘were the 
avant-garde  among  engineers,  planners,  technocrats,  high-level  administrators, 
architects,  scientists,  and  visionaries.’
288 Included  in  Scott’s  Hall  of  Fame  of  high-
modernism were figures such as Saint-Simon, Lenin, Leon Trotsky, and the Shah of 
Iran.  
My motivation for leading the analysis of Kropotkin’s understanding of and 
approach to society into the terrain of high-modernism is not to add his name to Scott’s 
Hall of Fame. Neither do I wish to reinterpret Kropotkin as a high-modernist thinker 
who should be lifted from a context of anarchist political thought and understood in 
relation to technocrats, administrators, planners, and architects. My reasoning for this 
detour  is  two-fold.  First,  to  reinforce  the  notion  –  one  that  Kropotkin  repeatedly 
emphasised – that when he thought about society from a political point of view he did 
so as a scientist apprehending an organism:  a reified entity that could be rationalised 
and improved through the application of scientific technique and knowledge. Second, 
to bring to light the fact that an anarchist thinker could share not only the conceptual 
approach, but also the broadly framed ambitions of often centralised, bureaucratic, 
imperative, hierarchically coordinated political agencies.
289 I do not seek to illuminate 
Kropotkin’s wish for society to be rationally designed or his desire to tame nature in 
order to play down the significance of his anarchist politics. On the contrary, I draw 
attention to these central features of his worldview in order to assess their political 
implications for Kropotkin’s anarchism. 
According to Scott, ‘the belief that it was man’s destiny to tame nature to suit 
his interests and preserve his safety is perhaps the keystone of high modernism’.
290 The 
appeal of this possibility, he argues, ‘gripped intellectuals of almost every political 
persuasion’.
291 In order to convey its ubiquitous nature in nineteenth-century thought, 
Scott quotes a famous passage from the Communist Manifesto (1848) in which Marx 
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and Engels glorify capitalism’s increasing command over nature.
292 This ambition was 
not only alive in authoritarian state-centric socialism, however, but in the anarchism of 
Kropotkin.  Although  a  naturalised  vision  of  society  was  his  prime  target,  the 
transformative ambition to ‘tame’ embraced the whole of nature. Society was but part 
of  a  larger,  natural  world,  whose  existence  could  also  be  explored,  altered,  and 
improved. In the opening chapter of The Conquest of Bread, Kropotkin lauded the 
ability of humanity to conquer nature and submit it to the demands of scientific and 
technological modernity: 
 
Thousands  of  highways  and  railroads  furrow  the  earth,  and  pierce  the 
mountains. The shriek of the engine is heard in the wild gorges of the Alps, the 
Caucasus and the Himalayas. The rivers have been made navigable; the coasts, 
carefully surveyed, are easy of access; artificial harbours, laboriously dug out 
and protected against the fury of the sea, afford shelter to the ships.
 293 
 
Kropotkin’s pride at the technological progress of the nineteenth century is qualified 
by  the  extent  to  which  the  forces  of  nature  could  be  suppressed.  Great  mountain 
ranges, the once impenetrable emblems of nature, are cut open and pierced by the 
railway, whose artificial scream dominates the soundscape of the wild environment. 
Man-made modifications are sliced into the coastlines, where the once terrifying and 
capricious fury of the ocean now lays timid and tamed. Kropotkin equated progress 
with victory over a powerful, though potentially submissive natural world. 
Kropotkin’s stories of humanity’s successful conquests over nature during the 
nineteenth century continue in Fields, Factories and Workshops where he describes 
the weapons that have made nature bend to the will of progress: ‘the formidable array 
of implements, machines, and prime-motors […] has shown to humanity how to utilise 
and  manage  the  forces  of  nature’.
294 The  totalising  ambition  to  break  nature’s 
resistance was a prerequisite to its manipulation. The strength of human knowledge 
over nature was, as Kropotkin put it, ‘formidable’: in its desire to progress, humanity 
wielded  an  impressive,  though  intimidating  power  over  a  world  that  it  sought  to 
control. 
Society would not escape this formidable quest for control. While recognising 
that human skill, knowledge, and ingenuity were the agents behind its transformative 
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ambitions, Kropotkin analysed human societies as natural phenomena and thus placed 
them at the mercy of rational science. He had a double assessment of humanity as both 
transformer and transformed. Progress was about humanity’s increasing power over 
itself, an effort to tame and manage the forces of its own nature. Humanity’s natural 
status qualified society as a legitimate realm for intervention. 
The ambition to improve society with politically administered science involved 
an effort to change it according to the most advanced technical standards. Forms of 
personal and social life, it seemed, could be changed for the better. Through the total 
application of machinery to the domestic realm, technology could not only improve 
people’s daily lives, but transform their existence. Domestic work and the laborious 
activities  of  the  day  would  benefit  from  mechanisation.  ‘Machinery  of  all  kinds’, 
Kropotkin argued, could be ‘introduced into households’.
295 Machines for blackening 
boots, for washing and cleaning could not only make life easier, he argued, but would 
create the opportunities for human beings to experience a quickened, rationalised pace 
of living. In The Conquest of Bread, he endowed modern technology with the power to 
engineer new forms of life and social interaction. He spoke of 
 
machinery palaces where [people] will spend their five or six hours of leisure; 
where they will make experiments; where they will find others, experts in other 
branches of industry, likewise coming to study some difficult problem, and 
therefore able to help and enlighten each other, the encounter of their ideas and 
experiences causing the longed-for solution to be found.
296 
 
For Kropotkin, scientific technology should occupy a special position in society: as a 
new master of men, machinery belongs in the majesty of palaces. Technology can 
allow for humanity’s experimentation with and control over nature. The application of 
machinery to social life could solve society’s problems: it could manufacture new 
ways of living. Kropotkin presented the shaping qualities of mechanical intervention as 
potentially limitless. Its effects could even reach the minds of human beings, elevating 
their consciousness to new, enlightened heights. 
The peasantry posed a particular problem to Kropotkin’s totalising ambition to 
scientifically modernise the social realm. As the least modernised part of nineteenth-
century European societies, rural life represented to him a huge part of nature yet to be 
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tamed by rational science. This was a general obstacle that appeared to stand in the 
way  of  many  modernising  projects  and  ambitions  in  nineteenth-century  social  and 
political thought. In the 1870s, Russian Populist Petr Lavrov (1823-1900) saw the 
same overwhelming problem of a peasant population whose traditional ways of life 
stood in contrast to the prescriptions of progress. In ‘Historical Letters’ (1870), he 
summed up the problem that Kropotkin would face later in the century: ‘The majority 
[…] set up idols in place of truth and justice, or they limit themselves to truth and 
justice in thought but not in life, or they do not want to see what an insignificant 
minority enjoys the advantages of the progress of civilization’.
297 In his discussion of 
nineteenth-century  scientific  modernity,  David  L.  Hoffmann  highlights  the  same 
problematic aspects of traditional peasant life set out by Lavrov. Religious faith stood 
in the way of rational thought and the pursuit towards objective standards of scientific 
truth. Rural life lacked modern technological forms of production, transportation, and 
communication.  And  the  countryside  remained  bound  in  local  contexts,  not  yet 
integrated into broader economic and political frameworks.
298 
Kropotkin  confronted  the  same  obstacles  in  peasant  life.  He  believed  they 
could be overcome with the extensive application of scientific thought and technology 
to  the  countryside.  He  argued  that  farming  could  not  continue  with  its  traditional 
methods and that it should take on an industrial character: ‘Cultivation of the soil is no 
longer  possible  without  machinery’,  he  argued,  ‘without  great  irrigation  works, 
without railways, without manure factories’.
299 Owing to the intervention of scientific 
technology, the peasant commune would cease to be an isolated, disconnected vestige 
of  a  pre-modern  world,  and  would  become  part  of  a  highly  industrialised, 
interconnected social whole. With the telegraph, railway, and machines the commune 
of the nineteenth century could not hope ‘to enclose itself within its walls’, but would 
try to ‘extend itself, to universalise itself’.
300 The work and universe of the peasant 
would be transformed.  
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Art of Government 
 
Kropotkin was not alone in insisting that politics was a form of social gardening. It 
was an idea that resonated with Western political thought in the late nineteenth century 
as it strove to submit nature further and further to the demands of modern civilisation. 
In ‘Evolution and Ethics: Prolegomena’ (1894), for example, Huxley described the 
politics of modernity as a ‘horticultural process’.
301 By ‘the intervention of man’, wild 
nature – including human nature and the life of societies – was being ‘made into a 
garden’.
302 Huxley recognised that the key characteristic of horticultural politics is that 
of establishing the conditions in which the life of the garden grows: ‘The tendency of 
the horticultural process is the adjustment of the conditions to the needs of the forms of 
plant life which the gardener desires to raise’.
303 In his emphasis on the responsibility 
of politics to adjust and arrange the conditions of societies most favourable to the life 
of individuals, Huxley shared the same concern later put forward by Kropotkin: the 
primary  object  of  politics  is  a  conception  of  society  itself,  understood  as  a  set  of 
conditions, parameters, limits, and allowances in which the life of a certain type of 
person will develop. Huxley reiterates the point: ‘The gardener […] attempts to modify 
the conditions, in such a manner as to bring about the survival of those forms which 
most nearly approach the standard of the useful, or the beautiful, which he has in 
mind’.
304 With the same rationale as the gardener, politics seeks to reach and affect the 
life of individual organisms by modifying their environment. It hopes to encourage 
desirable ways of life not in direct contact with individuals, but by intervening in the 
realm of their existence.  
Huxley saw in the activity of gardening the qualities and intentions of the artist. 
Through metaphor he suggests that political interventions into society bring about an 
artificial environment for human life: 
 
It will be admitted that the garden is as much a work of art, or artifice, as 
anything that can be mentioned. The energy localised in certain human bodies, 
directed by similarly localised intellects, has produced a collocation of other 
material bodies which could not be brought about in the state of nature. The 
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same  proposition  is  true  of  all  the  works  of  man’s  hands,  from  a  flint 
implement to a cathedral or a chronometer; and it is because it is true, that we 
call  these  things  artificial,  term  them  works  of  art,  or  artifice,  by  way  of 
distinguishing them from the products of the cosmic process, working outside 
man, which we call natural, or works of nature.
305 
 
When Kropotkin described humanity’s intervention into food growing as a form of art, 
I  think  he  had  in  mind  the  process  outlined  by  Huxley.  Scientifically  and 
technologically  aided  agriculture,  he  believed,  produced  artifice  from  nature.  It 
brought  into  existence  something  man-made  that  resulted  from  the  imposition  of 
human-willed form onto the otherwise formlessness of the wild. Farms, greenhouses, 
vegetable  plots,  and  manure  factories  all  imposed  new  forms  on  nature  that  were 
distinguishable from its ‘original’ or ‘natural’ state.  
Politics, in its intentions to modify the social realm, also aspired to artistry. 
Kropotkin’s  conception  of  politics  as  a  constant  ‘gardening’  of  the  conditions  of 
human life and a taming of nature rested on the notion that human beings could take 
control over and manufacture the world in which they lived. According to Foucault, 
this ambition represents a new idea of politics that came about in Europe during the 
late eighteenth century and which came to characterise the expectations of politics in 
the  nineteenth  century.  Before  the  appearance  of  the  technologies  to  count  and 
visualise populations, and the forms of knowledge to analyse them, he argues, politics 
was  conceptualised  as  an  art  of  rulership.  Foucault  describes  how  in  The Prince, 
Machiavelli advises political power about how to rule and keep one’s principality:  
 
The  objective  of  the  exercise  of  power  [in  The  Prince]  is  to  reinforce, 
strengthen and protect the principality, but with this last understood to mean 
not the objective ensemble of its subjects and territory, but rather the prince’s 
relation to what he owns […]. [I]t is essentially a treatise about the prince’s 
ability to keep his principality.
306 
 
By contrast, the new notion of politics that became prominent in the nineteenth century 
differed  from  the  art  of  rulership  in  that  it  had  as  its  object  not  the  territory  and 
subjects of a principality, but an ensemble of relationships between living beings and 
the  conditions  of  their  existence.  Foucault  suggests  that  the  idea  of  an  art  of 
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government emerged, whose exercise of power was targeted at the arrangement of 
social reality. 
Foucault  argues  that  the  art  of  government  addressed  ‘a  set  of  problems 
specific to the issue of population’.
307 But what were the problems specific to life and 
its environment that the art of government sought to reconcile? A look down the list of 
Kropotkin’s concerns in The Conquest of Bread offers an insight into the problems of 
population facing politics in the late nineteenth century: housing, disease prevention, 
poverty,  domestic  work,  urban  planning  –  including  electrification,  sanitation,  the 
securing  of  public  leisure  space,  street  paving  and  lighting  –  transportation, 
communication,  education,  food,  clothing,  and  water  supply.  In  dealing  with  such 
problems specific to populations, Kropotkin’s thought shows the horticultural aspect to 
the art of governing: it required a continual process of detailed adjustment. It aspired 
towards  the  artificial  organisation  of  nature  that  best  corresponded  to  standards  of 
health, utility, and beauty. 
Such were the set of problems specific to the issue of population. Together, 
they  constituted  the  holistic  arena  for  the  intervention  of  politics:  the  social.  As 
Hoffmann shows, by Kropotkin’s time this ‘new realm’ had become the recognised 
space in which political authority found its sphere of application: 
 
‘The social’ [was] a new realm created in the late nineteenth century when a 
variety  of  problems  were  grouped  together  and  acted  on  by  a  body  of 
governmental officials and qualified personnel in the fields of medicine, social 
work, demography, urban planning, and social hygiene.
308 
 
Although he could specify individually the manifold problems facing humanity in an 
industrialising and urbanising world – disease, overcrowding, poverty, famine, etc. – 
Kropotkin  often  grouped  them  together  under  a  broader  term:  ‘the  great  social 
question’:  the  state  of  the  garden  itself.
309 Only  if  this  social  realm  were  treated 
scientifically, he insisted, could it be affected and improved. 
The problem for politics, therefore, was the task of arranging the social realm 
in such a way that the needs of the population would be met. Kropotkin understood 
this as a matter of economy. This did not mean managing a complex monetary flow, 
but governing the relationships, operations, functions, and processes of the social field. 
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Kropotkin’s  use  of  the  word  ‘economy’  follows  the  meaning  it  takes  on  from  the 
eighteenth century, described by Foucault as an idea ‘to designate a level of reality, a 
field of intervention’.
310 While the economy or arrangement of the social realm was 
Kropotkin’s primary concern, he was able to describe desired economies of smaller 
fields of reality which could be secured through the intervention of politics. He showed 
how the productivity of working populations in large industrial works, for example, 
could be improved through the arrangement of the things constituting its reality: ‘In 
these  works,  light,  cleanliness,  the  space  allotted  to  each  bench,  are  but  a  simple 
question of economy. Work is better done when you can see what you do, and have 
elbow-room’.
311 Kropotkin’s  idea  of  political  intervention,  then,  although  non-
hierarchical,  is  one  of  populations  exercising  power  over  themselves  through  the 
creation  of  new  economies.  It  is  a  politics  that  allows  populations  to  affect  their 
condition – increase their productivity, improve their health – by adjusting the world 
around  them,  and  thus  relations  within  them,  in  accordance  with  pre-determined 
scientific norms.  
What did it mean for politics to intervene and ‘economise’ social reality? For 
Kropotkin, this involved the same process of ‘adjustment’ that he considered applying 
to large factories. The political art of economising society was, as Foucault describes, 
not  concerned  with  managing  territories  and  inhabitants,  but  with  governing  ‘a 
complex  of  men  and  things’.
312 The  target  of  politics,  the  place  where  it  acquires 
meaning as a power capable of affecting life, is the nexus of human beings and things: 
the social realm. The words of Foucault help illustrate the forces that came together to 
produce this interconnected level of reality: 
 
The things which this sense of government [the art of government] is to be 
concerned  are  in  fact  men,  but  men  in  their  relations,  their  links,  the 
imbrication  with  those  other  things  which  are  wealth,  resources,  means  of 
substance, the territory with its specific qualities, climate irrigation, fertility, 
etc.; men in their relation to that other kind of things, customs, habits, ways of 
acting and thinking, etc.; lastly men in their relation to that other kind of things, 
accidents, and misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death, etc.
313 
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Kropotkin is similarly concerned with the imbrication of men and things described by 
Foucault.  Politics  is  a  question  about  how  ‘things  are  arranged’.
314  Political 
intervention can address the ‘social question’ in so far as it can arrange the relations 
between people, between people and their environment, and between people and their 
nature.  His  ideas  for  the  altering  of  urban  space,  increased  public  hygiene, 
technological  production,  the  dissemination  of  rational  thought  throughout  the 
expanses of rural life, allotted leisure time, etc. are all, as he put it, ‘arrangements’.
315 
They are invested with the intention of governing an ensemble of relations. 
The following sets of specific proposals Kropotkin put forward for affecting 
the social realm show his belief that politics should aspire to modify the arrangement, 
or  economy,  of  people  and  things.  In  Memoirs of a Revolutionist,  he  wrote  about 
politics  as  a  constructive  activity  in  whose  jurisdiction  should  be  things  like 
‘dwellings, gas works, supplies of food, sanitary arrangements, etc.’
316 In ‘Anarchism’ 
(1910), he continued to emphasise the necessity to scientifically arrange the social 
realm. Science should be applied ‘for all possible purposes: production, consumption 
and exchange, communications, sanitary arrangements, education, mutual protection, 
defence  of  the  territory,  and  so  on’.
317 Clearly  Kropotkin  had  in  mind  a  radical 
reordering  of  the  economy  of  the  social  realm.  A  new,  ordered  economy  would 
transform peoples’ relations to each other through technologised communications and 
rationalised urban housing, their relations to resources by altering modes of production 
and  consumption,  their  relations  to  thought  and  behaviour  through  educational 
arrangements, and their relations to the accidents of famine and epidemics through 
food supply and sanitation.  
This  style  of  gardening  politics  pursued  a  definite  objective.  Scientific 
arrangements of society aimed to ‘guarantee the necessities of life to its inhabitants’.
318 
He  invested  politics  with  the  power  to  achieve  its  chief  end  –  securing  a  healthy 
population  –  not  by  the  imposition  of  laws,  but  by  the  disposition  of  elements 
constituting the social realm. In this sense, Kropotkin’s conception of political power 
is  again  typical  of  what  Foucault  describes  as  the  nineteenth-century  art  of 
government: politics could most effectively govern life not by ‘imposing laws on men; 
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but [by] disposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws’.
319 For 
Kropotkin, this form of government embodied the artificial qualities of politics: the 
ambition to scientifically modify the arrangement of society in order to affect the life 
of its human constituents: 
 
We may define this science as: The study of the needs of mankind, and the 
means of satisfying them […]. Its true name should be physiology of society. It 
constitutes a parallel science to the physiology of plants and animals, which is 
the study of the needs of plants and animals, and of the most advantageous 
ways of satisfying them. In the series of sociological sciences, the economy of 
human societies takes the place occupied in the series of biological sciences by 
the physiology of organic bodies.
320 
 
Kropotkin’s social physiology is a version of the art of government. Its method was 
tactical: to govern human life by the very intentional and rational disposing of the 
things and relationships of the social field. Its objective was biological: to improve 
social health and satisfy human needs. His expectation of politics was artistic: the 
taming, management, and modification of nature into distinctly artificial forms. 
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Part Two 
 
The Diagnostic and Remedial Politics of Anarchism 	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4 The State 
 
The plague is already on our doorsteps; we must destroy its causes, and even if we 
have to proceed by fire and iron, we must not hesitate. It is a question of the salvation 
of humanity.
321 
 
Kropotkin, ‘The Inevitability of Revolution’ (1882). 
 
 
Kropotkin’s article ‘The Inevitability of Revolution’ diagnosed the problems facing the 
modern world. He evaluated the state of Western civilisation with fearful pessimism. 
After  outlining  the  features  of  its  decline,  drawing  on  ideas  of  degeneracy  that  I 
discussed in chapter one, the article finished with a summary about the affliction of 
society in the late nineteenth century. Human beings faced a biological threat: their 
bodily health suffered from epidemics of contagious diseases. As a species, humanity’s 
existence was in danger of coming to an end. Degeneration, however, was an effect 
that  could  be  understood,  checked,  and  reversed  if  its  causes  could  be  known 
scientifically. In order to be saved from certain death, humanity would have to locate 
the origins of its own disorders. The great scientific task facing anarchism in the late 
nineteenth century was to prevent extinction by eradicating the causes of the plague.  
Kropotkin found many of the causes of the plague in the modern state. The 
decline of human beings was an effect of political regimes that created the conditions 
and environments in which they lived. His attempt to highlight the state’s damaging 
relationship to the human condition built on a nineteenth-century tradition of anarchist 
political thought: anarchists throughout the century had tried to lay bare the political 
roots of what they took to be the negative, undesirable features of social existence. 
Although  Kropotkin  was  contributing  to  anarchism’s  nineteenth-century  project  of 
unmasking the power of the modern state, the power he sought to expose was more 
than  authoritarian,  but  a  bio-power  that  threatened  biological  existence.  In  its 
arrangement and management of the world, Kropotkin saw not only the propensity of 
the modern state to dominate over people, but its tendency to infect and contaminate. 
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Kropotkin  traced  the  development  of  the  modern  state  in  ‘The  State:  Its 
Historic Role’ (1896). His analysis presented a narrative of an interdependent, dual 
process of historical change: the more powerfully the state took hold of society, the 
unhealthier its life became: 
 
The state emerges…and then – death! Yes: death – or renewal! Either the state 
forever, crushing individual and local life, taking over in all fields of human 
activity, bringing with it its wars and its domestic struggles for power […] and 
inevitably at the end of this development there is…death! Or the destruction of 
the state, and new life starting again.
322 
 
Kropotkin  identified  the  increasing  strength  of  the  state  with  humanity’s  greater 
proximity  to  death.  It  was  a  critique  that  made  sense  within  his  biological 
understanding of politics. The failure of state politics was betrayed by the degenerate 
state of society. For Kropotkin, this was a yardstick for politics that underpinned his 
theory  of  the  state.  Its  pestilential  effects  could  be  read  in  bodies  and  minds,  in 
defective  changes  empirically  verified  by  scientific  investigation.  Moreover,  the 
biological  menace  of  the  state  was  measurable:  statistical  studies  of  society  could 
count its diseases, suicides, crimes, and insanities. Knowledge of the threat of the state 
was accessible through scientific study.  
 
 
Knowing the Enemy 
 
Saul Newman highlights anarchism’s distrust of the state as the driving force behind 
its critique of Marxism in the nineteenth century. Through this critique, he argues, 
anarchism had succeeded in both locating the place and scrutinising the operation of 
power: 
 
The anarchist critique exposed Marxism’s inadequacy in dealing with questions 
of noneconomic power and authority: by reducing political power to economic 
power, by seeing the economy as ultimately determining, Marxism has failed to 
take account of other autonomous sources of power and has thereby neglected 
their dangers […]. Anarchism, on the other hand, has, through its confrontation 
with Marxism, opened the way for a critique of these noneconomic forms of 
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power. By breaking the hold economic determinism had on radical political 
theory, anarchists have allowed power to be studied in its own right.
323 
 
In  its  interrogation  of  the  centralised  political  authority  of  states,  anarchism  had 
isolated a form of power seemingly invisible to the Marxist. An exclusive focus on 
society  as  the  place  of  power  and  domination,  with  its  class  structures  and  social 
relations,  blinded  Marxism  from  the  autonomous,  determining  power  intrinsic  to 
political states. In contrast to the Marxist view of the state’s neutrality, and thus its 
possible instrumentalisation as a tool of revolution, anarchism invests the state with its 
own agency and force. At the hands of the anarchists, political power is stripped of its 
status as a resultant of the economic base. 
What is this power that springs from the very existence of the state? Newman 
looks to the poles of a Manichean binary between artificiality and ‘naturalness’ that he 
sees at the heart of anarchist thought. Though ‘man-made’, the artifice of the state and 
the  artificiality  of  its  authority  stand  in  an  antagonistic  opposition  to  humanity 
conceived  as  a  ‘natural’,  living  phenomenon,  and  the  human  being  as  a  ‘natural’, 
organic  entity.
324 This  was  an  oft-used  distinction  in  nineteenth-century  political 
thought. Marx used a similar dichotomy between state and society, terming the state ‘a 
parasite  feeding  upon,  and  clogging  the  free  movement  of,  society’.
325 Mill  began 
‘Considerations on Representative Government’ (1861) by comparing two opposing 
interpretations of government: one as manmade ‘invention or contrivance’, the other as 
‘a sort of organic growth from the nature and life of […] people’.
326 In lifting the veil 
from the state, anarchists wanted to show that Mill’s first interpretation is correct: the 
state exists outside of nature. Bakunin wrote powerfully on this theme. The power he 
saw lurking in the state represented ‘something apart’ from the nature of society, an 
‘external’ force over and above but never part of life. His description of state power 
took  many  forms:  at  times,  when  allied  to  the  church,  it  was  ‘spiritual  and/or 
divine’,
327 and  in  other  cases  it  was  simply  the  ‘mechanical’  force  of  political 
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despotism.
328 At  all  times,  however,  the  power  of  the  state  acquired  its  meaning 
through its opposition to nature. 
The struggle with Marxism in the nineteenth century forced anarchists to place 
state power at the centre of their political philosophies. It became something to expose, 
a powerful agent with unique characteristics. Owing to its artificial form, anarchists 
tended  to  study  the  state  and  its  power  in  political  terms.  They  described  its 
illegitimacy,  its  capacity  to  dominate,  oppress,  and  repress.  They  warned  how  it 
limited  freedom  and  crushed  liberty.  They  berated  its  intensification  of  inequality. 
Such was the suitable method of investigation for something so far removed from 
nature. The methodologies and epistemologies of science, on the other hand, dealing 
with the natural world, of which humanity was a part, were ill equipped or simply 
wasted as a means to study the state. The anarchists, rather, subjected it to a political 
analysis that took into account its synthetic qualities. 
Kropotkin  also  looked  to  Marxism  when  developing  an  anarchist  theory  of 
state  power.  Critiquing  ‘state  socialism’  proved  a  useful  exercise  in  his  writings, 
allowing  him  to  expose  to  his  readers  the  form  of  power  that  anarchism  seeks  to 
destroy. In Modern Science and Anarchism, he told a story of the origins of Marxist, 
‘authoritarian’ socialism in order to unmask political power: 
 
However, these Revolutionists appeared under two different aspects. Some of 
them, while rebelling against the authority that oppressed society, in nowise 
tried to destroy this authority; they simply strove to secure it for themselves. 
Instead of a power that had grown oppressive, they sought to constitute a new 
power, of which they would be the holders; and they promised, often in good 
faith, that the new authority, handed over to them, would have the welfare of 
the people at heart and would be their true representative – a promise that later 
on  was  inevitably  forgotten  or  betrayed.  Thus  were  constituted  Imperial 
authority  in  the  Rome  of  the  Caesars,  ecclesiastical  authority  in  the  first 
centuries  of  our  era,  dictatorial  power  in  the  decaying  cities  of  the  Middle 
Ages, and so forth. The same line of thought brought about royal authority in 
Europe at the end of feudal times. Faith in an emperor “for the people,” a 
Caesar, is not yet dead, even in the present day.
329 
 
Rather than overcoming or eradicating power, Marxism simply secures its existence in 
another guise. Kropotkin points to the fact that Marxism’s revolutionary act merely 
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reaffirms the place of power.
330 The reason for Kropotkin’s critique of Marxism, to 
stress once more, is to uncover and pinpoint the state as the bearer of power and as the 
enemy against which anarchism will channel its forces.  
In the same vein as other anarchists, then, Kropotkin exposed the power of the 
state, as Newman says, to be studied as something in its own right. But how exactly 
would he study it? It must be remembered that the idea of study for Kropotkin, as we 
saw in chapters one and two, was a scientific activity, a process of investigation in 
which  empirical  objects  could  be  observed,  tested,  measured,  made  visible,  and 
explained. Studying something meant to explore it scientifically, always with the view 
to tell the truth about its existence in the world. Study was a practice of knowledge 
acquisition, an attempt to bestow form to the unknown. It was an exercise opposed to 
metaphysical,  religious,  spiritual,  or  any  other  set  of  explanatory  frameworks  that 
sought conclusions outside of nature. Kropotkin trusted in only one method of study 
when seeking knowledge of the state and its political power: ‘True to our method’, he 
declared  in  Modern  Science  and  Anarchism,  ‘we  study  the  state  with  the  same 
disposition of mind as if we studied a society of ants or bees, or of birds which have 
come to nest of the shores of an Arctic lake or sea.’
331 While acknowledging, perhaps, 
the aberrational character of the state, like the temporary nesting of gulls on the cliff-
side, Kropotkin maintains the applicability of the scientific method when passing from 
wildlife to politics. Here, Kropotkin’s essential epistemological and methodological 
outlook on reality produces a major twist in his political interpretation of anarchism. 
The forms of knowledge that he used to understand and explain the world would not 
be abandoned when identifying the threat of the state. Far from an artificial construct 
inaccessible to natural science, the state would be treated as if it were part of nature, ‘a 
form of society’ which, like other natural phenomena, had ‘developed […] under the 
influence of a series of causes’.
332 The biologist’s ‘disposition of mind’, therefore, was 
essential to anarchism’s political task of dissecting the state, of laying bare the intimate 
details of its existence and, not least, of scrutinising its power.  
In order for Kropotkin to gain knowledge of the state and become familiar with 
the power of the enemy, modern forms of scientific knowledge and measurement had 
to be applied to all aspects of its life. As parts of nature, its institutions, apparatus, and 
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political  organisation  must  be  made  subordinate  to  the  authority  of  science.  As 
Kropotkin pointed out, anarchism ‘represents an attempt to apply the generalisations 
obtained by the inductive-deductive method of the natural sciences to the appreciation 
of human institutions’.
333 Integral to this epistemological conquest of the state would 
be  an  attempt  to  study  the  effects  of  its  institutions  on  life.  From  Kropotkin’s 
perspective, the power of the state can truly be said to be studied in its own right when 
the  impact  of  its  institutions  on  social  health  is  both  illuminated  by  and  made 
answerable  to  science.  With  Kropotkin’s  approach  to  the  state,  its  political  power 
could be explained and visualised as something biological.  
 
 
“Nests of Infection” 
 
In answer to the question ‘what is anarchism?’, David Miller sets out to unpack the 
charges  anarchists  have  levelled  against  the  state.  He  suggests  one  of  their  main 
arguments  is  that  ‘the  state  is  a  punitive  body,  which  inflicts  cruel  and  excessive 
penalties on those who infringe its laws’.
334 Through prisons, exile, labour camps, and 
other  penal  mechanisms,  the  state  demonstrates  its  punitive  relation  to  society.  Its 
power is exerted institutionally across its territory through forms of punishment that 
are localised and contained in particular penal settings. Within the spaces of the state’s 
political jurisdiction, citizens who violate its laws are liable to suffer at the hands of a 
highly coordinated and centrally administered system of punishment. 
Prisons, in particular, have provided anarchists the opportunity to isolate a site 
within the state in which to explore and condemn the infliction of its power over 
individuals. They are exposed as locations seemingly representative of the broader 
violent and dominating relation of the state to its population. Anarchists believe that 
prisons  are  indicative  of  the  state’s  fundamental  opposition  to  liberty:  the 
irreconcilable tension between freedom and power essential to the existence of states is 
exemplified by the regulated and controlled patterns of life behind the prison walls. 
Anarchists are interested in the prison as a space wherein a power specific to states 
finds its unobstructed means of expression. The idea of power associated with the 
state,  described  by  Nathan  Jun  as  ‘essentially  hierarchical,  dominative  and 
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coercive’,
335 is  embodied  in  the  prison’s  organisation  and  practices:  incarceration, 
confinement, separation, isolation, arbitrary violence, and torture exhibit the operation 
of a top-down form of authority. In revealing that prisons rest on a power that is 
wielded as a weapon, anarchists want to make a broader point about the nature of the 
state’s relation to society. One can judge a state by its techniques of punishment. 
Anarchist thinkers have made discussions of prisons central to their broader 
critique of political government. In the late eighteenth century, Godwin condemned 
government reliance on coercive power. ‘Coercion first annihilates the understanding 
of the subject upon whom it is exercised’, he warned, ‘and then of him who employs 
it’.
336 While coercion may return to ruin the rational capacity of its perpetrator as well 
as its victim, Godwin makes it clear that the power of punishment, like the political 
power of the state, is exercised upon people. It is a form of political domination that 
strikes vertically onto its recipients. In the mid-nineteenth century, French anarchist 
Joseph Déjacque (1821-1864) argued that ‘the stirring of consciousness’ is silenced by 
imprisonment.
337 Thought became a victim of political power as it submitted to the 
domination of state punishment.  
Kropotkin was one of the most prolific anarchists to address the question of 
punishment. His extensive exploration of the prison as a site in which to expose the 
power  of  the  state  was  distinctively  anarchist.
338 Investigating  the  practice  of 
punishment, however, allowed him to reveal state power as a biological problem. His 
extensive writings about the St. Peter and Paul fortress in St. Petersburg, Sakhalin 
Island, and late Imperial Russia’s wider system of exile in Siberia, were investigations 
that emphasised the way that the Russian state sickened prisoners and convicts through 
its  penal  policy.  Similarly,  his  descriptions  of  the  French  prisons  of  Lyon  and 
Clairvaux attempted to demonstrate the epidemiological nature of the Third Republic’s 
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punitive  relation  to  the  population  of  France.  When  Kropotkin  wrote  about  the 
experience of the prisoners within these penal institutions, he focused on how they 
suffered from illnesses that developed as a result of their imprisonment. The most 
noticeable, significant, and condemnable effect of the political act of incarceration, 
Kropotkin believed, was the worsening or destruction of the prisoner’s physical and 
moral condition. 
When Kropotkin reflected on the imprisonment of the Russian radical writer 
Pisarev in the St. Peter and Paul fortress between 1864 and 1868, what struck him was 
the fact that ‘when he came out of prison his health was already broken’.
339 Although 
the Russian state had denied Pisarev his civic liberty, its impact on his existence as an 
organism  registered  most  with  Kropotkin.  Similarly,  when  writing  about  his  own 
experiences of imprisonment in St. Petersburg, Kropotkin emphasises the danger it 
posed to his health. On entering his cell in the St. Peter and Paul fortress in 1874, he 
anticipated  that  the  most  severe  effects  of  state  punishment  would  not  be  felt 
politically – in a longing for freedom – but biologically, in the decline of his bodily 
strength. ‘The main thing’, he realised, ‘is to preserve my physical vigor. I will not fall 
ill.’
340 His resolution proved futile. Two years later he succumbed to serious illness. 
The conditions of the prison, created and maintained by the state, were the causes he 
identified behind his deterioration: 
 
I did my best to maintain my energy, but the “arctic wandering” without an 
interruption in the summer got the better of me. I had brought back from my 
Siberian journeys the slight symptoms of scurvy; now, in the darkness and 
dampness of the casemate, they developed more distinctly; that scourge of the 
prisons had got hold of me.
341 
 
Kropotkin’s description of sickness as the ‘scourge’ of the prison provides an insight 
into his understanding of how state power operates through the prison. The common 
image of the scourge as a whip or lash would be representative of a coercive state 
power inflicted as torture, as an instrument of domination designed to crush the spirit 
and break barriers of resistance. With the lash, the state strikes the exterior of the 
prisoner, lacerating and slicing the skin. By designating scurvy as the scourge of the 
prison, Kropotkin is altering the anarchist conception of state power as displayed in the 
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prison.  State  power  shifts  from  an  infliction,  an  act  of  political  domination,  to  an 
infection, a power that reaches into the depths of humanity’s organic structure. 
Kropotkin’s critique centres on the state’s mismanagement of life within the 
prison. As I discussed in chapter three, he thought it was in the disposition of the social 
field, in its economy of men and things, that social health could be affected by politics. 
As one of the features of its political power, the state’s arrangement of things within 
the prison walls – the inmates, their relations to each other, and their relation to the 
conditions of their existence – provided the fertile ground in which disease could grow 
and spread. Moreover, Kropotkin’s belief in the Lamarckian theory of adaptation, part 
of his epistemological armoury of which I outlined in chapter one, allowed for this 
critique of state power: if environments operate at all times on living beings, causing 
reactions  to  take  place  in  their  bodies,  then  the  threat  of  the  state  resides  in  the 
conditions – the filth, dampness, darkness, overcrowding, uncleanliness – it establishes 
for human beings to live. That these conditions are conducive to contagion means the 
state compromises health. The power of the state, the scourge of the prison, moves 
indirectly from the political environment into the bodies of its inhabitants.  
It is on this basis that Kropotkin was able to condemn prisons as ‘nests of […] 
infection’.
342 Environments  engendered  by  the  state  for  political  purposes  expose 
human beings to epidemics. In In Russian and French Prisons, he assessed a prison in 
Kiev in these terms: 
 
At Kieff, the gaol was a sink of typhus fever. In one month in 1881, the deaths 
were counted by hundreds, and fresh batches were brought in to fill the rooms 
of  those  removed  by  death.  This  was  in  all  the  newspapers.  Only  a  year 
afterwards  (June  12,  1882),  a  circular  from  the  Chief  Board  of  Prisons 
explained  the  epidemics  as  follows:  –  “1.  The  prison  was  dreadfully 
overcrowded, although it was very easy to transfer many of the prisoners to 
other  prisons.  2.  The  rooms  were  very  damp;  the  walls  were  covered  with 
mildew, and the floor was rotten in many places. 3. The cesspools were in such 
a state that the ground about them was impregnated with sewage;” and so on, 
and so on. The Board added that owing to the same foulness other prisons were 
also exposed to the same epidemics.
343 
 
Clearly,  the  most  striking  feature  of  state  punishment  was  the  biological  peril  it 
generated for the prison population. A far greater concern to the prisoner than his loss 
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of freedom, Kropotkin believed, was the invisible danger of the epidemic. Again, the 
political  environment’s  effect  on  human  life  is  of  paramount  importance  in 
Kropotkin’s  critique:  it  was  not  the  cells  themselves,  with  their  restrictions, 
confinements,  and  limitations  that  caused  the  greatest  harm  to  prisoners,  but  their 
pathogenic condition and the economies of things within.  
In a chapter entitled ‘Exile in Siberia’, Kropotkin persists with his bio-political 
critique of punishment. After discussing the ‘terrible scurvy epidemics’ that broke out 
in 1857 amongst convicts sentenced to hard labour in the Kara gold mines, he reflected 
on the situation sixteen years later: 
 
And later on, in 1873, have we not seen again a similar epidemic, due to similar 
causes, breaking out in the Yeniseisk district, and sweeping away hundreds of 
lives at once? The places of torture, the proceedings were slowly modified, but 
the very essence of hard labour has remained the same, and the word katorga 
has still maintained its horrible meaning.
344 
  
Kropotkin recognised that the Great Reform era had ‘modified’ some of the punitive 
horrors of hard labour. A law passed in April 1863 had abolished such ‘proceedings’ 
as  flogging  with  the  lash  and  branding  ‘K-A-T’  onto  the  forehead  and  cheeks  of 
prisoners.
345 By 1873, katorga – a sentence to a period of confined hard labour, second 
only to capital punishment in the 1845 Penal Code’s hierarchy of criminal punishment 
– had lost some of the brutal and inflictive aspects of physical punishment that would 
have been present in 1857.
346 Yet, Kropotkin suggests that even after such reform, by 
which many of the horrors of torture had been abolished, the essence of hard labour 
persisted and retained its fearful connotations in the popular imagination. But what 
was  the  horrible  meaning  of  katorga  if  no  longer  associated  with  the  vertically 
administered cruelty of torture? For Kropotkin, its essence lay in the vulnerability of 
the prisoners to the waves of scurvy. Unaffected by official changes to penal law, 
disease endangered prisoners with equal intensity in 1873 as it had done in 1857. 
Although Kropotkin condemned the harsh and relentless labour of Siberian exile, he 
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understood its greatest threat to be the reduction of the physical state of the convict to 
the  point  where  he  can  no  longer  fight  off  disease.  The  ‘similar  causes’  of  the 
outbreaks of 1857 and 1873 are the overworked, weak, and thus biologically exposed 
populations of convicts through which the contagion may easily spread. The worst 
aspect of hard labour is the draining of the organism’s energy to such an extent that it 
becomes the defenceless victim of fatal scurvy.  
To be convincing, Kropotkin’s bio-political critique needed to find a way of 
illuminating the invisible movement and severity of epidemics. He could only label 
prisons as nests of infection if he could show the impact of disease upon populations at 
large. In order to illustrate this, Kropotkin turned to his trusted technique of visualising 
social  processes:  statistics.  Following  his  discussion  of  the  1881  and  1882  typhus 
epidemics  in  Kiev,  Kropotkin  entertains  the  view  that  the  situation  may  have 
improved: 
 
It might be supposed that some improvements have since been made, and the 
reoccurrence of such epidemics prevented. At least, the official publication of 
the Statistical Committee for 1883 would support such a supposition. There 
remains, however, some doubt as to the accuracy of its figures. Thus, in the 
three provinces in Perm, Tombolsk, and Tomsk, we find only an aggregate of 
431 deaths reported in 1883 among prisoners of all categories. But if we revert 
to another publication of the same Ministry – the Medical Report for 1883 – we 
find that 1017 prisoners died the same year in the hospitals of the prisons of the 
very same three provinces. And even in 1883, although no special epidemics 
are  mentioned  this  year,  the  mortality  at  the  two  Kharkoff  central  prisons 
appears to have been 104 out of 846 inmates, that is, 123 in the thousand; and 
the same report states that scurvy and typhus continued their ravages in most 
Russian prisons, and especially on the way to Siberia.
347 
 
Kropotkin looks to official statistics for support of his political argument. His criticism 
of the Russian state is medical: it requires quantifications of health and sickness in 
order to track the spread of scurvy and typhus from its political centre outwards into 
the inmate population. The dangers of political punishment are made visible through 
the quantification of life processes. The technology of statistical mapping, discussed in 
chapter two, Kropotkin now employs in his anarchist attack on the state. His political 
arguments have a cool, neutral air of objectivity: his assertions are seemingly free from 
the  distorting  influence  of  emotional  outrage.  It  is  because  the  state’s  power  is 
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biological that objectivity is required: as part of nature, its impact on life could be 
observed, measured, and made visible. 
The  contagious  clutches  of  the  state,  however,  reached  further  than  the 
confined spaces of penal servitude. Kropotkin argued that as an institution of state 
punishment  the  prison  placed  the  health  of  the  wider,  non-penal  population  under 
threat. In The Terror in Russia, he passed from an exploration of the effect of the 
prison on prisoners to an assessment of its infectious assault on life outside the prison 
walls: ‘Last year it became known that several prisons were nests of typhus infection. 
Thus the Ekaterinoslav zemstvo reported that the Lugansk prison was a breeding-place 
of typhus for the city and the whole district.’
348 Kropotkin’s critique of state power is 
not spatially limited by his use of the prison as a way to explore its effects. The nature 
of the power he exposes in the prison – epidemiological, transmissible – means that its 
reach will inevitably breach the site of its incubation. Because the power of the state 
moves through or, more accurately, feeds from the proximity between its subjects, 
Kropotkin’s  concern  shifts  from  the  condition  of  the  individual  organism  of  the 
prisoner to the broader and more sinister problem of the state of social health. By 
turning his geographical attention to the realm of the city and the district, Kropotkin is 
thinking in terms of populations. The state’s threat to the population of Lugansk is 
conceived as an infection of the wider social organism. 
It could be asked how this demographic weakening of social health ‘became 
known’,  as  Kropotkin  put  it.  How  was  it  possible  to  acquire  knowledge  of  the 
centrifugal force of the state? His description of the situation in Kiev provides the 
evidence in support of his political critique: 
 
The infirmary [of the Kiev prison], which has accommodation for 95 persons 
only, contained 339 sick prisoners, the average space which the patients were 
enjoying  being  only  210  cubic  feet  per  person  […].  The  mortality  was 
appalling. From the prison the epidemic spread to the city of Kieff, with the 
result that the official figures for Kieff for the year 1908 were 9,150 cases of 
typhus, out of which 2,188 were in the prison.
349 
 
Kropotkin used official, scientific measurements of social health to form an image of 
contagion, a picture of decay accessible to the eyes of anyone who cared to look at the 
published  data.  Statistics  allowed  Kropotkin  to  show  social  suffering.  It  was  a 
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necessary  weakness  of  numerical  political  argumentation  that  personal  experiences 
would be strikingly absent. Indeed, the contribution of statistics to Kropotkin’s thought 
was to allow him to grasp the decline of a living entity – the social body – that could 
not be described on a personal level. Nonetheless, such statistical arguments against 
the state are a good example of Cole’s description of statistical studies more generally: 
they are ‘haunted by the absence of individual narratives, the untold stories of each 
particular case’.
350 
Part of Kropotkin’s critique was a claim that prisons produce criminals. On the 
face  of  it,  this  assertion  appears  to  be  unrelated  to  Kropotkin’s  biological 
understanding of state power. Yet, the argument that the state, in creating criminals in 
prisons,  reveals  its  biological  danger,  made  perfect  sense  to  Kropotkin  within  his 
broader medical understanding of deviance that I described in chapter one. If deviant 
behaviour was a consequence of an individual’s poor medical condition, then crime 
could take on a literal biological dimension. Crime was but another sickness generated 
by state punishment and imparted to human beings, a plague with its roots in political 
punitive practice.  
Kropotkin believed that physical illnesses bred in prison could cause crime 
from inside the body of infected prisoners. This idea about the biological causes of 
deviance  was  borrowed  from  the  criminologists  and  psychiatrists  he  turned  to  for 
expert knowledge about crime. In In Russian and French Prisons, he stated his view 
that explanations for crime could be found within the body:  
 
The influence of inherited faculties and of the biological organization on the 
inclination  towards  crime  has  been  illustrated  of  late  by  so  many  highly 
interesting investigations, that we surely can form a nearly complete idea about 
this  category  of  causes  which  bring  men  and  women  within  our  penal 
jurisdiction.
351 
 
Kropotkin’s political critique of state punishment shared in a scientific gaze into the 
body of the criminal that was common to late nineteenth-century criminology. He was 
enthusiastic about how the criminal, not his or her crime, had become an object of 
research. In this sense, Kropotkin’s anarchism is indicative of how the importance of 
crimes  faded  into  the  background  of  criminological  thought  in  the  late  nineteenth 
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century, replaced by a fascination with the criminal man or woman. Foucault traces 
this historical development, showing how the gradual penetration of expert criminal 
psychiatry  into  European  justice  systems  was  accompanied  by  the  receding 
significance of the crime itself: it became ‘nothing but a shadow hovering about’ the 
case of a particular criminal.
352  
The  growing  scientific  significance  of  the  body  of  the  criminal  proved 
fundamental to Kropotkin’s political thought: it granted him the conceptual possibility 
of  channelling  a  political  attack  against  the  state  by  showing  the  condition  of  the 
bodies  that  inhabited  prisons.  As  he  wrote  in  Memoirs  of  a  Revolutionist  when 
describing the prison of Lyon, illnesses acquired in prison literally caused crime: 
 
Flocks of children are also taken at certain hours to [the prison] yards. Thin, 
enervated, underfed, – the shadows of children, – I often watched them from 
my window. Anæmia was plainly written on all the little faces and manifest in 
their thin, shivering bodies […]. What will become of them after they have 
passed through that schooling and come out with their health ruined, their wills 
annihilated […]? Anæmia […] is responsible for crime to an infinitely greater 
extent than plethora, and it is precisely this enemy of the human race which is 
bred in prison.
353 
 
Criminals were created and unleashed by the state. Degenerate defects, which were 
bred under the political jurisdiction of state prisons, found outward expression in the 
form of crime. The suffering victims of anaemia carried the state’s threat to public 
order within their bodies, smuggling its political power from inside the prison walls to 
the far reaches of society.  
Alongside being a useful site in which to explore the nexus of political power, 
crime, and physical disease, Kropotkin used the prison to examine the relationship 
between the state, crime, and insanity. As I explained in the first chapter of this thesis, 
Kropotkin was interested in the ideas of British psychiatrist Maudsley and the apparent 
link  he  made  between  crime  and  madness:  criminals  were  often  the  victims  of 
psychological  disorders.  From  this  medicalised  understanding  of  crime,  based  on 
contemporary  expert  knowledge,  Kropotkin  was  able  to  attack  the  state  as  a 
‘pestilential’  influence  on  moral  health.
354  The  prison,  especially  cellular 
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imprisonment, he argued, demoralises prisoners and drives them to ‘insanity’.
355 When 
Kropotkin argued in The Terror in Russia that prisons do not ‘answer their purpose’, 
their ‘double influence – the deterring and the moralising’, he was making a statement 
about crime and moral illness.
356 The state demoralises individuals through prisons, 
and thus, by impairing their moral sense and pushing them to madness, it does not 
deter, but encourages crime.  
Kropotkin  thought  that  the  state’s  punitive  technique  of  isolating  prisoners 
worsened  their  mental  condition,  which  in  turn  predisposed  them  to  violent  and 
immoral deviant behaviour. The life of an imprisoned individual, he wrote, ‘takes on 
such a character as to make it belong entirely to the domain of psychopathy. Kraft-
Ebbing himself had no idea of the aspects it assumes with certain prisoners in solitary 
confinement’.
357 Kropotkin’s  reference  to  Krafft-Ebing  (although  he  misspelt  his 
name)  suggests  his  belief  in  the  psychiatric  factuality  of  what  would  be,  had  the 
psychiatrist only known, clinically diagnosed cases of madness caused by the state. 
But  how  did  the  conditions  of  the  prison  create  this  psychopathy,  and  why  did 
Kropotkin believe it would lead to criminal behaviour? The answer lies in the late 
nineteenth-century  medical  codification  of  madness  I  outlined  in  chapter  one:  the 
medicalised  relationship  between  the  will  and  the  passions.  As  a  popular  calculus 
employed  by  nineteenth-century  psychiatry,  and  to  which  Kropotkin  looked  for 
scientific  explanations  of  morality,  the  delicate  balance  between  the  will  and  the 
passions was disrupted by state prisons. The passions, that could lead individuals to act 
in opposition to moral restraint, were intensified and diseased in prison: 
 
And  if  [the  prisoner]  has  got  into  trouble  in  consequence  of  a  morbid 
development of the passionate, sensual side of his nature, now, after having 
spent a number of years in prison, this morbid character is still more developed, 
in many cases to an appalling extent. In this last direction – the most dangerous 
of all – prison education is most effective.
358 
 
As an educating force, the state-engendered environment of the prison leads to an 
unsafe exaggeration of the passions. Such an intensification, however, is but one of the 
conditions  of  a  criminally  predisposed  mental  illness.  If  the  individual’s  will,  the 
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rational check on impulsive instincts and inclinations, remains intact and strong, then 
the descent into madness is prevented. Yet, worryingly for Kropotkin, this last medical 
barrier to criminal insanity is also affected in the prison, crushed under the weight of 
political incarceration: 
 
Incarceration in a prison of necessity entirely destroys the energy of a man and 
annihilates his will. In prison life there is no room for exercising one’s will; to 
possess one’s own will in prison means surely to get into trouble. The will of 
the prisoner must be killed, and it is killed.
359 
 
This  medical  codification  of  madness  was  fundamental  to  Kropotkin’s  political 
critique  of  the  state  and  his  unmasking  of  its  power.  It  was  one  of  the  crucial 
conceptual  elements  of  contemporary  scientific  thought  that  he  absorbed  into  his 
anarchist reading of prisons, and which supported his political statement that ‘prisons 
are ‘“universities of crime, maintained by the state”’.
360  
Kropotkin read the medical link between the will and the passions into the 
experiences of suffering. His recollection of an episode involving a fellow prisoner in 
the  St.  Peter  and  Paul  fortress  illustrates  the  way  in  which  he  conceived  of  an 
individual’s fall into madness at the hands of the state: 
 
Soon I began to notice, to my terror, that from time to time his mind wandered. 
Gradually his thoughts grew more and more confused, and we […] perceived, 
step by step, day by day, evidences that his reason was failing, until his talk 
became at last that of a lunatic. Frightful noises and wild cries came next […]; 
our neighbor was mad, but was still kept for several months in the casemate 
before  he  was  removed  to  an  asylum,  from  which  he  never  emerged.  To 
witness the destruction of a man’s mind, under such conditions, was terrible.
361 
 
Kropotkin’s friend turned mad under certain politically imposed conditions. As the 
arbiter of those conditions, the state was to blame for the worsening and ruin of his 
mental health. His insanity developed as a consequence of confinement, an isolation 
that broke his reason and allowed his wild, beastly impulses to dominate his mind. The 
state  damages,  Kropotkin  believed,  irreversibly  in  this  case,  the  delicate  balance 
between  man’s  reason  and  his  nature  which  keeps  his  sanity  intact.  In  contrast  to 
Kropotkin’s critiques of state punishment built on the calculations of statistical data, in 
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this example the individual story of the victim is in full view. Suffering is not hidden 
within an abstract representation of a complex reality. Thus, Kropotkin’s biological 
reading of the threat of the state was able to incorporate both statistical and personal 
perspectives. He looked for signs of social illness in statistical tables and for signs of 
individual degeneracy in the destruction of a man’s mind.  
Like epidemics of typhus and scurvy, the lunacy engendered by the state, so 
closely linked to political deviancy, found its way out of the prison and jeopardised the 
sanity of society. Kropotkin condemned prisons as sources of a medically conceived 
moral contagion that led to social disorder outside their walls. ‘Corruption of all sorts’, 
he wrote, ‘spreads like a blot of oil round every prison’.
362 Moral sickness seeps out of 
the  prison  and  infects  the  life  of  the  surrounding  area.  The  state  medically 
compromises public order by its tendency to induce criminal insanity both inside and 
outside the prison. Like Ferri, whose criminal statistics (as I mentioned in chapter two) 
tried to measure crime as a social phenomenon, Kropotkin saw crime as a ‘Social 
Disease’  damaging  the  health  of  the  social  body.
363 He  linked  the  apparent  late 
nineteenth-century, European-wide epidemic of crime with the punitive politics of the 
state: 
 
It is known in what threatening proportions crimes against decency are growing 
all over the Continent […]. Many causes contribute towards this growth; but 
amidst  these  various  causes  one  occupies  a  marked  rank;  the  pestilential 
influence of our prisons.
364 
 
Kropotkin’s  idea  of  political  power  as  pestilential  was  not  an  attempt  to  describe 
through metaphor the state’s damaging relation to society. The notion that the state 
was the chief cause of all ‘social ills’ was made real by Kropotkin’s anarchism. He 
chose the adjective ‘pestilential’ as a literal description of a quality specific to the 
state: its capacity to subject individuals and the social organism to the deteriorating 
influence of physical and psychological disorders. 
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Morality of the State 
 
Through their attacks against the state anarchists claim to unmask its morality. In order 
to isolate a morality intrinsic to the notion of government and to show how it leads to 
corruption, Bakunin critiqued the theory of the social contract. He called it ‘a revolting 
nonsense! An absurd fiction, and what is more, a wicked fiction! An unworthy hoax!’: 
 
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  system  which  we  are  now  examining  the 
distinction between good and bad did not exist prior to the conclusion of the 
social contract. At that time every individual remained isolated in his liberty or 
in his absolute right, paying no attention to the freedom of others except in 
those cases wherein such attention was dictated by his weakness or his relative 
strength  –  in  other  words,  by  his  own  prudence  and  interest.  At  that  time 
egoism, according to the same theory, was the supreme law.
365 
 
Bakunin  contended  that  the  hidden  trick  played  by  social  contract  theorists,  like 
Hobbes,  for  example,  lay  in  their  claim  that  morality  came  into  being  with  the 
establishment  of  a  political  state  and  political  authority.  He  warned  that  their 
assumption about the isolated and egoistic existence of humans in a state of nature 
allows for the creation of a dangerous illusion: first, that society itself was the result of 
an artificial contractual binding, and second, that this enforced, intentional sociability 
made the emergence of morality possible.  
Anarchism reveals a very different story about the emergence of the state and 
the fate of morality. Rather than signalling the birth of morality, the state leads to the 
death of an authentic human morality. According to Bakunin’s Rousseauean reading, 
society  exists  in  the  absence  of  the  state.  People  are  naturally  egoistic,  but  not 
troglodytic.  Their  ‘ferocious  egoism’  exists  alongside  a  powerful  ‘sociability’  that 
accommodates community.
366 Within this environment, the conceptions of right and 
wrong, of good and bad, of justice, virtue, and respect are born.
367 With the emergence 
of political power, however, humanity’s natural morality is corrupted. It is replaced by 
the interests of the state. These interests – territorial survival, enlargement, enrichment, 
strengthening, empowering, ordering, controlling – generate the moral code of the state 
that rules over or simply sweeps aside the original morality of humanity: 
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To offend, oppress, rob, plunder, assassinate, or enslave one’s fellow man is, to 
the ordinary morality of man, to commit a serious crime. In public life, on the 
contrary, from the point of view of patriotism, when it is done for the greater 
glory of the State in order to conserve or to enlarge its power, all that becomes 
a duty and a virtue.
368 
 
This act of displacement is a moment of nature’s corruption. Not only is something 
natural suppressed, but the interests of the state become the basis of social morality. A 
façade of a morality is established, which underneath, however, lurks the valueless, 
cold rationale of state survival and perpetuation.  
In  The  General  Idea  of  the  Revolution  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  (1851), 
Proudhon claimed to have located the substance of a morality that derived its meaning 
from the interests of government: 
 
To be GOVERNED is to be kept in sight, inspected, spied upon, directed, law-
driven, numbered, enrolled, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, estimated, 
valued, censured, commanded, by creatures who have neither the right, nor the 
wisdom,  nor  the  virtue  to  do  so…  To  be  GOVERNED  is  to  be  at  every 
operation,  at  every  transaction,  noted,  registered,  enrolled,  taxed,  stamped, 
measured,  numbered,  assessed,  licensed,  authorized,  admonished,  forbidden, 
reformed, corrected, punished. It is, under pretext of public utility, and in the 
name  of  the  general  interest,  to  be  placed  under  contribution,  trained, 
ransomed, exploited, monopolized, extorted, squeezed, mystified, robbed; then, 
at the slightest resistance, the first word of complaint, to be repressed, fined, 
despised, harassed, tracked, abused, clubbed, disarmed, choked, imprisoned, 
judged, condemned, shot, deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed; and to crown all, 
mocked, ridiculed, outraged, dishonored. That is government; that is its justice; 
that is its morality.
369 
 
State  morality  corresponds  with  the  interests  of  governmental  power.  Behind  the 
smokescreen  of  ‘general  interest’  lie  the  concerns  of  political  government.  The 
necessity for the state to regulate, control, measure, punish, dominate, and judge its 
population assumes the role of a morality in itself. Proudhon exposes this lie, however, 
and  shows  not  only  how  state  morality  is  outside  of,  but  how  it  is  inflicted  upon 
society.  
  Because anarchists are interested in the experience of moral corruption under 
the state, their discussions of state morality revolve around insurmountable binaries: 
society/government;  good/evil;  human/mechanism;  natural/artificial.  These 
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fundamental  Manichean  oppositions,  as  Newman  describes  them,  however,  merely 
serve to represent the political power with which society is confronted and to which it 
will  inevitably  succumb.  State  morality  will  dethrone  the  natural  morality  of 
humanity.
370  
Kropotkin  continued  this  trend  in  nineteenth-century  anarchist  thought.  He 
believed that the state, through the perusal of its narrow interests, establishes a moral 
code that perverts human morality. Because of his Lamarckian view of adaptation it 
could not be otherwise. In Ethics: Origin and Development (1922), he summed up his 
position: ‘the ethics of every society will reflect the established forms of its social 
life.’
371 In the form of the state, society and its morality come to reflect, by way of a 
biological adaptation to surroundings, its anti-social, selfish, and duplicitous character.   
The  indoctrination  of  humanity  with  the  moral  norms  of  state  existence, 
however, made sense to Kropotkin as a medical matter. As I argued in chapter one, his 
medical understanding of morality framed the corruption of humankind as a worsening 
of a moral condition. Moreover, this deterioration could be proven and explained by 
psychological knowledge. When he warned that the state has a ‘pestilential influence 
on public morality’,
372 he was again speaking literally. Moral health is sickened when 
it is squeezed into centralised and authoritative environments. 
Kropotkin tried to build a case against the state’s moral corruption of society 
through the language of medical moral science. He began with humanity’s a priori 
moral health outside of the state. People are morally ‘sane’ with an intact and fully 
functioning moral sense. This stands in contrast to the psychiatric, abnormal condition 
of moral insanity I described in chapter one, where the moral sense is absent in an 
individual.  They  have  sound  mental  disposition  that  enables  them  to  recognise 
distinctions between moral and immoral, sociable and anti-social. In In Russian and 
French Prisons, Kropotkin alludes to this healthy psychological state: 
 
If we analyze ourselves, if everybody would frankly acknowledge the thoughts 
which have sometimes passed through his mind, we should see that all of us 
have had – be it as an imperceptible wave traversing the brain, like a flash of 
light – some feelings and thoughts such as constitute the motive of all acts 
considered as criminal. We have repudiated them at once.
373 
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There are two important qualities to this state of moral health. First, it is normal for 
people  to  experience  imperceptible  flashes  of  criminality.  This  is  a  psychological 
phenomenon: it is experienced in feelings, thoughts, and takes place across the brain.  
Kropotkin speaks of all acts considered criminal, referring not only to behaviour such 
as theft which could be argued is meaningful only in societies based on property and 
private ownership, but to more universally, non time-space-dependent crimes such as 
violence, sexual assault, and murder. Second, it is normal for people to withstand and 
immediately repudiate these impulses. What Bakunin termed in the passage above the 
‘ordinary morality of man’, was for Kropotkin a medically conceived, psychiatrically 
explained  condition  of  mental  health  characterised  by  the  capacity  to  prevent  the 
fruition of a criminal potentiality.  
Kropotkin’s understanding of how this medicalised conception of moral health 
is sickened led to his theory of state morality. All psychologically healthy humans 
experience flickers of criminal thought, ‘but they lead to anti-social deeds only under 
certain unfavourable circumstances’.
374 This is Kropotkin’s play on the criminological 
notion of criminal predisposition. Ferri’s ideas on this subject were important. Shifting 
the  Lombrosian  notion  of  predetermined  criminality  to  a  more  environmentally 
concerned view of criminal predisposition, Ferri argued for the circumstantial power of 
pathology over the individual’s moral faculty. He emphasised that his criminology 
‘consisted in asserting, not the fatality of predestination of human actions, including 
crimes, but only their necessary dependence upon their natural causes’.
375 A person’s 
psychological  propensity  to  commit  crime  must  be  brought  to  life  by  their 
surroundings before they could become a criminal. Crime was the result of a meeting 
between  body  and  environment,  ‘a  product  of  a  particular  organic  and  physical 
constitution, acting in a particular physical and social environment’.
376  
Kropotkin  absorbed  these  kinds  of  ideas  and  built  them  into  a  political 
argument. That the environment somehow fertilises and incubates the psychological 
causes  of  crime  seemed  politically  significant.  Speaking  of  the  normal,  harmless 
flashes of criminality people experience in good moral health, Kropotkin goes on to 
say: ‘But if they had had the opportunity of recurring again and again; if they were 
nurtured by circumstances […] then these passing influences, so brief that we hardly 
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noticed them, would have degenerated into some morbid element in our character’.
377 
Being responsible for the socio-economic and political circumstances in which people 
live, the state could be blamed for the fertile ground in which imperceptible criminal 
thoughts  become  diseased  and  degenerate.  As  an  environment,  therefore,  the  state 
sickens  the  healthy  morality  of  humanity.  Moreover,  having  engendered  cases  of 
mental  pathology,  the  state  punishes  its  sufferers.  Far  from  a  cure,  this  practice 
strengthens the hold of the disease over its victims. ‘Prisons’, he argued, ‘do not cure 
[…] pathological deformities, they only reinforce them’.
378 Though conceptually far 
removed, Kropotkin is reiterating Bakunin’s critique of the social contract. The state 
does not bring morality into existence, but obliterates it. Kropotkin’s political critique, 
however,  is  based  on  a  medical  interpretation  of  this  moral  displacement.  By 
weakening humanity’s sanity and making people susceptible to psychopathy, the state 
cultivates morally sick populations whose psychiatric conditions (moral insanity, for 
example) are characterised by the complete absence of a person’s ability to determine 
right from wrong. 
Kropotkin’s reading of the state’s psychological threat to humanity does not 
rely  on  the  traditional  anarchist  binaries  that  Newman  puts  forward  to  define 
anarchism. As a medical phenomenon, Kropotkin’s conception of morality does not fit 
into frameworks of good/bad or natural/artificial. Binary oppositions, however, are still 
useful for Kropotkin. Yet, the confrontations in his thought rely on scientific ideas 
prevalent to the age in which he lived: healthy/sick, sane/insane, normal/pathological. 
The  fact  that  fundamental,  insurmountable  oppositions  between  desirable  and 
undesirable states run through Kropotkin’s moral thinking is an important signifier of 
his anarchism. That these binaries are medical, however, shows his departure from an 
anarchist tradition of political thought that relied on Manichean oppositions, and the 
emergence  of  a  new,  bio-political  anarchism  that  relied  on  medical  knowledge  to 
confront the state.  
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Wild Beasts of Battle 
 
Anarchists have interpreted the spaces of warfare as sites in which to uncover the 
threat posed by the modern state. Within the context of war, anarchists argue, the state 
betrays its destructive relation to society. Horror at the devastating power of politics is 
another defining feature of Miller’s definition of anarchist anti-statism. He argues that 
the  state’s  tendency  to  destroy  human  life  is  central  to  anarchism’s  critique  of 
centralised  political  authority:  ‘The  state  is  a  destructive  agency  which  enlists  its 
subjects to fight wars whose only cause is the protection or aggrandizement of the state 
itself  –  all  anarchists  believe  that,  without  the  state,  there  might  be  small-scale 
conflicts, but nothing to resemble the horror and devastation of modern warfare’.
379 
Warfare  interests  anarchist  writers  because  the  experiences  of  conflict  –  pain, 
desolation, destruction, death, subjection to hierarchical domination, sacrificing liberty 
to an alien cause – appear to them to be representative of the ways in which society 
experiences life under states more generally. 
Before the emergence of the highly mechanised forms of battle associated with 
the  European  wars  of  the  twentieth  century,  anarchists  in  the  nineteenth  century 
critiqued the militaristic aggression of states. In the wake of the Franco-Prussian War 
(1870-1871), Bakunin wrote about the logic and effects of war: 
 
Henceforth every State, in so far as it wants to live not only on paper and not 
merely  by  sufferance  of  its  neighbors,  but  to  enjoy  real  independence  – 
inevitably must become a conquering State. But to be a conquering State means 
to  be  forced  to  hold  in  subjection  many  millions  of  alien  people.  And  this 
requires the development of a huge military force. And where military force 
prevails, there freedom has to take its leave.
380 
 
In order to survive, Bakunin argued, states need to exert their destructive power over 
millions of people. The will to perpetuate their existence requires the subjection of 
neighbouring  populations.  Moreover,  for  Bakunin,  warfare  has  particular  political 
consequences  that  exemplify  the  dangers  of  state  power.  The  effect  of  the  state’s 
destructive ambition is political: the disappearance of freedom.  
The First World War provoked an intensification of the anarchist critique of the 
state’s  destructive  relationship  to  humanity.  Anarchists  responded  to  the  new 
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dimensions of an industrialised conflict: the unprecedented carnage of total war, highly 
technologised  military  machinery  unleashed  upon  vulnerable,  helpless  victims,  and 
ever more efficient and rational ways of killing en masse. The effects of the state’s 
new, formidable destructive power, anarchists believed, could not be condemned in 
purely  political  terms  –  in  the  disappearance  of  freedom  –  but  in  the  physical 
annihilation of bodies and populations. Published in 1915, the ‘International Anarchist 
Manifesto Against War’, whose contributors included Errico Malatesta (1853-1932), 
Alexandr Berkman (1870-1936), and Emma Goldman (1869-1940), focused on the 
‘massacre’ caused by war. ‘Governments’, the manifesto stated, ‘seek to throw fresh 
peoples into the fiery furnace of war’.
381 Society was obliterated in the wake of an 
industrialised,  furnace-driven  state  war  machine.  Later  the  same  year,  Goldman 
reiterated this analysis of the state’s destructive power. In ‘Preparedness: The Road to 
Universal  Slaughter’  (1915),  she  pointed  to  ‘the  highly  developed  instruments  of 
murder’ now available to the industrialised state in its quest for survival. The effect of 
these modern technologies of warfare, she argued, was ‘to unloosen the furies of death 
over land and sea’.
382 In the context of war, Goldman conceived of the state’s threat as 
the infliction of widespread death. The power of the state could be seen in the visible 
signs of destruction it inflicted during times of war.  
Kropotkin also wrote about warfare as the manifestation of state power and he 
attacked the state with the same ideas used by many of his anarchist contemporaries. 
Roughly a year before the beginning of the First World War, his article ‘Modern Wars 
and  Capitalism’  (1913)  set  out  his  own  condemnation  of  the  state’s  destructive 
relationship to society in the context of war. Although he would later receive strong 
criticism from large sections of the European anarchist movement for announcing his 
support for the allied powers, in particular from Malatesta, his stance against state 
warfare in 1913 shares similar concerns with those later put forward by his fellow 
anarchists.
383 Kropotkin highlighted the precision of modern warfare and the state’s 
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newfound  capacity  to  manipulate  industrialised  weaponry:  ‘The  ravages  caused  by 
shells, thrown with accuracy of aim at a distance of three or four, or five miles, by 
batteries the position of which cannot be made out, as they use smokeless powder, are 
unimaginable.  The  guns  are  not  fired  haphazard  anymore’.
384 Like  other  anarchist 
critiques, Kropotkin argued that this new rationality and exactness of warfare led to an 
unprecedented destruction of physical life: ‘Who will ever tell of the sufferings of 
millions  of  men,  women,  and  children,  of  broken  lives  during  the  crisis,  while 
immense fortunes were being made in anticipation of mangled flesh, and the piles of 
human corpses about to be heaped up’.
385 The victims of modern warfare – mangled, 
deformed,  unrecognisably  blown  apart  –  became  the  visible  sites  on  which  the 
destructive power of the modern state was visited. Inter-state conflict, in pursuit of 
increased territory, wealth, and control, cared nothing for human cost. 
Alongside  the  conventional  anarchist  critique,  however,  Kropotkin’s  article 
develops a further argument against the state’s destructive power. His article goes well 
beyond outrage at the images and quantities of physiological damage and considers the 
psychological and degenerate effects of modern warfare. The battlefield, in particular, 
is taken as a space in which to explain how the power of state environments function 
and how they damage human health.   
Kropotkin  had  begun  to  think  of  battlefields  in  these  terms  before  writing 
‘Modern Wars and Capitalism’. In Mutual Aid, he stated that ‘men are maddened in 
the battlefield’.
386 As we have seen from Kropotkin’s faith in psychiatry, he would not 
have used this as a mere turn of phrase, but as a literal statement about a factual change 
in  psychological  condition.
387 A  central  claim  in  Kropotkin’s  political  argument 
against  the  state’s  destructive  power,  therefore,  was  that  the  experience  of  battle 
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produces a deviation from a normal condition of mental health to a sickened state of 
madness. The insanity of soldiers, a medical illness developed by exposure to a state-
engendered environment, was a form of regression taking place within the organism.  
In ‘Modern Wars and Capitalism’, Kropotkin developed this political critique, 
considering  the  degenerate  character  of  the  madness  caused  by  battle.  While  he 
thought  that  by  causing  insanity  the  state  was  producing  a  specific  form  of 
degeneration  of  human  beings  –  a  psychological  abnormality  –  Kropotkin  also 
considered the degenerate influence of the battlefield in broader terms. He wanted to 
show that the state was responsible for staving off biological progress and causing 
forms of regression, that it was guilty of plunging people back into ‘the most barbarous 
aspects  of  olden  days’.
388 As  organisms  adapting  to  environments,  soldiers  were 
getting biologically worse, not better. It was in this sense that Kropotkin argued that on 
the battlefield soldiers experience a ‘terrible return to the most atrocious savagery’.
389 
The destructive effects of state power, administered through the political conditions of 
the battlefield, produced an organic fall in humanity.
390 
Kropotkin’s  critique  of  state  warfare  drew  on  a  prevalent  theme  within 
contemporary ideas of degeneration. The image of a ‘tamed’ humanity, precariously 
situated on the precipice of a Hobbesian state of nature and struggling to suppress a 
sleeping  barbarity  endemic  to  modern  civilisation,  haunted  many  political  and 
historical works of the period. In his psychological histories of France, for example, 
Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893) emphasised the delicate relation of modern man to its 
barbarous past: 
 
Man is an animal by nature and by structure, and neither nature nor structure 
ever lose a single fold. He has the canine teeth like the dog and the fox, and, 
like the dog and the fox, he once fastened them in the flesh of his own kind; his 
descendants cut each other’s throats with stone hatchets […]. Even now he is 
not changed; he is only softened.
391 
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In  seemingly  opening  up  the  possibility  for  humanity  to  look  back  on  itself,  an 
opportunity that stimulated both excitement and fear, evolution provided Taine with a 
scientifically validated warning about the depths to which society could fall in the 
event of civilisational collapse. Although modernity has tamed man, has silenced the 
shrieks of his latent wildness, and subdued the convulsions of his violent instincts, his 
nature still lurks dormant underneath. 
  The  possibility  for  civilisation  to  crumble  and  for  humanity  to  return  to  a 
barbaric nature was a key trope in talking about war in this period, particularly the 
First World War. The fears that Taine expressed about the resurrection of humanity’s 
violent wildness were mapped onto interpretations of battle. This idea did not only 
frame anxieties about modern warfare, however, but was used by contemporaries to 
articulate  why  they  supported  technologised  European  conflict.  By  literally  and 
symbolically  blowing  apart  European  society,  industrialised  war  was  seen  to  cut 
through the crust of culture, removing the mask of civilisation from the primitive face 
of  human  beings.  Italian  futurist  Filippo  Tommaso  Marinetti  (1876-1944),  for 
example, thought of warfare as a hygiene that would cleanse modern Italy of its ‘need 
for restricted order, for laws, chains, obstacles, for police stations, for morality, for 
chastity;  fear  of  unrestricted  freedom’.
392 His  widely  read  ‘The  Futurist  Manifesto’ 
(1909) described war as ‘the Sole Cleanser of the World’, a regenerative force able to 
wash away modernity’s ‘cowardly quietism’.
393 Ernst Jünger (1895-1998) gloried the 
First World War for what he saw as a vital resurgence of human instinct. War had 
liberated our true nature from the regularised confines of mechanised, urban existence. 
The ‘animal in man’, he argued, ‘who slumbers on the comfortable, woven carpets of a 
polished, honed, and silently intricate civilization’, is awakened and set free on the 
battlefield.
394 In warfare, a human being’s ‘life reverts to its primal functions, [and] his 
blood, which up until then has flowed coolly and regularly through his veins in the 
mechanistic activity of his stony, urban skeleton, foams up’.
395 From this perspective, 
the destruction of battle was necessary for the revelation of life. War lifted the veil 
from modern man. 
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Kropotkin’s anarchist critique of the state constitutes part of this discourse. 
Like Marinetti and Jünger, Kropotkin made sense of modern warfare with reference to 
humanity’s potential beastliness and animalistic nature. For Kropotkin, however, this 
trope did not represent the positive vitality of war, but its tendency to induce in human 
beings a biological regression. He looked to the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) to 
make this regressive process visible.
396 It was on the battlefields of this war where the 
life of men was reduced to brutal instincts and blood lust: 
 
After having hurled hand-grenades and pieces of pyroxyline at one another 
(two pieces of pyroxyline tied together with a string were used by the Japanese 
as a sling), Russian and Japanese soldiers rolled in the trenches of Port Arthur 
like wild beasts, striking each other with the butt-end of their rifles and with 
their knives, and tearing each other’s flesh with their teeth.
397 
 
Kropotkin’s wild beasts of battle, becoming not men but mere monsters, share similar 
beastly  qualities  to  those  depicted  by  Taine.  Their  wildness  is  signified  by  their 
carnivorousness.  Both  thinkers  sink  human  teeth  into  human  flesh.  Although,  for 
Kropotkin, this is not a return to an original state, a violent state of nature that lurks 
below  the  safety  net  of  civilisation,  it  is  nonetheless  a  regression,  an  evolutionary 
deviation  from  a  possible  path  of  progress.  The  French  historian,  whose  radical 
conservatism he publicly criticised four years earlier in The Great French Revolution 
1789-1793 (1909), exhibited a deep-seated pessimism about biological degeneration 
with which Kropotkin sympathised. Unlike Taine, however, Kropotkin’s images of 
degeneracy function to condemn the political order of the modern state. Bestiality is 
not intrinsic to nature, but to state civilisation. His critique of war accuses the state of 
stimulating a deviation from a better condition to a state of ‘wildness’.  
In ‘Modern Wars and Capitalism’, then, Kropotkin employed popular tropes 
and  images  of  degeneration  to  warn  Britain  of  the  horrors  of  trench  warfare.  By 
looking to the Russian experience, one that would come to be seen as a precursor to 
the trench warfare of the First World War, he felt he could shed light on the damage 
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caused  by  this  new  form  of  battle.  Of  course,  there  would  be  unprecedented 
annihilation and carnage. Yet, trench warfare would also significantly affect the human 
condition itself. It would cause soldiers to become animalistic and primal, to adapt to 
conditions that would turn them into beasts. Kropotkin illustrated the state’s threat to 
society in terms that are not conventionally political or limited by a concern with the 
physicality  of  destruction.  He  condemned  the  state  for  perpetrating  a  far  subtler, 
though  no  less  damaging  form  of  destruction.  By  subjecting  individuals  to  the 
battlefields of war, the state damages their mental health and stimulates their biological 
regression. 	 ﾠ 137	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5 Capitalism and the Bourgeoisie  
 
In considering the methods of production and exchange, as they have been organized 
by the bourgeoisie, we found a situation of irremediable decay.
398 
 
Petr Kropotkin, ‘The Coming Revolution’ (1880). 
 
 
In  ‘The  Coming  Revolution’,  Kropotkin  surveyed  the  economic  organisation  of 
Europe. In order to show that the present state of the world was coming to an end and 
giving way to a new set of socio-economic conditions, he needed to provide a forceful 
and  persuasive  critique  of  the  state’s  economic  system:  capitalism.  ‘The  Coming 
Revolution’ develops an argument against capitalism that pointed to the signs of its 
impending death. For Kropotkin, capitalism had undergone a severe deterioration that, 
by  the  late  nineteenth  century,  had  rendered  it  unsalvageable.  At  the  heart  of 
Kropotkin’s critique of the capitalist system, therefore, was a warning about its ‘decay 
and  decomposition’.
399 Capitalism’s  most  distinctive  feature  was  its  irreversible 
decline.  
  In ‘Revolution and Famine’ (1887), Kropotkin likened capitalism’s decline to 
the unfolding of a tragic drama: 
 
The  situation  is  such  that  any  disturbance  anywhere  in  Europe  suddenly 
affecting trade may result in such a terrible crisis as we have never seen before. 
So, there is no use in saying, “We don’t want to bring things to a crisis.” The 
crisis has already begun independently of our will. The system that has grown 
up under middle-class rule is already crumbling to pieces. The fifth act of the 
drama is already on the stage.
400 
 
Played out on the stage in full view of all, capitalism’s downfall seems pre-ordained 
and sewn together by the intricate actions of middle-class actors. Kropotkin watches 
this unfolding like the audience watches the performance; his revolutionary foresight 
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lets him know the end is near. With a sense of catharsis he understands the series of 
causes and effects which have led to the terrible moments preceding the end. 
  Society  was  part  of  this  tragic  drama.  Like  the  inhabitant  of  a  crumbling 
building, it was plunged into a passage of critical time. In ‘To the Young’, Kropotkin 
passed from an image of the decline of the edifice of capitalism to one of the demise of 
the human beings inhabiting the system: ‘One day the crash will come, a crisis that is 
no longer temporary like those in the past, but one that will kill off industries, that will 
reduce to poverty thousands of workers and decimate their families.’
401 Capitalism’s 
demise meant that it was unfit as a method of production and exchange capable of 
satisfying the biological needs of society. Physiologically, nutritionally, and medically, 
the collapse of capitalism poses an existential threat to society. Knowing that ‘the 
crash  will  come’,  but  unsure  of  when,  society  stood  precariously  on  the  brink  of 
biological  disaster.  In  this  position  of  insecurity,  human  beings  feel  the  agony  of 
capitalism’s painful death in their own bodies. It was not the decay and decomposition 
of  the  capitalist  system  that  was  Kropotkin’s  primary  concern,  but  the  decay  and 
decomposition of human bodies that was occurring as a result.  
 
 
The Environments of Capitalism 
 
Anarchists  tend  to  explore  the  environments  of  capitalism  –  the  factory,  mine, 
industrial  complex,  even  the  capitalist  city  itself  –  as  the  physical  realities  of  an 
economic system upheld by the modern state. While to the state-centric worldview of 
many nineteenth-century anarchists, capitalism appeared as an epiphenomenal evil, an 
unfair  organisation  maintained  by  political  authority,  the  conditions  of  existence  it 
establishes are considered no less abhorrent and received substantial criticism. As a 
derivative of the state, the capitalist world made sense to the anarchist outlook that saw 
abstract, alienating, and artificial structures looming over and dominating human life. 
Centres  of  commerce,  directed  towards  to  the  single  aim  of  procuring  wealth  and 
capital, anarchists argued, were disconnected from the real life of the people and failed 
to meet the needs of society as a whole. The colossal nature of European industrial 
expansion  in  the  nineteenth  century  provoked  anarchist  fears  about  the  end  of 
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communality: the new towering and oppressive urbanity seemed to atomise society, 
devour local industry and trade, and destroy the natural bonds connecting individuals 
at a grass-root level.  
Thus,  Bakunin  condemned  the  relationships  established  by  the  prevailing 
industrial and economic mode of organisation: 
 
Let us even suppose, as it is being maintained by the bourgeois economists, – 
and with them by all the lawyers, all the worshippers of and believers in the 
juridical right, by all the priests of the civil and criminal code – let us suppose 
that  this  economic  relationship  between  the  exploiter  and  the  exploited  is 
altogether legitimate, that it is the inevitable consequence, the product, of an 
eternal,  indestructible  social  law  –  and  still  it  will  always  remain  true  that 
exploitation precludes brotherhood and equality for the exploited.
402 
 
Bakunin critiqued the capitalist environment as one characterised by relationships of 
inequality and personal distance. It positions people towards one another in a way that 
excludes  the  possibility  of  interaction  outside  the  context  of  economic  transaction. 
Whether artificial or natural, he argued, capitalism is a setting conducive to imbalance 
between members of society. 
Kropotkin devoted much of his writing to condemning the exploitation which 
anarchists  see  as  intrinsic  to  capitalism.
403 The  thrust  of  the  attack,  however,  once 
again stemmed from his biological perspective of reality which I outlined in chapter 
one. His critique of capitalism, therefore, built on and was understood as a necessary 
accompaniment  to  his  bio-political  critique  of  the  state.  Relations  of  inequality 
certainly roused Kropotkin’s anger and moral outrage, but the fate of social health was 
his primary concern. In ‘The Spirit of Revolt’ (1881), he articulated this view: 
 
In  epochs  set  on  an  unbridled  course  of  self-enrichment,  of  feverish 
speculations and crises, of the sudden ruin of great industries and the brief 
flourishing of other branches of production, of scandalous fortunes amassed in 
a few years and dissipated as quickly, one soon realizes that the economic 
institutions which preside over production and exchange are far from giving 
society the good health they were supposed to guarantee it; they lead precisely 
to a contrary result.
404 
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Capitalism afflicted humanity not simply by precluding equality and brotherhood, as 
Bakunin had argued, but by preventing good health. As a system, its shortcomings are 
judged in terms of their biological effects: Kropotkin realised that, in sum, the risk, 
disposability, inequality, and greed of capitalism are reproachable for guaranteeing 
society  its  sickness.  This  chapter  will  explore  this  idea,  revealing  in  Kropotkin’s 
writings on living and working environments his biological conception of capitalism’s 
danger. Indeed, he explored these settings at length in order to expose the effects of 
capitalism on the human body. He needed to show the processes of decay that were 
taking place in the dwellings of the working class, in the factories and other sites of 
work.  
When  Kropotkin  wrote  about  the  concept  of  the  modern  city,  or  when  he 
considered  particular  cities  of  Europe  or  Russia,  he  tried  to  show  that  it  was  an 
environment reflective of the capitalist system. This was not an expression of anti-
urbanism, but of his view that the modern city was the site in which the realities of 
capitalism  cause  most  harm  to  humanity.  For  Kropotkin,  the  spaces  of  capitalist 
production, the slums of the producing classes, and the sharp disparity between rich 
and  poor  were  not  features  intrinsic  to  the  city,  but  characteristics  of  its  capitalist 
incarnation. It was important for him to draw connections between conditions created 
by capitalism and bodily suffering. In ‘The Situation Today’ (1879), Kropotkin tried to 
show the relationship between capitalist production in the city and biological decline: 
 
Great industries are allowed to die, great cities like Sheffield are turned into 
deserts. There is poverty in England, above all in England, for it is there that 
the “economists” have most thoroughly applied their principles, but there is 
also poverty in Alsace and hunger in Spain and Italy. Unemployment exists 
everywhere,  and  with  unemployment,  mere  lack  becomes  real  poverty; 
anaemic children and women ageing five years in a single winter; sickness 
moving with great sweeps through the ranks of the workers! This is what we 
have attained under the rule of the capitalists.
405 
 
All over Europe capitalism is pushing the health of humanity to breaking point. As the 
physical  environment  of  the  economic  system,  the  city  accommodates  the  dismal 
plight of working class bodies. The crisis of capitalism and its immanent industrial 
collapse leads to mass unemployment across Europe, and in turn, as Kropotkin argues, 
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the  unemployed  fall  into  sickness.  Working  class  women  are  representative  of  the 
processes of accelerated organic deterioration; their children lack the vibrancy of new 
life and are instead pale with illness. In declaring that society has reached this state of 
being through capitalist rule, Kropotkin is making his basic and essential point about 
capitalism: it is an unjust model of socio-economic organisation, whose most severe 
threat to workers lies not in exploitation and alienation, but in the weakening and 
destruction of their health. 
Sickness is commonplace in Kropotkin’s depictions of cities and is one of their 
defining features. Again, this ever-present biological danger is not unique to the urban 
environment as such, but to urban centres of capitalist production and social relations. 
It is in these conditions that the unhygienic and cramped surroundings of the urban 
working class prevail, environmental results of the inequality produced by capitalism. 
In  Kropotkin’s  cities  life  is  accommodated  in  ‘squalid’
406 and  ‘crowded  slums’:
407 
places where the risk of infection from filth and dirt is heightened, and where the 
chance of contagion is intensified by the close proximity of living organisms.  
Kropotkin assessed the plight of working class people in the squalor of the 
crowded slums of the capitalist city. His writings depict the sights and sounds of the 
sufferings  of  sick  bodies  that  are  exploited  by  capitalism  and  they  focus  on  the 
conditions of their dwelling that might be conducive to disease. In ‘To the Young’, 
Kropotkin  encouraged  his  readers  to  analyse  a  typical  working  class  living 
environment from a medical point of view:  
 
Let  us  suppose  you  are  about  to  become  a  doctor.  Tomorrow,  a  man  in  a 
worker’s blouse will call you to visit a sick person. He will lead you into one of 
those alleys where neighbours can almost shake hands over the heads of the 
passers-by; you will climb in foetid air and by the shivering light of a lantern 
up two, three, four or five flights of stairs covered in slippery filth, and in a 
dark, cold room you will find the invalid, lying on a straw pallet and covered in 
dirty rags. Pale, anaemic children, shivering under their tatters, look at you 
through great, wide-open eyes.
408 
 
From Kropotkin’s bio-political perspective, the expertise of the doctor has valuable 
political dimensions. Only his authority can provide an insight into how capitalism 
endangers human beings. His medical knowledge exposes not exploitation, but the 
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biological  effects  of  the  economic  system  of  the  modern  state  –  a  woman  with 
tuberculosis,  fevered  children,  a  dying  laundress.  By  establishing  a  doctor’s 
perspective in his political writings, Kropotkin can centre his critique of capitalism on 
the details of working class living conditions that affect human bodies: lack of light, 
poor quality of air, overcrowding, dirty staircases, minimal if non-existent levels of 
hygiene. Capitalism, in plunging workers into poverty through exploitative and low-
paid work, sinks them to a level where their bodily health is ruined.  
At first sight, this particular passage in ‘To the Young’ appears to confirm the 
essence of Kropotkin’s attack against capitalism: the fundamental effect of the system 
is to worsen the health of the working classes. This would suggest that the bourgeoisie 
experiences  its  privileged  economic  and  social  position  in  good  health.  But 
Kropotkin’s argument does not follow a logic that says ‘capitalism makes workers sick 
while the bourgeoisie remains healthy’. He continued to ask the reader to adopt the 
doctor’s point of view, but this time upon visiting a lady in a mansion: 
 
Next day you are still thinking about those inhabitants of the slums, when your 
colleague tells you that a footman came to fetch him in a coach. It was for one 
of the inhabitants of a rich mansion, a woman, exhausted by sleepless nights, 
who gives all her life to her boudoir, to paying visits, to balls and to quarrels 
with  her  boorish  husband.  Your  colleague  has  prescribed  for  her  a  less 
frivolous way of life, a less rich diet, walks in the open air, calm of mind and 
some exercises at home which might partly make up for the lack of productive 
work!
409 
 
Kropotkin’s  criticism  of  capitalism  transcends  class  boundaries  and  considers  its 
relation  to  the  whole  of  humanity.  It  is  biologically  damaging  to  all  individuals 
regardless of their position in the productive process. The only difference is the cause 
of illness: ‘One woman is dying because, all her life, she has never eaten or rested 
enough; the other is wilting because all her life she has never known what work is.’
410 
Both  causes  are  rooted  in  the  socio-economic  system  to  which  their  bodies  are 
inextricably bound. Capitalism makes everyone sick.  
Alongside dwelling conditions, Kropotkin looked to sites of work to find the 
damaging  effects  produced  by  capitalism.  This  was  nothing  new  in  the  anarchist 
assessment of work. Anarchism has traditionally provided critiques of the spaces of 
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production in society as they are directed by, and towards the interests of capital gain. 
Proudhon explored the emerging role of the mechanised workshop as follows: 
 
With  machinery  and  the  workshop,  divine  right  –  that  is,  the  principles  of 
authority  –  makes  its  entrance  into  political  economy.  Capital,  mastership, 
privilege, monopoly, Loaning, Credit, Property, etc. – such are, in economic 
language, the various names for I know not what, but which is otherwise called 
Power, Authority, Sovereignty, Written Law, Revelation, God in short, cause 
and principle of all our miseries and all our crimes, and who, the more we try to 
define him, the more he eludes us.
411  
 
Proudhon articulated his hostility to the perverting values of government through a 
commentary on mechanised industrialisation. The capitalist workshop served as a site 
in  which  to  expose  the  political  domination  of  states  and  the  moral  perversion  of 
religion,  law,  and  the  idea  of  God.  The  capitalist  workshop  and  its  machinery 
physically embodied the external authority of the state and church. 
The fear of political domination and authority penetrating society through the 
workplace was felt by later anarchists who continued to associate oppression with 
industrial work. Reclus attacked the governmental principle of force through an assault 
on  late  nineteenth-century  industrial  progress,  mimicking  its  claims  to  power  and 
control: ‘Yes, it is force which reigns! proclaims modern industry louder and louder in 
its  brutal  perfection.’
412 Goldman  carried  Proudhon’s  anxieties  into  the  twentieth 
century, arguing that capitalism gives the modern state the means to exercise its power, 
that is ‘the power to subdue, to crush, to exploit, the power to enslave, to outrage, to 
degrade’.
413  
Goldman’s argument that the problem of capitalism lies in the authoritarian 
nature of the workplace and the dominating tendencies of modern machinery is present 
in Kropotkin’s writings. In Fields, Factories and Workshops, a book which deals at 
length  with  sites  of  work  under  capitalism,  he  characterises  the  factories  and 
workshops of late Victorian Britain as places of ‘industrial hell’.
414 But what makes 
them  so  unbearable  for  those  who  work  there?  Unlike  Proudhon,  Reclus,  and 
Goldman, it is not in the subjection to authority and the subservient recoil in the face 
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of  mechanic  domination.  What  Kropotkin  objected  to  most  of  all  is  the  fact  that 
capitalist factories are not ‘airy and hygienic’.
415 He feared for the physical health of 
the men, women, and children who toil to produce the wealth of the capitalist. Even 
the effects of large-scale machinery, considered by Proudhon to be the embodiment of 
political power, appeared to Kropotkin to take place in the physical constitution of the 
worker.  In  The Conquest of Bread,  he  wrote  that  ‘when  a  man  is  harnessed  to  a 
machine,  his  health  is  soon  undermined’.
416 The  problem  here  is  not  the  worker’s 
immobility or that he is bound to an inanimate object, but that his health deteriorates. 
Kropotkin  treated  factories  and  workshops  as  environments,  whose  poor 
hygienic  conditions  worsen  the  condition  of  the  organisms  inside.  Thus,  his 
consideration of young girls in the British manufacturing industry: ‘From the age of 
thirteen we compel the girl – a child yet – to work as a “woman” at the weaving-loom, 
or to stew in the poisoned, over-heated air of a cotton-dressing factory, or, perhaps, to 
be poisoned in the death chambers of a Staffordshire pottery.’
417 Capitalist enterprise 
subjects human beings to toxic surroundings. Later, in Ethics, Kropotkin refers again 
to the destructive inner world of the factory in which the ‘poisoning of adults and 
children  by  noxious  gases’  is  a  daily  occurrence  in  their  biological  experience  of 
capitalism.
418 As a system reliant on environments of exploitation, capitalism literally 
poisons. 
Descriptions of the effects of capitalist sites of work are a theme of ‘To the 
Young’.  Kropotkin  assessed  the  damage  caused  by  the  building  of  the  privately 
financed Swiss trans-alpine Gotthard Railway that began in 1872: 
 
Once you have reached the site of this work, you will see whole battalions of 
workers  decimated  by  exhaustion  and  sickness  in  the  building  of  a  single 
tunnel, you will see thousands of others going home with a few dollars and the 
unmistakable signs of consumption, you will see human corpses.
419 
 
Completed during the same year as the article’s publication, the construction of the 
Gotthard  Tunnel  symbolised  to  Kropotkin  the  essential  threat  of  the  capitalist 
environment. In pursuit of the financial rewards of their project, the Gotthard Railway 
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Company engendered an environment of decay in which epidemics swept through the 
workers. The most significant contribution made by the company to the lives of their 
employees  was  not  financial,  but  biological.  As  Kropotkin’s  words  indicate,  the 
limited power of the wages they took home stood in contrast to the severity and lasting 
impact of tuberculosis. Moreover, ‘the worker on the Gothard’, as Kropotkin wrote, 
who ‘dies of ankolystosis’, is a casualty of commerce.
420 He made the claim explicitly 
that the suffering and death of the worker was intrinsically connected to capitalism, 
caused by its insatiable greed and thirst for capital. The sick men on the Gotthard were 
the ‘victims of a vicious avarice’, he claimed, the biological signs that capitalism’s 
merciless  desire  for  wealth  and  blinkered  quest  for  riches  had  been  ruthlessly  at 
work.
421 The fused vertebrae of the ankolostosis sufferer, although a condition of the 
body, had its roots in the avaricious qualities of capitalism.  
 
 
Capitalist Values 
 
Capitalist  societies  appear  to  anarchists  as  particular  forms  of  educational 
environments. Within them individuals and groups learn which modes of behaviour 
and action are acceptable. Capitalism, they argue, teaches people the essential rules of 
living: how to understand one’s existence; what to wish for; how to recognise when 
something is wrong or right; how to judge others. Anarchism considers capitalism to 
be a negative pedagogy, one that has a damaging moral impact. Its moral education is 
presented  as  a  perversion  of  a  vital  moral  sense  in  humanity,  the  creation  of  a 
deceptive world of values according to which people live their lives as lies. Part of the 
anarchist  moral  critique  of  capitalism  is  to  challenge  the  illusion  of  universality 
surrounding the values of capitalism and to present them for what they really are: ideas 
born from a system based on individualism and inequality, which at the same time, by 
their  apparent  independence  from  the  system,  support  and  legitimise  it.  Anarchists 
maintain that underneath what Crowder terms a person’s ‘empirical’ notion of self – 
‘individuals  as  we  find  them,  identified  by  all  the  desires  they  might  (actually  or 
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potentially)  have’
422 –  lies  an  authentic  selfhood,  the  ‘true’  or  ‘real’  self,  often 
associated with genuine human needs of sociality.
423 Once the authentic selfhood is 
shown to exist and the empirical self revealed as a mere illusion, the spell of capitalist 
morality will be broken.  
Nineteenth-century anarchists developed attacks on the bourgeoisie that tried to 
blow away the smokescreen of empirical selfhood, behind which, the true reality of 
capitalism would be revealed. Proudhon’s dictum ‘property is theft’ underpinned his 
moral critique of capitalism.
424 If slavery, Proudhon argued, by depriving ‘man of his 
thought, his will, and his personality’, could be said to be a form of murder, then 
property, it follows, by denying society the fruits of its collective labour, can be said to 
be  theft.
425 Capitalism,  which  erects  the  idea  of  property  not  only  as  a  natural 
dimension  of  political  life,  but  as  a  moral  category  determining  behaviour  and 
aspirations, robs society of its power to collectively create, own, and utilise material 
reality. In his attempt to tell the truth about property, Proudhon seeks to expose the 
fundamental  contradiction  of  the  bourgeois  world  that  serves  to  morally  enslave 
people. 
Similarly, Bakunin’s moral critique of capitalism explored the illusion of the 
isolated and complete individual. He reasoned that this illusion rules out the very idea 
of society itself: 
 
It will not be very difficult for me to prove that the human individual whom 
they love and extol is a thoroughly immoral being. It is personified egoism, a 
being that is pre-eminently anti-social. Since he is endowed with an immortal 
soul, he is infinite and self-sufficient; consequently, he does not stand in need 
of anyone, not even God, and all the less of other men. Logically he should not 
endure,  alongside  or  above  him,  the  existence  of  an  equal  or  superior 
individual, immortal and infinite to the same extent or to a larger degree than 
himself. By right he should be the only man on the earth, and even more than 
that: he should able to declare himself the sole being, the whole world. For 
infinity, when it meets anything outside of itself, meets a limit, is no more 
infinity, and when two infinities meet, they cancel each other out.
426 
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The centrepiece of bourgeois morality – the complete, isolated individual – negates the 
possibility of collective existence, logically cancelling out the interaction of human 
beings. The damaging effects of capitalist moral norms are felt in the spaces between 
individuals, in their antagonistic, competitive relationships, and the tragic realisation 
that their lives can never coalesce. Moreover, as an extension of capitalist morality, 
every isolated individual ‘appears as an exploiter of others, for materially he stands in 
need of everyone else, though morally he needs no one’.
427 Like Proudhon, Bakunin’s 
first task as he unmasks bourgeois moral codes is to present its internal contradiction. 
For Bakunin, this is the distinctive feature of a social order whose moral essence is 
metaphysical:  a  world  of  myths  and  riddles  where  the  fantasies  of  the  soul,  God, 
immortality, infinity and divine redemption rule supreme. 
In ‘The Inevitability of Revolution’, Kropotkin showed how his conception of 
capitalism analyses not only the effects of its physical environments but also their 
potential moral impact. After a typical assessment of the corrosive nature of the factory 
on human health, he changes perspective and considers bourgeois society’s capacity to 
corrupt: ‘We have been shown recently how the bourgeoisie massacre our children by 
making them work long hours in the factories. There, they are physically ruined. But 
that  is  not  everything.  Corrupt  to  the  core  as  it  is,  society  also  kills  our  children 
morally.’
428 To ruin the physicality of social life is not the only tendency of capitalism: 
its damage is not limited to the bodies of human beings, but is felt in their morality. 
Kropotkin  showed  that  he  was  willing  to  consider  a  different  kind  of  death  by 
capitalism, a decline in the quality and vitality of values, a corruption endemic to the 
conditions created by the bourgeoisie.  
Kropotkin’s  medical  understanding  of  morality  helped  him  to  understand 
capitalist values and the way they come to dominate social morality. Although the 
values he highlighted for criticism – avarice and individualism – were the same as 
those singled out by Proudhon and Bakunin, the way he thought about their influence 
had  a  new,  bio-political  dimension.  In  Kropotkin’s  mind,  the  longing  for  personal 
property and riches, the moral basis of capitalism highlighted by Proudhon, appeared 
as  a  passion  intrinsic  to  a  social  environment.  Once  acquired  by  individuals,  this 
passion signified the existence of moral sickness. Sanity was destroyed not only by the 
state, but by the state’s supporting system of economic organisation. Yet, there were 
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differences to the form of moral disorders produced. Under capitalism, people became 
morally sick with ‘wealth-accumulating passions’, victims of the irrational desires and 
inclinations bred by bourgeois culture.
429 Those driven by a lust for capital exhibited 
the symptoms of madness: they were weak of will and lacked restraint, rendering them 
vulnerable to the most base and condemnable temptations. Kropotkin also transposed 
the individualism of capitalism – what Bakunin critiqued as its anti-sociality – into a 
sign of psychiatric illness. To be selfish and egoistic meant to be plagued by the ‘anti-
social passions’ common to violent criminals and other dangerous individuals.
430 The 
blinkered  self-absorption  and  narcissism  Kropotkin  associated  with  capitalism 
represented  the  lack  of  awareness  and  consideration  for  other  people  indicative  of 
sufferers devoid of the moral sense. Kropotkin fed the principle values of bourgeois 
culture into a scientific framework of analysis, wherein he could equate the apparent 
ruthless pursuit of individual wealth with the ‘low and paltry passions’ that afflicted 
Western civilisation’s moral health.
431  
The capitalist world’s moral threat lay in its role as an environment whose 
value system, once internalised, could produce in its inhabitants the signs of insanity. 
Individuals, therefore, could learn the moral codes of capitalism by living amidst the 
morally  destitute  conditions  of  the  city.  Once  again,  Kropotkin’s  Lamarckian 
perspective  allowed  him  to  investigate  these  urban  surroundings  as  a  set  of 
environmental  conditions  to  which  organisms  adapt.  He  viewed  the  perversion  of 
human  morality  under  capitalism  as  something  that  occurred  as  a  result  of  the 
‘influence of the middle class environment’.
432 Owing to his understanding of morality 
as  a  psychological  phenomenon,  moral  adaptation  still  appeared  as  a  biological 
alignment of a species to its environment, a change of their internal structure that could 
take place during the lifetime of the individual. This evolutionary notion of ‘direct 
action’ formed the basis of his critique of capitalist values; they were a feature of the 
external  environment  to  which  organisms  adjust.  As  a  result,  Kropotkin  was 
particularly concerned with the plight of children. They were morally corrupted due to 
their psychological adaptation to a degrading moral environment. They ‘grow up in the 
filth – material and moral – of our great cities’,
433 Kropotkin wrote in In Russian and 
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French Prisons, revealing his understanding of the physical and moral dimensions of 
the  physical  environments  of  capitalism.  ‘Left  to  themselves  and  to  the  worst 
influences of the street, receiving but little care from their parents ground down by the 
terrible struggle for existence, they hardly know what a happy home is; but they learn 
from  the  earliest  childhood  what  the  vices  of  our  cities  are.’
434 For  Kropotkin, 
capitalism was the economic agent behind what he saw as the moral filth and vice-
ridden streets of the modern city. In this sense, capitalism manufactures living beings 
in its own image through the impact it creates on their psychological constitution. 
Immoral individuals are the victims of corruption, the ‘sad products of an abominably 
organized  society’,  whose  experience  of  external  reality  has  produced  their  moral 
descent into degeneracy.
435 
The  reach  of  capitalist  values,  however,  was  not  limited  to  the  organisms 
whose  moral  constitution  had  adapted  to  a  world  of  egoistic  avarice.  The  second 
premise  of  Kropotkin’s  Lamarckism  -  the  inheritance  of  acquired  characteristics  –
allowed him to consider capitalism from a hereditary perspective. Because he believed 
that the influence of the environment on living beings could be measured not only by 
an  individual’s  acquired  characteristics  but  by  the  presence  of  these  traits  in  the 
individual’s offspring, capitalism appeared to him as a moral conditioner that could 
exert its power hereditarily. The bourgeois child, he wrote in ‘To the Young’, may 
‘have inherited from his father the interest to exploit’.
436 Kropotkin’s anti-capitalist 
stance revealed a sinister biological reality: the learned values of bourgeois society – 
greed, self-interest, narcissism, etc. – could be visited unknowingly on progeny. 
Bakunin had taken an interest in the power of bourgeois inheritance, but of a 
different form. He believed that the bourgeoisie perpetuated its rule generationally 
through property, cementing the existence of individual property and inequality by 
way of family inheritance. ‘Individual and hereditary property’, he claimed, had been 
‘the bases of […] bourgeois omnipotence’.
437 For Kropotkin, however, the bases of 
bourgeois omnipotence were biological. It was the inheritance of psychological defects 
that had maintained the lifespan of the capitalist regime. In a passage of In Russian and 
French Prisons dealing with the question of heredity, Kropotkin asserted it to be a fact 
and called on the expert work of psychiatrist Thomson to support his claim. Referring 
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to Thomson’s article ‘The Hereditary Nature of Crime’ (1870),
438 Kropotkin notes that 
‘[m]any of the anti-social feelings, we are told by Dr. J. Bruce Thompson and many 
others,  are  inherited;  and  facts  amply  support  this  conclusion.’
439 When  he  looked 
deeper into the matter, Kropotkin pointed to the predominance of inherited character 
traits whose root lay in the bourgeois world: ‘But what is inherited? Is it a certain 
bump of criminality, or something else? What is inherited is insufficient self-control, 
or  a  want  of  a  firm  will,  or  a  desire  for  risk  and  excitement,  or  disproportionate 
vanity.’
440 With a sarcastic nod to Thomson (and Lombroso, who would later develop 
Thomson’s  criminal  anthropology  with  its  emphasis  on  the  physiognomic  signs  of 
criminality), Kropotkin rejected the idea of an inherited predetermined criminality that 
could be phrenologically observed in a ‘bump’ on an individual’s skull. Instead, the 
inherited values of the bourgeois world lead to anti-social behaviour and in some cases 
crime. It is possible, Kropotkin argued, to inherit the psychological imbalance – a 
weak will and excessive desires – which could lead to an individual’s mental illness of 
moral  depravity.  Here  lies  a  significant  transformation  of  a  conventional  anarchist 
critique of capitalism. The secret behind capitalism’s hold over morality and its ability 
to maintain and perpetuate the moral basis of bourgeois society was not to be found in 
family inheritance, but in biological heredity. 
Even when Kropotkin wrote optimistically about the emergence of anarchist 
morality,  he  acknowledged  the  worrying  realisation  that  the  bourgeoisie  carries  a 
hereditary lust for power. In ‘The Permanence of Society After the Revolution’ (1890), 
he discussed how anarchy would be preserved and strengthened by an evolutionary 
psychological modification produced in humanity by the establishment of new socio-
economic conditions. ‘We have it for an acquired fact’, he wrote, ‘that the inspiration 
of Liberty causes not only, like every other common cause, a development of fraternity 
and solidarity amongst its adherents, but a modification of the mental inclinations’.
441 
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As Kropotkin went on to explain, he understood this change in social psychology to be 
the  result  of  an  evolutionary  process,  which  rested  on  the  inheritance  of  acquired 
impulses  towards  communal  living.  However,  while  this  underpinned  the  road  to 
anarchy, biological development in itself was not exclusive to that direction. Kropotkin 
thought about the existence and perpetuation of anti-social, bourgeois impulses in the 
same terms: 
 
We have every reason to believe that this [communalistic/anarchistic] impulse, 
awakened with a greater intensity than the crudely selfish ones mentioned as 
having risen in the course of evolution, like them, by heredity – quite as readily 
and to a greater extent – and, being beneficial, will be more persistent than they 
have been [my emphasis].
442 
 
Kropotkin  insisted  that  any  political,  socio-economic  environment  will  produce 
modifications  of  mental  inclinations.  These  psychological,  moral  changes  are  then 
passed down hereditarily to successive generations in a process that can act as the basis 
of a social state. Capitalism owes its existence to an evolutionary process in which its 
values are repeatedly learned and inherited by the people inhabiting its world. While 
this is a form of evolution, following the pattern of acquisition and inheritance, it is, 
for Kropotkin, not progressive, but the epitome of regression. Under capitalism and 
bourgeois culture humanity degenerates psychologically.  
The moral threat of the capitalist environment, therefore, is its tendency to 
engrave bourgeois values into bodies and minds. The affected, though victims of their 
conditions of existence, are nonetheless dangerous. The human products of capitalism 
are  moral  delinquents  whose  lust  for  greed,  coupled  with  their  inability  to  resist 
temptation,  makes  them  a  threat  to  others.  They  are  people  ‘whose  passions  may 
occasionally  lead  them  to  commit  acts  of  an  anti-social  character’.
443 There  is  an 
uncertainty  to  this  depravity,  a  scenario  whereby  individuals  seek  to  gratify  their 
capricious appetites at any cost. Kropotkin warned of the volatility of the bourgeoisie, 
wherein he saw the anti-social problem of people striving for ‘the satisfaction of lower 
passions’.
444 The anti-sociality of the morally insane who populate modern European 
cities, with their weakness of will and excess of lower passions, exists in both their 
avarice and their efforts to satisfy it. In jeopardising the safety, health, and lives of 
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others, the morally depraved represent a deviation from sociality. Their condition is an 
abnormality.  
Inhabited  by  morally  unhealthy,  dangerous  victims  of  bourgeois  culture, 
capitalist cities become conveyor belts of crime. Kropotkin saw a direct link between 
the acquired and inherited anti-social values of capitalism and the rise of crime in the 
urban centres of late nineteenth-century European states. ‘The great cities [of France]’, 
he wrote in In Russian and French Prisons, ‘supply the largest number of convicts’ to 
Clairvaux prison.
445 The capitalist city is a space of production, where the material 
goods  for  life  are  brought  into  reality  simultaneously  with  capital.  Alongside  this 
productive output, however, is a form of human production that results from the values 
that permeate within its walls. As Kropotkin wrote: ‘When we see this population 
growing up in all our big manufacturing centres, we cannot wonder that our big cities 
chiefly  supply  prisons  with  inmates’.
446 Capitalism  does  not  simply  manufacture 
physical products, but the moral sickness that plagues the urban population. 
 
 
The Degenerate Class 
 
Since  the  mid-nineteenth  century,  anarchist  thinkers  have  created  an  arsenal  of 
condemnations and critiques that have been levelled against the bourgeoisie as a social 
group. As an economic class, the bourgeoisie has been presented as a minority of 
proprietors, the owners of industry who get rich from the toil of the working class 
majority. Malatesta highlighted a single guiding factor that defined the culture of the 
bourgeoisie and explained its privileged social standing. ‘This class’, he claimed, ‘are 
solely influenced by a thirst for power and profit’.
447 This parasitical interpretation of 
the bourgeoisie is shared, of course, by Marxism with its conception of bourgeois 
culture being dependent on economic exploitation. Malatesta also viewed the political 
supremacy of the middle class in the apparatus of the state as the means through which 
it satisfies its need to dominate and get rich. As the powerful political grouping, the 
middle classes displayed another essential feature of their existence: the ruthless and 
merciless crushing of progress in an effort to maintain the comfort of the status quo. 
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‘The bourgeoisie’, he stated, ‘infuriated by the fear of losing their privileges, will use 
all means of repression and suppression not only against the Anarchist and Socialist, 
but every progressive movement’.
448 In its state of fright, the bourgeoisie becomes a 
political obstacle not only to peace and stability, but to progress itself.  
Anarchists also condemn the moral traits of the bourgeoisie. Bakunin saw a 
superior  self-image  as  a  characteristic  feature  of  bourgeois  rule.  Its  morality  was 
fuelled by an aspiration to dominate. ‘Tired of being an anvil like the great majority of 
people’, he described, the bourgeoisie wants ‘to become in turn a hammer’.
449 Italian 
anarchist  Carlo  Cafiero  (1846-1892)  claimed  the  morality  of  the  bourgeoisie  was 
duplicitous. They created a world of ‘intrigues’ and illusions: conjuring a façade on 
which their power rested. The purpose of their historical existence was nothing more 
than to subject the majority to play ‘the game of [the] oppressors’.
450 
From some of his earliest articles for Le Révolté, Kropotkin developed a fierce 
moral and cultural critique of the bourgeoisie. Like other anarchists, he attempted to 
isolate  an  immoral  minority  group  that  he  thought  should  be  condemned  for  its 
destructive relation to the majority. Kropotkin’s attack however, in its appeal to ideas 
and  truth  claims  from  contemporary  science,  stands  apart  from  the  work  of  other 
anarchist  writers.  His  descriptions  and  analyses  of  bourgeois  life  employed  many 
distinctive tropes from discourses of degeneration that were popular in late nineteenth-
century scientific literature. Themes of monstrousness, contagion, and evolutionary 
regression were important categories in Kropotkin’s depiction of the bourgeois class. 
As Eric T. Carlson argues, ideas of degeneration often had serious ‘moral implications’ 
and were employed to ‘condemn or defame certain groups’.
451 But if for Lombroso, 
Nordau, and others the degenerate groups included criminals, alcoholics, homosexuals, 
prostitutes, the insane, and, as we have seen in chapter one, anarchists, for Kropotkin 
the group in society most concerning to the healthy part of the population was the 
bourgeoisie.  With  an  inversion  of  images  conveying  the  dangerous  underworld  of 
modern  cities,  Kropotkin  targeted  the  lifestyles,  habits,  collective  morality,  and 
individual physiognomies of the ruling classes with a view to expose their degeneracy. 
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As I have shown, Kropotkin saw something worryingly unhealthy about the 
nature of the urban capitalist environment. The existence of a particular class of people 
seemed to him the source of a constant threat of disease that plagued the metropolises 
of Europe. Yet, rather than the lower classes of the slums, whose poverty plunged 
them into ill health and destitution, Kropotkin laid the blame for the uncleanliness of 
the modern city on the lives of the bourgeoisie. In particular, he found the bourgeois 
youth  morally  and  materially  repulsive.  In  ‘The  Inevitability  of  Revolution’,  he 
portrayed the lifestyle of the average middle-class boy: 
 
Some will search in novels for the poetry which is lacking in their lives; they 
will stuff their minds with this literary rubbish, cobbled together by and for the 
bourgeoisie at a penny or two a line, and they will end up, like the young 
Lemâitre, slashing open the bellies and cutting the throats of children in the 
hope of becoming “celebrated murderers”. Others will give themselves up to 
execrable vices […who…] will provide society with its contingent of good 
citizens with niggardly mentalities who admittedly do not steal handkerchiefs 
in  the  street,  but  “honestly”  rob  their  customers;  who  have  no  passion  but 
secretly visit the brothel to get rid of the gravy from the stewpot, who stagnate 
in their marshes and curse whoever tried to stir up their muck.
452 
 
Lacking  beauty  and  the  influence  of  higher,  noble  feelings,  the  lives  of  young 
bourgeois males are base and disgusting. They are driven not by a love of beauty, but 
by  a  bourgeois  literature  whose  cheap,  rotten  stories  inspire  the  most  hideous, 
bloodthirsty  crimes.  One  assumes  Kropotkin  is  referring  to  the  nineteenth-century 
playwright  and  actor  Frédérick  Lemâitre  (1800-1876)  who  was  famed  for  his 
performances as criminals on the Boulevard du Crime. It is interesting that Kropotkin 
should refer to theatre when attempting to convey the threat of the bourgeois youth. 
This, I believe, is another example of Kropotkin’s tendency to make the metaphorical 
real and, as he did with his interpretation of Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov, to blur the 
boundaries  between  fictional  and  non-fictional  degeneracy.  Kropotkin’s  literalism 
allowed him to emphasise an impurity of being he thought was endemic to bourgeois 
culture. There is a dirtiness to their exploits, a secret economy of filth lurking in the 
urban underworld. They pose all kinds of dangers: child murder, violence, deceit, theft, 
subversive  sexual  deviancy.  The  bourgeoisie’s  moral  degeneracy  makes  it,  not  the 
workers, the dangerous group in society.  
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Kropotkin’s  description  of  the  sickening  life  of  the  middle-class  boy  is 
followed by an equally repugnant portrayal of young bourgeois girls: 
 
That is how it is for the boys! As for the girls, the bourgeoisie corrupt them at 
an early age. Absurd children’s books, dolls done up like whores, the mother’s 
dresses and her example, the chatter of the boudoir – nothing is lacking to turn 
the child into a woman who will sell herself to the highest bidder. And that 
child already spreads the infection around her: do not working-class children 
look  with  envy  on  this  over-dressed  girl,  with  her  elegant  demeanour,  a 
courtesan at twelve years old? But if the mother is “virtuous” – in the way a 
good middle-class woman understands the term – then the situation is even 
worse. If the child is intelligent and passionate, she will take at its true value 
this  double  morality  which  consists  in  saying:  “Love  your  neighbour,  but 
plunder him when you can! Be virtuous, but only up to a certain point”.
453 
 
Kropotkin  shows  in  what  terms  he  understands  the  bourgeois  corruption  of  youth. 
Under the influence of meaningless domestic chatter, the girl grows up to be a mute, 
expressionless commodity. Moreover, she becomes an outlet for the basest depraved 
passions  of  the  bourgeois  male,  reduced  like  her  dolls  to  an  object  of  sexual 
gratification. Kropotkin implies the importance of the private realm in the process of 
moral corruption. The family environment, uncaring for the fate of the public sphere, 
teaches the child the act of deception at the heart of bourgeois virtue. There is a fear of 
contagion in Kropotkin’s descriptions. Her purity having been contaminated by the 
depraved culture of the bourgeoisie, the once innocent child grows up to become a 
source of infection herself, contaminating the morally healthy group in society: the 
working class. In her prostituted existence, the bourgeois girl is a source of moral 
disease, a centrifugal force of moral decay. 
Kropotkin’s  repulsion  at  the  bourgeoisie  also  stemmed  from  what  he 
considered  to  be  its  inhuman  nature.  Images  of  monstrousness,  used  to  degrade 
anarchists in the popular European press during the late nineteenth century, were a key 
feature of Kropotkin’s depiction of the bourgeoisie. The class characteristics of the 
bourgeoisie often sit side-by-side with those of animalistic wildness. As a member of a 
‘cast of idlers’, the bourgeois is defined by ‘his moneybags and his brutal instincts’.
454 
A direct connection is established between the values of bourgeois culture and the 
traits  of  wild  beasts.  To  be  anti-social  and  selfish,  Kropotkin  implies,  is  to  be 
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‘depraved and vicious’.
455 Like the untamed carnivores of a Hobbesian state of war, or 
perhaps more relatedly, like the degenerate soldiers rolling around in the trenches of 
the Russo-Japanese War that I discussed in the previous chapter, the bourgeoisie is led 
by its ‘bestial passions’ and ferocious desires.
456 Here, Kropotkin is playing creatively 
with modern science, politicising tropes and themes from degeneration and employing 
them in an anarchist context. He is flipping conservative uses of degeneration the other 
way around, actively inverting science and employing it, as it were, against its self-
proclaimed proprietors. 
The presence of excessive, unbridled urges was, for Kropotkin, a characteristic 
feature of the bourgeoisie that had a causal effect on its behaviour. It was often these 
uncontrollable instincts that explained its immorality and dangerous lifestyle. In ‘To 
the Young’, Kropotkin made this connection when describing a hypothetical set of 
circumstances he thought were common to modern life. He began with the ‘crime’ 
committed by the bourgeois youth: 
 
One day you may hear a story of the young girl […]. Having struggled year 
after year against poverty, she left her village for the city. She knew life would 
be hard, but at least she hoped to earn her bred honestly. But by now you can 
guess the fate that overtook her. Courted by a young bourgeois, she let herself 
be trapped by his fine words, and gave herself to him with the passion of youth, 
to find herself abandoned at the end of the year, with baby in her arms. Ever 
brave, she did not cease to struggle, but she succumbed in the unequal fight 
against hunger and cold and ended up dying.
457 
 
The  demise  of  the  working-class,  former  peasant  girl  was  not  a  consequence  of 
capitalists exploiting her life and labour for capital gain, but of urban bourgeois sexual 
predation. But how does Kropotkin account for such damaging behaviour on behalf of 
the  young  middle-class  male?  As  he  makes  clear,  the  irresponsible  male  youth  is 
corrupt  because  he  comes  from  a  degenerate  group,  a  people  whose  threat  to 
civilisation is explained by its beastliness and its base, low animalistic appetites. Such 
stories are the inevitable result of a society divided between humans and beasts: ‘you 
will understand that they [such tragic incidents] cannot cease while mankind is divided 
into two camps; the poor on one side and on the other the idlers and the playboys with 
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their  fine  words  and  brutal  appetites’.
458 Kropotkin  explains  the  young  man’s 
entrapment of the girl, his impregnation of her, and subsequent abandonment of his 
baby  through  two  seemingly  contradictory  attacks.  First,  the  young  man  is  too 
civilised: his ‘fine words’ and charm are characteristic of the duplicitous and deceptive 
nature  of  urban  bourgeois  culture  that  can  be  used  to  trick  and  ensnare  the  rural, 
uneducated peasant. Yet, his danger is also explained by his excessive naturalness: the 
young  bourgeois’  attempt  to  satisfy  his  sexual  desire,  his  ‘brutal  appetites’,  also 
contributes  to  the  girl’s  hardship  and  death.  What  Kropotkin  condemned  as  the 
immoral, anti-social behaviour he associated with the bourgeoisie had its roots in both 
its civilisational decadence and its biological degeneracy. 
As we have seen, Kropotkin’s reasoning that the moral depravity of bourgeois 
culture was a result of unchecked desires dominating the rational will, made use of a 
calculus for insanity popular in the psychiatric moral sciences. His descriptions of 
bourgeois  culture  employed  a  codification  of  moral  insanity  used  by  some  of  the 
nineteenth-century criminal psychiatrists to whom I referred in chapter one. Despine, 
for example, whom Kropotkin applauded for opening up a new medical approach to 
the political problem of deviancy, used this explanation in his analysis of the morally 
insane.
459 In  Psychologie naturelle: Étude sur les facultés intellectuelles et morales 
(1868),  Despine  considered  the  psychological  state  of  criminals.  One  of  the 
conclusions he drew from a fifty-year research project into reports of criminal trials 
was that the serious offender, ‘subject to the law of self-interest, decides his course of 
action only in accordance to his strongest desires [and] depraved lusts’.
460 Without the 
resisting force of a will, criminals are ‘involuntary slaves to their immoral desires’.
461 
What  interested  Kropotkin  about  Despine’s  work,  I  believe,  was  the  psychiatrist’s 
exploration of a nexus of self-interest, desire, immorality, and mental sickness. Indeed, 
this  was  a  crucial  combination  in  Kropotkin’s  scientific  condemnation  of  the 
bourgeoisie.  His  assessment  of  bourgeois  culture  shares  Despine’s  view  that  the 
morally depraved are degenerates who ‘are dominated by the appetite for pleasures at 
any  price’.
462 Inverting  ideas  from  criminal  psychiatry,  Kropotkin  was  able  to 
medicalise  the  very  notion  of  self-interest  intrinsic  to  the  culture  of  bourgeois 
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capitalism, explaining the criminal behaviour of the middle classes as a result of their 
search for ‘an outlet for their passions’.
463 As a consequence, anarchism’s objection to 
the selfishness and hedonistic pursuit of pleasure it identifies with bourgeois culture is 
transformed  into  a  fear  about  moral  sickness.  For  Kropotkin,  greed,  egoism,  and 
avarice betray the degeneracy of their bearer. 
In Kropotkin’s fiercest attacks on bourgeois culture he gives a clue to its moral 
insanity. The ‘besotted playboy’ with the distinctive attributes of the ruling class is 
driven  in  his  dealings  by  a  mental  imbalance.  His  lack  of  solidarity  and  ‘vilely 
egotistical feelings’ are the symptoms of a moral disease, characteristic of a man ‘who 
spends his whole life in the pursuit of new pleasures’. The prototypical bourgeois, 
Kropotkin argues, will ‘always lean towards the grossest kind of sensuality, and he 
will  degrade  everything  he  touches’.
464 Like  Maudsley’s  representations  of  the 
criminal classes in his psychological work, Kropotkin’s bourgeoisie is insane, a social 
grouping ‘deprived of the moral sense’.
465  
Kropotkin’s idea about the degeneracy of the middle classes, however, did not 
introduce the notion of a bourgeois decline to anarchist thought. Bakunin, for example, 
had told of the bourgeoisie’s demise. He described how it had fallen from a position of 
political strength and vitality, engendering three revolutions in 1789, 1830, and 1848, 
before losing vigour, historical agency, and becoming ‘impotent, stupid, and sterile’.
466 
This image of descent, however, was a promise of the decline of their economic and 
political supremacy as the ruling class. These were not the terms in which Kropotkin 
would express their fall. For him the idea of their degeneracy was a biological descent. 
In  ‘The  Inevitability  of  Revolution’,  he  conveyed  the  regressive  nature  of  the 
bourgeois class in a statement about its cruelty to children: 
 
Respect for childhood is one of the finest qualities that developed in humanity 
as it accomplished its painful march from the state of savagery to its present 
condition. How often has one not seen the most depraved of men disarmed by 
the smile of a child? But such respect is vanishing.
467 
 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
463 Kropotkin, ‘The Inevitability of Revolution’, p. 32. 
464 Ibid., p. 33. 
465 Maudsley, ‘The Borderland’, p. 107. 
466 Bakunin, Scientific Anarchism, p. 193. 
467 Kropotkin, ‘The Inevitability of Revolution’, p. 31. 	 ﾠ 159	 ﾠ
Signalled by the its lack of respect for children – the drudgery of factory labour, the 
poisoning  of  girls  in  Staffordshire  potteries,  the  destitute  lives  of  working-class 
children in the filth of the capitalist city – the bourgeoisie was reversing the process of 
civilisational  development  and  pulling  humanity  back  towards  its  uncivilised  past. 
Kropotkin identified the degeneracy of the bourgeoisie as an evolutionary regression. 
The ‘painful march’ of evolution from savagery to civilisation, though accomplished, 
could be re-trodden. This worrying prospect of a savage return, Kropotkin foresaw, 
would prove to be far more painful, and agonising to traverse, than the centuries-long 
progressive march to civilisation. 	 ﾠ 160	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6 Revolution 
 
Honest men of all classes call down the tempest, so that it can burn up with its breath 
of flame the pestilence that afflicts us, blow away the miasmas that stifle us, and sweep 
up in its furious progress all that debris of the past which weighs down on us, stifles 
us,  deprives  us  of  air  and  light,  so  that  in  the  end  it  can  give  us  a  whole  new 
atmosphere  […];  it  becomes  a  question  of  progress  against  immobility,  of  human 
development against brutalization, of life against the foetid stagnation of the marsh.
468 
 
Kropotkin, ‘The Inevitability of Revolution’. 
 
 
Kropotkin’s  words  from  ‘The  Inevitability  of  Revolution’  convey  an  idea  of  the 
anarchist revolution’s power, of the reason for its intervention, and of what it could 
create  through  destruction.  Let  us  look  at  the  language  he  uses  to  depict  this.  A 
revolutionary  storm,  tumultuous  and  violent,  will  wash  the  world  clean  in  a  great 
moment  of  disturbance.  The  tempest  will  ‘sweep  up’  everything  in  its  path:  the 
commotion  of  revolution  will  cleanse.  Kropotkin  endows  revolution  with  literal 
biological powers: an ability to ‘burn’ pestilence and eradicate the sicknesses caused 
by the modern state and capitalism. Real diseases will be wiped out: typhus, scurvy, 
and  tuberculosis  countered  and  prevented.  Revolution  will  target  the  threat  of 
pathology,  healing  the  madness  and  insanity  afflicting  humanity  and  restoring  to 
society its moral and mental health. Again, Kropotkin’s scientific tropes and images 
are not metaphors of political transformation: the political task of the revolution is the 
resuscitation of the world, to pull it back from the brink of biological death. Human 
existence will cease to regress and degenerate into savagery, but will move forward 
and  be  improved.  As  a  remedy  to  illness  the  revolution  affects  an  environmental 
change, purifying the deathly atmosphere in which humans live. With miasmas blown 
away, the conditions in which diseases grow and spread are decontaminated and life 
can flourish once more amidst new-found hygiene. 
Science was critical to the success of Kropotkin’s concept of revolution. His 
diagnosis  of  the  biological  problems  facing  the  modern  world  that  I  explored  in 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
468 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 	 ﾠ 161	 ﾠ
chapters four and five required a medical solution. Empirically verifiable, biological 
threats could only be cured by practices based on authoritative scientific knowledge. 
Technologies  were  needed  whose  effects  would  be  measured  and  calculated  in 
advance. Remedies had to be administered with exactness. The scientific quality of 
revolution, however, did not render it apolitical. Its political dimensions were not lost 
in a technocratic appeal to scientific thought. As I will show, anarchist political ideas 
were  required  to  restore  human  health.  If,  as  Kropotkin  wrote  in  ‘Revolution  and 
Famine’, ‘the very cause of the evil indicates the remedy’, then political revolution 
was essential for regeneration.
469 Indeed, with the state and capitalism identified as the 
causes  of  the  evil  (sickness,  pestilence,  miasma),  political  revolution  was  the  only 
viable  remedy  available  to  humanity  to  save  itself  from  further  decay  and  death. 
Revolution was a form of social treatment, an intervention into the social body whose 
political significance lay in its medical ambition. 
 
 
Resistance and Revolt 
 
Scientific  thought  provided  Kropotkin  with  attractive  and  authoritative  ideas  that 
helped  him  to  conceptualise  elements  of  the  revolutionary  program.  Notions  of 
individual  resistance  and  collective  revolt  found  expression  in  his  thought  through 
recourse  to  contemporary  psychology.  While  only  a  part  of  the  overall  anarchist 
revolutionary  project,  the  ability  to  resist  and  the  activity  of  revolt  were  crucial 
preconditions of broader social revolution. Resistance demonstrated the first signs of 
strength  against  the  destructive  and  corruptive  pressures  of  the  socio-economic, 
political world. By withstanding the authority of the state and the moral perversion of 
capitalism, individuals were practicing the elementary skills necessary for successful 
social revolution. Revolt is also important for anarchist revolution as it expresses the 
revolutionary spirit of collective human entities in moments of direct opposition to 
existing political orders. Unplanned and eruptive, revolt forms the emotional basis of 
the  revolution’s  more  strategic  political  and  economic  objectives.  In  the  following 
section I will briefly concentrate on an aspect of Kropotkin’s conception of resistance, 
before going on at length to provide a reading of his understanding of revolt. 
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Kropotkin believed that political resistance could begin with a component of an 
individual’s  interior  psychology.  Owing  to  his  tendency  to  understand  political 
oppression  and  moral  corruption  in  medical  terms,  whose  effects  manifested 
themselves in insanity, psychopathy, and moral degeneracy, any mode of resistance 
against  these  pressures  had  to  have  psychiatric  qualities.  A  firmness  of  will  – 
conceptualised by criminal psychiatrists, as we have seen, as an ingredient of mental 
health for its ability to check the maddening influence of excessive lower passions – 
appeared to Kropotkin as the suitable point of departure for political resistance. He 
believed  it  could  be  strong  enough  ‘to  resist  the  first  impulse  of  a  passionate 
character’.
470 Like the psychiatrists whose work he read, Kropotkin made resistance 
intrinsic to the will.  
These  were  qualities  that  had  great  political  implications  for  Kropotkin’s 
thought. Unlike psychiatric science, which generally saw the passions as endemic to 
civilisation  per  se,  Kropotkin  associated  the  lower  passions  and  the  morbid 
deterioration of noble passions with the modern state and capitalism. As a result, he 
transformed mental and moral illness into consequences of undesirable political and 
economic  environments.  To  resist  the  influence  of  the  lower  passions,  and  thus 
insanity, then, meant to resist the particular socio-economic and political reality of the 
modern state and capitalism. When Kropotkin termed the will ‘the interior force of 
resistance’, he was talking literally about its capacity for political resistance.
471 Again, 
because he saw the threat of the passions to mental health as an endemic feature of the 
capitalist modern state, to resist them meant to partake in an act of political defiance. 
Such  a  transformation  of  a  medical  concept  into  a  powerful  revolutionary  device 
shows not only Kropotkin’s reliance on contemporary scientific thought to articulate 
anarchism,  but  his  creative  ability  to  politicise  it.  In  this  way,  politics  remained 
paramount  in  the  meeting  of  science  and  anarchism.  Kropotkin  used  psychiatry  to 
think about the anarchist concept of resistance, but in so doing, he added to the will’s 
original,  non-radical  meaning  in  professional  psychiatric  discourses  a  new, 
revolutionary significance.  
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These interplays were also at work in Kropotkin’s anarchist conception of revolt. At 
least as far back as Proudhon, who saw in society an immeasurable ‘collective force’ 
and a ‘higher kind of collectivity’, nineteenth-century anarchists had been interested in 
the potential of collective action and revolt to ignite revolutionary change.
472 They 
were excited by the possibility that revolutions could begin with a supra personal, 
collective expression of what Kropotkin described as the ‘spirit of revolt’. Alongside 
Marx  and  later  nineteenth-century  socialists,  anarchist  thinkers  sought  to  provide 
historical examples of collective revolt, citing the episodes of the French Revolution 
and  the  Paris  Commune  of  1871  in  order  to  draw  lines  of  revolutionary  heritage 
between  themselves  and  their  predecessors.
473 However,  if  for  Marx  the  historical 
perspective showed the revolutionary role of the proletariat, the emphasis in anarchist 
historiographies  of  preceding  revolutions  is  on  the  collective  power  of  the 
revolutionary mass.  
In  his  historical  interpretations  of  French  revolutionary  history,  Kropotkin 
continues the trend of nineteenth-century anarchist thinking that located the agency of 
revolt in the collective.
474 He believed that the Paris Commune, for example, ‘was not 
a product of the conceptions of an individual philosopher. It was born of the collective 
intelligence;  it  sprang  from  the  heart  of  an  entire  people’.
475 However,  while  the 
traditional  anarchist  emphasis  on  the  revolutionary  power  of  the  mass  persisted  in 
Kropotkin’s  thought,  the  way  he  understood  its  character  and  potential  was 
transformed  by  contemporary  psychological  thought.  His  understanding  of  the 
character  of  revolt  and  his  analysis  of  what  lay  behind  its  force,  then,  display  a 
conceptual indebtedness to important psychological ideas prevalent in Europe around 
the turn of the twentieth century. 
Kropotkin’s interest in collective revolt emerged in the early 1880s. At this 
time  another,  non-revolutionary  discourse  was  beginning  to  interrogate  the 
characteristics of mass human thought and behaviour within revolutionary contexts. As 
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an  expression  of  popular  curiosity  about  crowds,  crowd  psychology  was  part  of  a 
broader interest in mass politics that emerged in Europe after the French Revolution 
and  a  response  to  the  processes  of  rapid  urbanisation  and  population  increase 
witnessed  throughout  the  nineteenth  century.  As  a  recognised  science,  however, 
‘crowd’ or ‘herd’ or ‘mob’ psychology, as it was known, emerged around the time 
Kropotkin began writing, in the wake of the Paris Commune.
476 Crowd psychologists 
wrote extensively on the psychology of human collectives, examining the crowd in 
religious  ceremonies,  national  carnivals,  and  patriotic  parades.  Yet,  theorists  were 
particularly  fascinated  with  the  collective  power  of  lower  class,  revolutionary 
crowds.
477 As  one  of  the  discipline’s  leading  figures  Gustave  Le  Bon  (1841-1931) 
indicated in the opening lines of his famous book La Psychologie des Foules (1895), 
crowd psychologists claimed to be examining their object scientifically, exploring its 
hidden psychological characteristics: 
 
In its ordinary sense the word ‘crowd’ means a gathering of individuals of 
whatever nationality, profession, or sex, and the chance that may have brought 
them together. From the psychological point of view, the expression ‘crowd’ 
assumes quite a different significance. Under certain given circumstances […] 
an agglomeration of men presents new characteristics very different from those 
of the individuals composing it. The sentiments and ideas of all the people in 
the gathering takes one and the same direction, and their conscious personality 
vanishes. A collective mind is formed, doubtless transitory, but presenting very 
clearly defined characteristics. The gathering has thus become what […] I will 
call  an  organised  crowd,  or,  […]  a  psychological  crowd.  It  forms  a  single 
being, and is subject to the law of the mental unity of crowds.
478  
 
The  new  psychology  took  a  historical  interest  in  crowds,  exploring  the  past  for 
examples of when the ‘collective mind’ had been at work. Crowd psychologists looked 
for  exceptions;  their  objects  of  analysis  were  the  eruptions  of  uncontrollable  mass 
activity  during  the  French  Revolution,  for  example,  or  the  unpredictable  and 
destructive  disturbances  of  the  Paris  Commune.  According  to  historian  Susanna 
Barrows, French crowd theorists in the late nineteenth century reached similar, broad 
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conclusions  in  their  work,  agreeing  as  to  the  hyper-emotional,  insane  character  of 
crowds,  their  instinctual,  irrational  behaviour,  their  destructive  potential,  and  their 
thirst for violence.
479 
Like many ideas in contemporary science, Kropotkin was well aware of the 
theories of crowd psychology that were springing up around him. By 1908 he was so 
convinced that crowds had their own psychology that in a letter to prominent anarchist 
educationalist Francisco Ferrer (1859-1909) he argued that ‘in order to reach the level 
of the science of the day’ the anarchist Modern School in Barcelona should include in 
its programme lessons on ‘the psychology of the individual and of the crowd’.
480 If 
anarchist  schools  hoped  to  give  children  a  holistic  scientific  education,  then  they 
should  teach  the  most  contemporary  and  up-to-date  theories  emanating  from 
psychology.  This,  Kropotkin  believed,  included  the  theory  of  crowd  psychology. 
Children must be made aware of the potential for a new form of consciousness to come 
into being – the collective mind – with the formation of crowds. 
A  year  later,  Kropotkin’s  The  Great  French  Revolution  1789-1793  was 
published. He presented it as a contribution to recent historical scholarship on the 
French Revolution and referred to historian and crowd theorist Taine’s influential The 
Origins  of  Contemporary  France  (1875-93).  In  his  psychohistories  of  the  French 
Revolution and the Paris Commune, Taine had tried to trace the degeneracy of France, 
attempting to mark the decline of its national health since 1789. As Ginneken suggests, 
Taine  wanted  to  show  that  ‘something  was  thoroughly  wrong  with  the  national 
character  of  the  French  as  a  whole’.
481 The  first  moments  of  that  descent,  Taine 
argued, began with the storming of the Bastille: 
 
The  starving,  the  ruffians,  and  the  patriots  all  form  one  body  […].  A  new 
power has sprung up […], anonymous, without restraint, driven onward by 
coffee-house theories, by transports of the brain […]. This is the dictatorship of 
the  mob,  and  its  proceedings,  conforming  to  its  nature,  consists  in  acts  of 
violence; wherever it finds resistance, it strikes […]. The fatal moment has 
arrived [the storming of the Bastille]. Like a tame elephant suddenly become 
wild again, the populace throws off its ordinary driver, and the new guides 
whom it tolerates perched on its neck are there simply for show; in future it 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
479 Barrows, Distorting Mirrors, p. 5.  
480 Petr Kropotkin, ‘The Reformed School’, Mother Earth (August, 1908), 259-62 (p. 260). 
481 Ginneken, Crowds, psychology, and politics, p. 32.  	 ﾠ 166	 ﾠ
will move along as it pleases, freed from control, and abandoned to its own 
feelings, instincts, and appetites.
482 
 
For Taine this was a worrying example of the latent wildness of the French masses. 
His way of interpreting threats to political order and national stability through the 
language of biological decline, wild irrationality, and psychological ‘transportations’ 
was typical of public discourses about the crowd in late nineteenth-century France.
483 
Expressed in these terms, the crowds of the French Revolution represented a threat to 
civilisation that Taine believed was present in his own day.  
It was in this political interpretation of the events where we find Kropotkin’s 
disagreement  with  Taine,  whose  interpretations  of  French  revolutionary  history  he 
criticised as the ‘faithful echoes of the fears of the middle class’.
484 For Kropotkin, in 
contrast to Taine, the storming of the Bastille by the mob was an indication of the 
possibility of revolutionary change, a reminder that collective action could produce an 
effective  revolt.  It  symbolised  the  ‘first  victory’
485 of  the  people  over  authority:  a 
‘proof of [collective] strength’.
486 There is none of Taine’s anxiety about civilisational 
collapse  in  Kropotkin’s  analysis.  Rather,  the  thronging  and  terrifying  mob  was 
essential  for  the  ‘conquest  of  liberty’.
487 Kropotkin’s  political  interpretation  of  the 
crowd represented it as an entity through which, as Lucas puts it, the people ‘expressed 
its  collective  identity  and  values  [and]  regulated  its  relationship  with  authority’.
488 
Kropotkin saw the crowd as ‘the natural organ of the people’.
489 The storming of the 
Bastille was not simply a manifestation of the crowd’s physical strength, but of its 
political and moral power. 
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Despite these differences, Kropotkin and Taine are in agreement about the role 
of the crowd in the unfolding of events and they share a fascination with the mob’s 
revolutionary  potential.  In  chapter  twelve  of  The  Great  French  Revolution,  ‘The 
Taking of the Bastille’, Kropotkin reiterates Taine’s view that revolutionary political 
processes are ignited by crowd psychology: 
 
On the way the mob, furious at his [Marquis de Launey] treachery, heaped 
every kind of insult on him; twenty times he was nearly killed, despite the 
heroic efforts of Cholat and another. These two men protected him with their 
own bodies, but, when only a hundred steps from the Hotel de Ville, he was 
dragged out of their hands and decapitated […]. There was great emotion, and 
tears  were  shed  at  the  sight  of  the  phantoms  who  issued  from  their  cells, 
bewildered by the light of the sun and by the sound of the many voices […]. 
These poor martyrs of royal despotism were carried in triumph by the people 
through the streets of Paris. The whole town was soon delirious […]. In this 
way the Revolution began [my emphasis].
490 
 
In his keen interest in instances of mob behaviour Kropotkin shares the historical focus 
of crowd psychologists. He agrees with Le Bon that a crowd is not simply ‘a gathering 
of individuals’, but signifies the appearance of a collective mind. His crowd exhibit in 
abundance the same characteristics attributed to the mob by crowd psychologists. It 
was  emotional:  furious  with  rage,  shedding  tears  of  despair  and  horror.  It  was 
destructive and violent: closing in on its victim and brutally killing him in the streets. 
It was irrational: drenched in delirium. Moreover, Kropotkin and Taine share the view 
that the collective psychology of the crowd ignited the revolution. For both thinkers, 
the  storming  of  the  Bastille  represented  the  critical  moment  when  empirically 
observable facts of human psychology created the conditions for revolt and propelled 
individuals towards political rebellion.  
Drawing  on  the  knowledge  of  crowd  psychology,  Kropotkin  was  able  to 
present the idea of collective action in anarchist politics as a scientific fact. These ideas 
also helped him conceptualise the transformation of peaceful individuals into members 
of a revolutionary group. This was an important idea of change within his of broader 
understanding of revolution. In ‘The Spirit of Revolt’, he considered how this process 
could occur: 
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From these still pacific thoughts about insurrection and revolt, extends a great 
abyss which among the major part of mankind divides reason from act […]. 
How is that abyss crossed? How did these men, who just yesterday grumbled 
peacefully about their fate as they puffed their pipes and a moment afterwards 
humbly saluted the same gendarme they had just been cursing a few days later, 
seize  their  pitchforks  and  billhooks,  and  attack  in  his  castle  the  lord  who 
yesterday had seemed so terrible? By what magic have these men, whom their 
wives  justifiably  treated  as  cowards,  become  transformed  today  into  heroes 
who march through shot and shell to conquer their rights. How have these 
words, so often spoken in the past and lost on the air like the fading sound of 
bells, at last become transformed into acts?
491 
 
Kropotkin gives the answer to this question: the action of minorities awakens the spirit 
of revolt in the masses. The first part of this formulation, that is, that ‘propaganda by 
deed’
492  (peaceful  protest,  acts  of  resistance,  terrorism)  plays  a  role  in  the 
revolutionary  process,  has  been  explored  in  interesting  ways  by  a  numbers  of 
scholars.
493 The  second,  that  a  collective  spirit  of  revolt  is  aroused  by  an  external 
emotional trigger or spark, has received less attention. To fully understand Kropotkin’s 
view of revolutionary tactics we need to take seriously the role of the mass and the 
crowd in ‘The Spirit of Revolt’. For as Kropotkin tells us, the spirit of revolt is not a 
force that inspires individuals to commit propagandistic acts, nor is it a spirit awakened 
in individuals impressed by such acts; it is ignited in the crowd itself, whose heroism 
carries its constituent members along on a ‘wave [that keeps] on mounting’,
494 a wave 
of  ‘tumultuous  demonstrations  […],  riots  and  uprisings’.
495  Turning  back  to 
Kropotkin’s questions in the above quotation, we notice that the pacifistic individuals 
are transformed into revolutionary heroes as part of a group, that is, part of a violent 
mob  that  attacks  a  castle,  or  part  of  a  marching  insurrectionary  movement.  Their 
‘audacity’, as Kropotkin put it, derives from the group’s audacity. The spirit of revolt 
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has  not  been  awakened  in  their  individual  minds,  as  such,  but  in  the  mind  of  the 
revolutionary collective of which they are a part.   
  Minority, propagandistic acts trigger the heroism of the masses – Kropotkin 
conceived of this as a form of contagion. ‘Courage, devotion, the spirit of sacrifice’, he 
argued, ‘are as contagious as cowardice, submission and panic’.
496 The act ‘infiltrates 
into  men’s  minds’.
497 Alongside  contagion,  however,  Kropotkin  conceives  of  the 
knock-on  effect  of  propaganda  by  deed  on  the  masses  though  the  notion  of 
imitation.
498 The  mass  imitates  action:  ‘the  crowd  […]  will  follow  the  counsels  of 
those  whose  theoretical  ideas  are  perhaps  less  clearly  formulated  and  whose 
aspirations are less broad, but whom it knows because it has seen them in action’.
499 
Here,  Kropotkin  anticipates  Le  Bon’s  inconsistencies  when  thinking  about 
transmission between human beings in the context of crowds. As Nye explains, ‘Le 
Bon was not precise […] in distinguishing between suggestion, mental contagion and 
imitation in his account of crowd behavior’.
500 In ‘The Spirit of Revolt’, Kropotkin 
similarly moves unclearly between contagion and imitation. What is clear, however, is 
the idea that propaganda by deed ignites the revolutionary spirit of the crowd. This was 
also  an  important  idea  in  crowd  psychology.  Crowd  theorists  considered  how  the 
masses could be led, directed, even hypnotised by influential figures.
501 
  Novak  suggests  that  propaganda  by  deed  ‘was  believed  to  have  an 
“educational”  value  in  reminding  the  working  class  of  its  oppression,  raising  its 
revolutionary confidence, and making it more determined to overthrow the existing 
system’.
502 For Kropotkin, the isolated revolutionary act certainly has an impact on the 
masses, but to think of this influence as a form of education is misleading. Education is 
about an appeal to reason – explaining, convincing, helping to understand. The spirit of 
revolt in Kropotkin’s crowds, like those of the psychologists, was awakened not by 
rational education, but by emotional stimuli. The crowd was stimulated not by clarity 
of argument, but by a moving act. In another pamphlet from 1881 that reflected on the 
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execution of Russian revolutionary Sofia Perovskaia (1853-1881) – the first women in 
Russia sentenced to death by hanging for revolutionary activism – Kropotkin gave a 
sense  of  his  assumption  that  the  crowd  responds  emotionally  to  stirring  external 
events, and what is more, that its revolutionary vitality can be gauged by the intensity 
of its emotional state. He imagined Perovskaia’s thoughts as she stood on the scaffold: 
‘By the attitude of the crowd she understood that she had dealt a mortal blow to the 
autocracy. And she read in the sad looks which were directed sympathetically towards 
her, that by her death she was dealing an even more terrible blow, from which the 
autocracy will never recover.’
503 Standing before the spectacle of execution, the crowd 
is  saddened  by  Perovskaia’s  impending  death,  able  to  sympathise  with  her  own 
emotional experience. Her martyrdom has no educational properties, but appeals to the 
crowd’s  instincts,  feelings,  and  passions.  The  crowd’s  revolutionary  power  is 
generated by this spectacle and reflected by its emotional response to the unfolding 
scene: Perovskaia knows, by casting her eyes over the entire crowd and gaining a 
sense of its collective ‘attitude’, that she has awakened in it the spirit of revolt that will 
bring down the autocracy.  
Returning to ‘The Sprit of Revolt’, we can see that Kropotkin wants to give an 
impression of the spirit’s collective character by describing how it operates in the 
‘crucible of the crowd and the street’.
504 Within this furnace, a setting of intense heat 
where individual elements melt into one another, Kropotkin agrees with the crowd 
psychologists  that  ‘the  population  will  be  emboldened  and  their  gatherings  will 
become more and more threatening’.
505 Like Kropotkin’s mob in his history of the 
storming  of  the  Bastille  which  I  analysed  above,  the  revolutionary  crowd  brought 
about by the action of minorities is dangerous and violent: the crowd manhandles the 
rich,  assaults  religious  leaders,  throws  its  enemies  into  the  rivers  of  the  city.
506 
Moreover, the mob has a mind of its own: ‘the crowd amuses itself by jeering at the 
members  of  the  government  as  they  pass  by’,  expressing  its  emotional  unity  and 
singular personality.
507 Such behaviour, however, is the essence of the spirit of revolt 
as  it  grows  in  the  gathered  crowd  –  it  symbolises  the  immanency  of  action  and 
revolutionary heroism. Indeed, while propaganda by deed ignites collective revolt, it is 
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only collective force that can bring about a revolution. As Fleming rightly points out, 
‘it was not sufficient [for Kropotkin] that the masses support the revolution; they must 
also make it’.
508 Kropotkin employs dominant tropes about the late nineteenth-century 
crowd’s  character  –  its  unity,  collective  spirit,  violence,  audacity,  heroism  –  and 
inverts them into a powerful theory of revolutionary strategy. 
Finally,  let  us  recall  the  problem  Kropotkin  posed  about  an  individual’s 
transformation into a revolutionary hero. He asked his reader what magic is behind this 
metamorphosis. We can see that, although the action of minorities – propaganda by 
deed – is the catalyst, the original spell in this process, it gives birth to a new form of 
magic: the spirit (l’esprit), or mind of revolt. As the bearer of this spirit, the crowd 
therefore  solves  the  next  problem  Kropotkin  raises  about  the  translation  of  an 
individual’s  words  into  acts.  This  is  not  a  matter  of  individuals  losing  their  voice 
within the crowd and becoming mute through its action. On the contrary, it is through 
their absorption into the crowd and public participation in its action on the street that 
they acquire a new, louder, and more expressive voice: ‘the language of the people’.
509 
The language of the people is action.  
This reading of Kropotkin’s theory of revolt raises an interesting contradiction. 
We can notice that the scientific tropes of contagion and transmission that, as we have 
seen, are central to his pessimistic anarchist diagnoses, function here to support his 
optimism about the possibility for mass revolutionary action. Moreover, the loss of the 
will and the reign of the passions, an imbalance that elsewhere frames Kropotkin’s 
scientific understanding of social disease, signify here the revolutionary power of the 
collective. The intensity of the crowd’s emotion is not a sign of its ill health and 
degeneracy, but an indicator of its potential to erupt into a challenge to authority. That 
Kropotkin  uses  biomedical  images  both  to  identify  and  subvert  power  is  an 
ambivalence of his political thought resulting from the fluid interplay of science with 
his understanding of anarchism.  
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Revolution as Hygiene 
 
Anarchists present revolution as a response to particular problems. We can identify 
overarching, all-embracing goals in their proposals for change. These goals can be 
understood as thresholds by which the success of the revolution could be judged. In 
1846, Proudhon formulated the problem in the following way in a letter to Marx: ‘How 
can we put back into society, through some system of economics, the wealth which has 
been  taken  out  of  society  by  another  system  of  economics?’
510 The  economic 
revolution was put forward as a process that would allow humanity to reclaim the 
fruits of collective labour lost to ownership and property. In this way, Proudhon’s 
conception  of  revolution  established  a  return:  the  restoration  of  social  wealth. 
Proudhon’s contemporary Déjacque also pursued an overarching revolutionary goal. In 
contrast to Proudhon, however, his goal was not economic, but political. The political 
consequences of revolution – the ‘abolition of government in all its guises’ – would 
secure  ‘anarchy,  individual  sovereignty,  complete,  boundless,  utter  freedom’.
511 
Déjacque’s revolution promises the release of the restrictions that shackle the life of 
societies. His ambition was typically socialist: the revolution was designed to forcibly 
eradicate barriers to emancipation.
512 Its political character lay in its pursuit of an all-
embracing  concept  of  freedom  made  possible  by  the  revolutionary  removal  of 
governmental control. 
Likewise,  Kropotkin  believed  an  anarchist  revolution  would  bring  about 
positive economic and political changes for humanity: a federated, communal social 
organisation, freedom from the dictates of authoritative and dominative government, a 
release from the exploitative demands of capitalist production. But for Kropotkin, the 
fundamental aim of revolution was to stave off the biological degeneration of social 
health. Revolution was a medical response to an array of social sicknesses – bodily, 
mental, moral – whose pernicious effects had brought humanity to the brink of death. 
Kropotkin  justified  revolution  as  a  remedy  that  ‘will  sweep  away  all  this  decay, 
enliven with its breath the hearts that have grown torpid, and bring to humanity the 
devotion, the abnegation, the heroism, without which a society becomes debased and 
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degraded  and  eventually  decomposes’.
513 The  most  fundamental  promise  made  by 
Kropotkin’s revolutionary politics was not freedom, but revival. It would intervene at a 
critical moment in the process of social decline, stopping the rot before it would be too 
late.  
Kropotkin’s medical conception of revolution employed the typical anarchist 
revolutionary  trope  of  destructive-creationism.  Leading  anarchist  thinkers  in  the 
nineteenth century had thought of revolution as a constructive force, but accepted that 
the ambition to create new social and economic conditions could only be realised by 
the destruction of the forms of the old world. The popular misconception of anarchism 
– a dangerous attempt to rid society of all order in a nihilistic, terroristic search for 
chaos – focuses only on the destructive side of its duel aspect of revolution. But as 
Woodcock points out, ‘in the mind of no anarchist thinker has the idea of destruction 
ever stood alone’.
514 The idea of anarchism as being driven by an urge to destroy 
overlooks  the  philosophical  and  political  meaning  of  destruction  in  the  anarchist 
conception  of  revolution.  Destruction  was  a  means  to  a  creative  end:  it  was  a 
precondition. As Proudhon stated in 1851, ‘I destroy and I build up’.
515 To flatten the 
world through destructive revolution was to create the canvas on which to paint the 
future, a tabula rasa necessary to produce something new. In this sense, the destruction 
inherent in revolution can be understood as the autumn in one great cycle of political 
change. 
Bakunin  developed  this  idea  in  his  disputes  with  Marxism  during  the  mid-
nineteenth  century,  adding  to  destructive-creationism  a  political  dimension  that 
accommodated anarchism’s unique stance against the state. Bakunin’s famous adage 
that ‘the passion for destruction is a creative passion’,
516 although part of anarchism’s 
broader philosophical ontology, emerged from its denial of the state’s viability as a 
tool of revolution and the subsequent need for it to be destroyed before the creation of 
the new anarchist world could begin. In the anarchist worldview, the Marxist idea of 
hijacking, enlarging, and strengthening the state as a force for social change would 
corrupt the revolution and perpetuate the existence of the source of social evils. Only 
by completely destroying the state could anarchism’s political ideals of federalism, 
non-hierarchical  social  relations,  and  equality  hope  to  prevail.  As  a  concept  of 
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transition, Bakunin’s political reading of destructive-creationism implies the mutual 
dependency of ruin and design that finds the signs of freedom in the death of the state. 
Kropotkin developed the anarchist trope of destructive-creationism in a culture 
where politics related to a world characterised by the seeming inseparability of decay 
and renewal. Sally Ledger and Roger Luckhurst argue that the ‘dialectic between de- 
and re-generation was played out on a broad scale between different political stances 
and different philosophies, and often in factions within disciplines’.
517 In a reply to 
Nordau’s Degeneration, for example, economic and social philosopher Alfred Egmont 
Hake (1849-1916) argued that ‘the alarming symptoms of degeneration, revealed by 
the  psychologists,  are  the  first  symptoms  of  regeneration’.
518 Kropotkin’s  work  is 
characteristic of this tension, seeing in the devastating sickness of social health not 
only an alarming situation of decomposition, but a fascinating promise of revolution. 
The  degenerative  state  of  the  old  world  would  stimulate  an  anarchist  regenerative 
revolution.  
When Kropotkin wrote that ‘the instinct to destroy […] is so natural and so just 
because it is also an urge to renew’, he was reiterating Bakunin’s political maxim in a 
millenarian culture sympathetic to the view that death guarantees life.
519 Kropotkin’s 
anarchist stance against the state and his insistence on its unsuitability as a tool of 
revolution drew hope from the apocalypse: devastation meant progress. Thus, through 
this  symbiotic,  reciprocal  relationship  between  destruction  and  renewal,  Kropotkin 
could make the paradoxical argument that biological decline is a symptom of renewed 
life.  In  Modern  Science  and  Anarchism,  he  applied  destructive-creationism  to 
revolution: ‘During a revolution new forms of life will always germinate on the ruins 
of  the  old  forms’.
520 With  the  state  destroyed  completely,  anarchy  would  be  a 
possibility. 
Unlike  Proudhon,  Kropotkin  saw  the  problems  that  faced  revolution  not  in 
terms of economic inequality, but through the lens of social medicine. The pressing 
social question, as he often put it, of ‘misery and degradation […], vice [and] crime’, 
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appeared to him as an agglomeration of social diseases demanding of his concept of 
revolution that it addressed not only the wealth of society but, primarily, its health.
521 
The  revolutionary  challenge  confronting  Kropotkin  can  be  put  differently  to  the 
predicament that faced Proudhon: It was not a question of ‘how can we put back into 
society, through some system of economics, the wealth which has been taken out of 
society by another system of economics?’, but of how can we protect and improve, 
with the knowledge of the medical sciences, the health of the social body which has 
become so afflicted? Believing that his critique of the state and capitalism ‘cut to the 
heart of society’s sickness’,
522 Kropotkin could argue that the political (destroying the 
state) and economic (replacing capitalism with communism) transformations of the 
anarchist revolution would function as a form of medicine.  
In this regard, Kropotkin’s revolution was literally curative. It does not just 
cure social ills; it cures society’s illnesses. He understood revolution as a remedial 
force in so far as it eradicated the sources of sickness. He did not want revolution to be 
limited by an attempt to reduce the symptoms of social disorders, but to prevent them 
from  occurring  by  destroying  their  causes.  As  he  wrote  in  ‘The  Inevitability  of 
Revolution’, revolutions should ‘cleanse societies down to the roots, for as long as the 
causes of the gangrene from which they suffer remain, there can be no cure’.
523 With 
its primary goal being disease prevention, revolution was a form of social hygiene. 
‘Hygiene’, he wrote in In Russian and French Prisons, ‘is the best of medicines’.
524 
The only way to cure society was through a revolution that had as its fundamental 
quality and ultimate goal to establish a state of public hygiene. Kropotkin’s revolution 
would only be truly medical if it precluded the possibility of the plague itself.  
Kropotkin’s conception of the politico-economic anarchist revolution as a form 
of public hygiene resonated with contemporary scientific approaches to social health. 
As the physical and moral hygiene of populations emerged as a regulatory concern for 
European states in the nineteenth century, scientific thinkers across a wide range of 
interconnected disciplines began to see hygiene as the most efficient and effective 
medical measure against social illnesses.
525 Italian criminologists, for example, whose 
research Kropotkin had found so compelling, were exhilarated by the possibility of 
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preventing the disease of crime. ‘Instead of trying to cure crime’, argued Lombroso in 
the second edition of Criminal Man (1878) ‘we must try to prevent it by neutralizing 
its causes’.
526 Ferri also called for a political response that would ‘apply the rules of 
social hygiene in order to reach the roots of criminality’.
527 Kropotkin built his idea of 
a hygienic revolution around a similar model. ‘Instead of merely curing diseases’, he 
wrote,  ‘medicine  tries  now  to  prevent  them’.
528 He  was  in  line  with  contemporary 
medical  approaches  to  social  problems,  arguing  that  anarchism  should  ‘trust  to 
hygiene’ the task of their prevention.
529 
Kropotkin took these conceptual tools from biosocial science and turned them 
towards the service of anarchist revolution. In ‘To the Young’, he lamented what he 
saw as the unsustainable state of social health caused by the state and capitalism and 
offered hygiene as the necessary response: ‘No, it is all unjust! It cannot continue like 
this! It is not a question of curing sickness; they must be prevented.’
530 But how could 
a political revolution cleanse society through social hygiene rather than merely treating 
its sicknesses? Kropotkin goes on to provide the answer to these questions: ‘To hell 
with drugs! Fresh air, proper feeding, less brutalising work: that is where we must 
start. Without these things, the whole occupation of a doctor is no more than a trickery 
and a deception’.
531 By destroying the state and the capitalist system of production, 
anarchist revolution would be able to eradicate the pestilential conditions so conducive 
to infection, contagion, and epidemics in which human populations were condemned 
to  live.  Once  more,  Kropotkin’s  Lamarckism  is  important  for  his  political  ideas, 
making the conception of the revolution’s hygienic qualities possible. For the only way 
to cure the biological defects and psychological abnormalities of humanity would be to 
remove the political and economic agencies perpetuating the physical environments in 
which they had developed. Thus, the primary objective of the revolution was not the 
eradication  of  authority,  domination,  exploitation,  and  government  understood  as 
political ends in themselves, but the rearrangement of the social field of reality for the 
sake of improved human health. The dampness and overcrowding of prisons, the filth 
of the cities, and the destitution of sites of work would all be replaced by environments 
with greater light, fresh air, space, and cleanliness. The first work of the revolution 
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would be to implement the scientifically determined norm of hygiene to restore the 
biological life of society.  
Again, Kropotkin’s political thought reflects specific scientific standpoints in 
criminology.  The  idea  that  changing  the  socio-economic  and  political  environment 
could act as a medical, hygienic remedy to social health was an important component 
of Ferri’s criminology. Criminal statistics showed him that in order to cure society of 
crime, a modification of surroundings was necessary. This process of causation he 
summed up scientifically as ‘the possibility of modifying effects by modifying the 
activity of these [environmental] causes’. Even Quetelet, Ferri argued, had showed 
faith in this method of intervening into the operation of social law: 
 
Quetelet himself recognised this when he said, “If we change the social order 
we shall see an immediate change in the facts which have been so constantly 
reproduced […]. These studies therefore show how important is the mission of 
the legislator, and how responsible he is in his own sphere for all phenomena of 
the social order.”
532 
 
As I showed in chapter two, Kropotkin thought of social laws in a similar way to 
Quetelet: as laws of chance and probability, as regularities in social behaviour caused 
by sets of social conditions. Like Ferri, who believed the means to cure society of 
crime  was  to  change  social  law  through  environmental  modification,  Kropotkin’s 
scientific revolution would seek to alter these laws in an attempt to cure the social 
body of social disease. By removing the socio-political and economic order of state 
capitalism,  the  repeated,  statistically  represented  facts  of  social  disease  would  be 
immediately reconfigured. 
  The speech Kropotkin gave at the First International Eugenics Congress placed 
social  hygiene  at  the  heart  of  revolutionary  anarchist-socialism.  It  advanced  a 
eugenicist  argument  antithetical  to  sterilisation.  Kropotkin  supported  the  goal  of 
eugenics – improving the biological condition and preventing the biological decline of 
human populations – but thought this would not be achieved by sterilisation because it 
systematically avoided ‘considerations about the influence of surroundings upon the 
soundness of what is transmitted by heredity’.
533 Referring to modern criminology and 
the psychiatric work of Krafft-Ebing, Kropotkin touched on a number of potentially 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
532 Ferri, ‘The Data of Criminal Statistics’, p. 298. 
533 Kropotkin, ‘The Sterilization of the Unfit’, p. 122. 	 ﾠ 178	 ﾠ
inheritable  diseases  whose  causes  lie  in  the  social  environment:  crime  and  sexual 
aberrations are created or intensified by prisons, sexual promiscuity can be caused by 
overcrowded  living  conditions,  poverty,  and  hunger,  and  feeblemindedness  and 
epilepsy both have ‘social roots’.
534 The solution to these problems, Kropotkin argued, 
was political: ‘making Socialism’. But what exactly did this mean? To make socialism 
was to ‘destroy the slums [and] build healthy dwellings [my emphasis]’. It was ‘to 
pave  the  streets  [and]  to  bring  a  supply  of  water  to  a  city’.
535 Here,  Kropotkin’s 
conception of socialism, as a revolutionary political idea, is designed to bring about 
changes  that  are  understood  in  biological  terms.  As  a  political  response  to  social 
problems, Kropotkin’s speech presented revolutionary change as a form of eugenics 
that would function through social hygiene: it improves the biological condition of 
populations by making their social environment healthier.  
Kropotkin, the bio-political revolutionary, felt a great sense of frustration with 
the wilful ignorance of contemporary society towards the deterioration of its health. 
Society simply refused to acknowledge the causes behind its decline. Under the state 
and capitalism, it ‘does not want to hear its own diseases spoken of and dissected’.
536 
Against this, Kropotkin presented anarchist revolution as a force that would not only 
be  open  and  honest  about  the  diseases  afflicting  society,  but  would  perform  the 
operation  required  to  remove  them.  A  passage  in  ‘To  the  Young’  addressing  the 
physician asks for the scientific expertise that would make this revolution possible: 
 
And you, physician, whom hard experience has led to understand socialism, do 
not tire of telling us – today, tomorrow, every day in every occasion – that 
humanity is doomed to degenerate if it remains in the present condition of 
living and work; that your drugs will remain powerless against sickness while 
99 per cent of humanity vegetate in conditions absolutely opposed to those that 
science teaches; that it is the causes of sickness which must be eliminated – and 
how are we to eliminate those causes? Come then with your scalpel to dissect 
with  a  meticulous  hand  this  society  on  its  way  to  collapse,  tell  us  what  a 
rational way of life could and should be, and, as a true doctor, repeat to us 
untiringly that one does not hesitate to amputate a gangrenous limb when it 
might infect the whole body.
537 
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Revolution is the elimination of the causes of sickness. No longer will the state and 
capitalism  be  able  to  create  and  protect  the  conditions  of  life  and  work  in  which 
humanity has become degenerate. Anarchy, on the contrary, will establish conditions 
‘that science teaches’ are conducive to good human health. The revolution has no 
miracle cure; it merely seeks to put into practice knowledge of hygiene that had been 
developed  by  nineteenth-century  medicine.  Through  the  application  of  existing 
scientific knowledge for the betterment of human life the revolution would rationalise 
society. Looking back to the epigraph that I placed at the very beginning of this thesis, 
we can now see that Kropotkin’s prescription for all of humanity’s sicknesses was 
political: a medical revolution. 
 
 
Anarchy 
 
When anarchists argue in favour of their visions of a post-revolutionary society they 
emphasise the importance of social order. Their insistence that revolution will bring 
order to the world is given as a response to the popular reproach that anarchy would 
subject humans to a life of chaos. The criticism that anarchist revolution, by cutting the 
regulating cords of political government would plunge human beings into a state of 
confused and uncontrollable disarray, is dismissed as a popular misconception. On the 
contrary,  anarchists  argue  that  the  existence  of  states,  governments,  and  capitalist 
production  inflict  disorder  on  social  life.  The  continual  military  conflicts  between 
states,  the  rule  of  the  majority  by  the  minority,  the  increasingly  sharp  disparity 
between rich and poor, and the ungoverned, capriciousness of the free market are the 
features of the modern world anarchists describe as disordered. Anarchy, on the other 
hand,  with  its  rationalised  systems  of  production  and  exchange  and  communally 
managed, federated forms of social life, would restore order. Mid-nineteenth-century 
French anarchist Anselme Bellegarrigue (1813-c.1900), for example, thought of the 
end of government as a means to establish social order. ‘If dispensing with government 
is, on the one hand, the establishment of order, and, on the other, the enshrinement of 
anarchy’, he wrote, ‘then order and anarchy go hand in hand’.
538 Anarchist attempts to 
abolish the existence of governments were an assault on chaos, revolutionary attacks 
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whose  pursuit  of  anarchy  had  as  their  anticipated  outcome  a  situation  of  social 
harmony. 
This  anarchist  tendency  to  invert  the  charge  of  disorder  is  evident  in 
Kropotkin’s thought. His article ‘Order’ (1881) addressed the problem connected to 
the word anarchy: ‘We are often reproached with having taken as our slogan the word 
anarchy which […] in current speech, is the synonym for disorder, for chaos’.
539 In 
response, his article compares the supposed ‘order’ of the present socio-economic and 
political  situation  of  late  nineteenth-century  European  state  capitalism  with  the 
‘disorder’  of  anarchy.  The  order  protected  by  the  defenders  of  the  status  quo, 
Kropotkin argued, is nothing but inequality, deprivation, poverty, famine, exploitation, 
servitude, destruction, and death. By contrast, the ‘disorder’ desired by anarchists is 
the  abolition  of  slavery,  freedom  from  religious  persecution,  self-government, 
progress, and love.  
Kropotkin’s conception of revolution, however, would add a new dimension to 
the order of an anarchist society. The order of his vision of anarchy lay in the rational 
measurement, calculation, and distribution of the resources of the city. The abolition of 
the disordered, destructive chaos of the status quo would not bring order to the world 
in and of itself. Positive, intentional steps were required to reorder society and bring a 
rational form to the newly acquired resources of the social field. In ‘Why Must We 
Occupy  Ourselves  with  an  Examination  of  the  Ideal  of  a  Future  System?’  (1873), 
Kropotkin’s earliest projection of revolution considered how to order urban space: 
 
All houses in the cities should become the property of the whole city. In each 
quarter,  committees  should  be  named  for  the  calculation  of  how  many 
apartments are needed for the inhabitants of this quarter, for the subdivision of 
them  into  unmarried,  artel,  and  family  [apartments].  All  those  registered  in 
apartments  for  the  unmarried  receive  them  by  lot  from  those  listed  in  this 
category. The same holds for the artel and family [categories] […]. All wares 
in the stores must be registered in detail and records made thereof.
540 
 
Dwelling  spaces  and  human  life  would  be  quantitatively  harmonised,  with  the 
population’s need for shelter met by strict and calculated numerical precision. The 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
539 Petr Kropotkin, ‘Order’, in Words of a Rebel, pp. 76-80 (p. 76). Originally appeared in Le Révolté as 
‘L’Ordre’ (1881). 
540 Petr Kroptokin, ‘Why Must We Occupy Ourselves with an Examination of the Ideal of a Future 
System?’, in Selected Writings, pp. 47-116 (pp. 74-75). Originally published in Russian as ‘Dolzhnyi-li 
my zaniat’sia rassmotreniem ideala budushchego stroia?’ (1873). 	 ﾠ 181	 ﾠ
revolution would impose a level of exactness onto the products of the city, bringing 
order to material reality through the detailed practices of registration and recording. 
The  human  resources  of  anarchy  would  be  equally  subject  to  the  revolution’s 
rationalisation of life. Segmented into categories of social status, the urban population 
would become an ordered, mapped, and thus importantly, visible social reality of types 
and groupings, a quality of Kropotkin’s revolution made possible by his measuring and 
mapping techniques which I outlined in chapter two. In this effort to classify social 
existence, Kropotkin’s revolution would initiate a statistical and numerical process of 
what Hacking terms ‘making up people’.
541 Thus, the order brought to the world by 
Kropotkin’s anarchist revolution resided not only in the rigorous mapping of the social 
field, but in ascribing categories to individuals by which they were able to understand 
their social role and status.  
From his earliest images of revolution, then, Kropotkin’s desire to rationalise 
and bestow numerical form on to reality shone through. Science was interacting with 
anarchism in a productive, transformative way. No longer able to map the peoples and 
geographic spaces of the Russian Empire, the scientific and statistical training of his 
youth  found  a  field  of  application  in  the  imagined  reality  of  a  post-revolutionary 
society. The measuring skills he learned while studying in the Corps of Pages and on 
military  service  in  Siberia,  coupled  with  the  enthusiasm  he  developed  for  the 
application of statistics to social questions, were channelled into the political idea of 
revolution. Such epistemological and methodological practices would have to be at the 
heart of a revolution if it were to be successful. A scientific revolution could only 
improve social health if it was ‘guided by observation, analysis, and experiment’.
542 
When Kropotkin gave his most comprehensive vision of a post-revolutionary, 
anarchist society in The Conquest of Bread, the ideas of statistical measurement, first 
allied  to  the  revolutionary  cause  nineteen  years  earlier  in  ‘Why  Must  We  Occupy 
Ourselves with an Examination of the Ideal of a Future System?’, remained central. 
The  revolutionary  process  of  bringing  order  to  Paris,  Kropotkin  suggested,  would 
depend largely on numerical mapping: 
 
If such a revolution breaks out in France, namely, in Paris, then in twenty-four 
hours the commune will know what Paris has not found out yet, in spite of its 
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statistical committees, and what it never did find out during the siege of 1871 – 
the quantity of provisions it contains. In forty-eight hours millions of copies 
will be printed of the tables giving a sufficiently exact account of the available 
food, the places where it is stored, and in the means of distribution.
543 
 
Amidst  the  uncertainty  and  flux  of  urban  revolution  a  focused,  statistical  scrutiny 
would be at work. The measurement of Paris would take place on a total scale, turning 
what appears at ground level to be the imperceptible labyrinths of streets into a clearly 
visible and well-ordered numerical representation: a map of the city in tabulated form. 
The once hidden provisions of the city would be unveiled by the revolution’s piercing 
eye of empirical scientific observation. In Kropotkin’s mind, the success of one of the 
revolution’s  central  aspirations  –  providing  the  people  with  food  –  was  intimately 
dependent on the objective knowledge acquired by scientific-statistical study. When 
the food of Paris had been measured, tabulated, and exactly represented in printed, 
numerical form then the political problem of hunger and starvation could be overcome.  
Nothing would be left to chance during the revolution. The expropriation of 
land would not be a haphazard, tumultuous event fuelled by vengeful rage, but a cool, 
calculated,  and  scientific  process  of  social  rearrangement  informed  by  statistical 
knowledge. In The Conquest of Bread, Kropotkin forecasted how the huge undertaking 
of expropriation will be approached and carried out: 
 
It seems very likely that, as soon as expropriation is fairly started, groups of 
volunteers  will  spring  up  in  every  district,  street  and  block  of  houses,  and 
undertake to inquire into the number of flats and houses which are empty and 
of  those  which  are  overcrowded,  the  unwholesome  slums,  and  the  houses 
which are too spacious for their occupants and might well be used to house 
those who stifled in swarming tenements. In a few days these volunteers would 
have drawn up complete lists for the street and the district of all the flats, 
tenements, family mansions and villa residencies, all the rooms and suites of 
rooms,  healthy  and  unhealthy,  small  and  large,  foetid  dens  and  homes  of 
luxury. Freely communicating with each other, these volunteers would soon 
have their statistics complete. False statistics can be manufactured in board 
rooms and offices, but true and exact statistics must begin with the individual 
and mount up from the simple to the complex.
544 
 
Kropotkin’s  enthusiasm  for  counting  the  quantity  and  quality  of  dwelling  places 
(including  an  assessment  of  whether  they  were  healthy  or  not)  stemmed  from  his 
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understanding of society as an empirical entity requiring scientific measurement. Like 
the unmapped spaces of Siberia and Asia he witnessed during military service, social 
space  that  was  not  recorded,  classified,  and  catalogued  seemed  provoking  to  him. 
What was needed to make it visible was a highly scientific, empirical study of society 
through direct observation and counting. The political task of the revolution to provide 
shelter for the urban population rested on the exactness of citywide, comprehensive 
statistical  reports.  Moreover,  voluntary  social  counting  was  central  to  the  political 
power  of  Kropotkin’s  anarchist  revolution.  As  Kinna  writes,  ‘Kropotkin’s  concern 
with the organizational aspects of power led him to suggest that the key to the state’s 
destruction was the ability of individuals to cooperate in the construction of new ways 
of living.’
545 Nowhere was this more apparent than in the revolutionary function of 
statistical mapping. Indeed, the ability of Kropotkin’s revolution to defy the state came 
in  part  through  its  cooperative,  decentralised,  and  non-hierarchical  organisational 
practice of counting society. By ‘acting for themselves’, statistical volunteers would 
‘bypass the power of the state’ and ‘present it with a revolutionary challenge’.
546 
The same techniques Kropotkin used in his anarchist diagnoses are employed 
in  the  service  of  his  anarchist  remedy:  the  hygienic  revolution.  From  providing 
descriptions of the conditions of social life under the state and capitalism, statistics 
now became a creative tool to map the future and give expression to the idea of social 
transformation.  Paradoxically,  however,  these  tactics  to  gain  knowledge  about  the 
social  field,  its  resources,  and  the  human  population  would  not  differ  from  those 
employed by the state. As we saw in chapter two when I explored his response to the 
1897 imperial census of the Russian Empire, Kropotkin supported the state’s use of 
statistics to measure society. Here, we can see that his anarchist politics invested this 
state  technology  with  the  power  to  generate  knowledge  about  a  post-revolutionary 
society.  The  epistemological  technologies  of  the  state  made  possible  Kropotkin’s 
belief  that  a  revolution  could  meet  the  biological  and  social  needs  of  human 
populations.  
Kropotkin  did  not  disagree  with  the  modern  state’s  tendency  to  measure, 
categorise, and tabulate reality into ordered, readable forms. Despite sharing the state’s 
scientific  method  of  measuring  society,  however,  Kropotkin’s  anarchist  politics 
remained paramount. Only with the freely organised, voluntary, and community-led 
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statistical investigation initiated by an anarchist revolution could the food required to 
feed  the  people  of  Paris  be  found  and  distributed.  In  contrast  to  the  municipal 
statistical committees of the state, the reports and figures produced by revolutionary 
statistical committees would be accurate and representative of reality. Through their 
ground-level,  quantitative  social  research,  anarchist  volunteers  could  achieve  an 
intimate  knowledge  of  reality,  a  level  of  precision  unattained  by  state  statisticians 
whose work was conducted from the detachment of boardrooms.  
Within this rationalised anarchist future, where statistics measure life and its 
resources and where living and working conditions are hygienic, the place of science 
will be radically altered. This is a typical feature of the nineteenth-century image of 
anarchy  more  generally  and  it  is  not  unique  to  Kropotkin.  The  dissemination  of 
scientific knowledge – the spreading of science along newly reconfigured horizontal 
lines  of  society  –  was  particularly  important  to  Bakunin’s  theory  of  anarchy.  He 
described the position of science within a centralised state as ‘the reign of scientific 
intelligence,  the  most  aristocratic,  despotic,  arrogant  and  contemptuous  of  all 
regimes’.
547 The consolidation of science in the ivory towers of government creates ‘a 
new class, a new hierarchy of real and pretended scientists and scholars [and] the 
world will be divided into a minority ruling in the name of knowledge and an immense 
ignorant majority’.
548 Science’s exclusion deprives society of the knowledge needed to 
organise itself without government interference. By so doing it strengthens the state’s 
political claims to govern. Bakunin’s solution lay in relocating science: ‘What I preach 
then  is,  up  to  a  certain  point,  the revolt of life against science,  or  rather  against 
government by science, not against the destruction of science […] but the putting of 
science in its rightful place’.
549 To talk of science’s ‘rightful place’ is confusing in this 
context. The dissemination of science renders it placeless: nowhere and everywhere at 
the same time. No longer will its powers be restricted to one location, but scattered 
amongst the people: ‘Science, as a moral entity existing outside […] social life […] 
should be liquidated and widely diffused among the masses [...]. Science must in a real 
sense  become  everybody’s  property’.
550 Two  political  benefits  will  result  form  this 
diffusion. Society would posses the knowledge necessary to organise its own affairs, 
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and government would be stripped of its epistemological power and claims to govern. 
With  the  dissemination  of  knowledge,  self-rule  and  political  freedom  are  achieved 
simultaneously.  
Kropotkin was an advocate of the same process. His words in ‘To the Young’ 
echo Bakunin’s: 
 
It is no longer a question at this moment of accumulating scientific truths and 
discoveries. It is more important to spread the truths already gained by science, 
to make them enter human life, to turn them into a common domain. This must 
be  done  in  such  a  way  that  the  whole  of  humanity  may  be  capable  of 
assimilating and applying them, so that science will cease to be a luxury and 
will become the foundation for the life of all.
551 
 
Knowledge dispersal should be total and far reaching. Its truths should penetrate every 
individual’s consciousness. This is a precondition for a rationally ordered society, one 
that could be designed, built, and perpetuated in accordance with scientific norms.  
While  sharing  Bakunin’s  call  for  the  dissemination  of  science,  Kropotkin’s 
greater scientific knowledge and his keener interest in current scientific theories meant 
that he made appeals for more specific forms of knowledge to be dispersed. One of 
Kropotkin’s most illuminating calls for scientific knowledge to enter the ‘common 
domain’ came in In Russian and French Prisons: ‘The time, we hope, is not too far 
distant’,  Kropotkin  stated,  ‘when  the  noble  ideas  which  have  inspired  Griesinger, 
Krafft-Ebbing, Despine, and some of the modern Italian criminologists, like […] Ferri, 
will  become  the  property  of  the  general  public’.
552 In  Kropotkin’s  thought,  the 
anarchist theme of knowledge dissemination serves to scatter ideas from nineteenth-
century criminal psychiatry throughout society. He envisaged the wide dissemination 
of  Griesinger’s  medical  understanding  of  insanity,  Krafft-Ebing’s  view  of  sexual 
deviance as mental disease, Despine’s conception of immorality as moral insanity, and 
Ferri’s  approach  to  crime  as  being  the  result  of  an  interaction  between  body  and 
environment. In short, Kropotkin wanted expert knowledge about biosocial deviance to 
become a part of the epistemological basis of social anarchy. 
Kropotkin’s call for the dissemination of these scientific ideas was made in the 
service of anarchist politics. Once dispersed, prominent strands of nineteenth-century 
criminal psychiatry would not come to govern social existence technocratically. On the 
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contrary,  as  ‘the  property  of  the  general  public’,  as  Kropotkin  put  it  in  the  above 
quotation, a biomedical perspective of deviance would strengthen society’s capacity to 
organise its own affairs. Equipped with this expert knowledge, communities could 
make  their  own  informed  decisions  about  crime,  madness,  and  sexual  aberration. 
Moreover, by disseminating a medical approach to deviance, Kropotkin’s anarchism 
subverts the power of the state to punish its citizens. How to respond to anti-sociality, 
violence, and moral transgression would no longer be dictated to society by centralised 
political authority. With the idea of sin eradicated and replaced by a medical discourse 
about sickness, society’s role would not be to discipline, but to cure and make healthy 
the afflicted individuals. Here, Kropotkin is reformulating the two political benefits – 
political freedom and self-rule – that Bakunin hoped to secure through the recasting of 
science: owned collectively by society, criminal psychiatry makes obsolete the state’s 
claim to punish and places the responsibility for treatment in the hands of the people.  
 
I  have  shown  how  Kropotkin’s  absorption  of  scientific  knowledge  and  methods 
transformed key elements of his anarchist politics. It shifted the focus of conventional 
strands of the anarchist diagnosis and made the notion of an anarchist remedy literal. I 
have  also  argued,  however,  that  anarchism  was  not  inactive  in  this  relationship. 
Kropotkin’s political ambitions were strengthened, not diluted, through their meeting 
with science. My analysis has not presented Kropotkin as a crude nineteenth-century 
positivist to whom all political questions were rendered irrelevant in the face of an 
administrative scientism. Instead, I have represented him as a political thinker who 
drew on prevalent scientific epistemologies and methodologies in order to develop, 
transform,  and  add  vitality  to  a  tradition  of  anarchist  thought.  This  is  particularly 
evident in my reading of Kropotkin’s conception of revolution. Science did not simply 
promise to Kropotkin, or allow him to foresee with optimism, the inevitability of social 
and moral progress that would rule out the necessity of mass revolutionary action. 
Rather, Kropotkin’s biomedical understanding of the threats posed by the state and 
capitalism made a hygienic revolution essential for humanity’s survival. In this sense, 
my analysis of science in Kropotkin’s anarchism, unlike Crowder’s, ‘sits well’ with his 
theory of revolution: biomedical science did not reduce the importance of spontaneity, 	 ﾠ 187	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but maximised it.
553 This thesis has argued that for all Kropotkin’s faith in scientific 
thought,  he  did  not  think  that  moral  progress  would  come  about  as  a  result  of  a 
‘passive evolutionary process’.
554 Quite the reverse: his conception of environmentally 
driven evolutionary change made the revolutionary modification of surroundings vital 
for humanity’s moral improvement. As a form of social hygiene, revolution would act 
literally as a medical retaliation against the illnesses caused by the state and capitalism. 
In  short,  Kropotkin’s  biomedical,  scientific  thinking  raised  the  stakes  of  anarchist 
revolution to new heights.  
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Conclusion: The Ambivalence of Kropotkin’s Anarchism 
 
In  the  preface  to  the  second  edition  of  Russian  Literature:  Ideals  and  Realities, 
Kropotkin  introduced  an  ambivalence  he  saw  at  the  heart  of  nineteenth-century 
Russian literature. The ‘Western reader’ will initially be struck by its hopelessness and 
misery. They will be impressed by ‘the absence from it of the joy of life, the happiness 
of existence’. Kropotkin identified a ‘striking note of sadness’ that unified the work of 
Russian poets and novelists. Yet, alongside this distinct melancholy, he was keen to 
point  out  to  his  Western  reader  another,  ‘even  more  characteristic’  feature.  While 
being sorrowful, it is at the same time alive with hope. It is driven by a ‘deeply rooted 
inner force’ that stops at no obstacle and can never be extinguished. Confidently it 
pursues  ‘higher  ideals,  the  higher  aspirations  of  mankind’.  Kropotkin’s 
characterisation of nineteenth-century Russian literature cantered on a contradiction: 
amidst its ‘deep traces of sadness’, there is a ‘real happiness’.
555 
It is apt that Kropotkin should cast such a view of nineteenth-century Russian 
writers,  because,  I  think,  a  similar  ambivalence  was  at  work  in  his  thought.  The 
delicate balance between despair and hope he noticed in Alexandr Pushkin (1799-
1837) and Nikolai Gogol (1809-1852), for example, I consider to be a striking feature 
of  his  own  writings  about  the  world.  Kropotkin’s  energy  was  continually  divided 
between critiquing the status quo and imagining its improvement. His focus shifted 
back and forth from a fear of a decayed past and present to a hope of a healthy future. 
The  strength  with  which  he  condemned  humanity’s  desperate  state  of  existence  is 
matched by his faith in its possible salvation. Kropotkin’s ambivalence is common to 
his tendency to think in terms of binaries: to search for meaning in the world through 
the  confrontation  of  contradictory  ideas  and  in  the  arrangement  of  seemingly 
insurmountable oppositions. His political philosophy made sense within his ambiguous 
statement that ‘only those who know how to hate know how to love’.
556 He judged the 
modern age as a place full of horror, a place he undoubtedly hated, but one that was 
pregnant with an idea he certainly loved: the prospect of a better future. 
Kropotkin explained the ambivalence of nineteenth-century Russian literature 
not as a specific feature of the mystical Slavonic soul, but as a consequence of many of 
the authors’ experience of persecution at the hands of the Tsarist state. Kropotkin’s 
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precarious  oscillation  between  pessimism  and  optimism,  however,  cannot  be 
accurately  accounted  for  by  turning  to  his  experiences  of  imprisonment.  What 
stimulated his ambivalence, I believe, was the scientific thought he absorbed into his 
anarchist  project.  As  I  have  shown,  biomedical  knowledge  fuelled  Kropotkin’s 
pressing anxiety about the sickened condition of modern society as well as his belief in 
the  possibility  of  purifying  it  through  hygienic  revolution.  His  panic  about  the 
biological degeneration of the human species was informed by the truth claims of 
evolutionary science, ideas which simultaneously promised him the potential for its 
regeneration. And his fears about increased levels of moral depravity, epidemics of 
madness, and the danger of mental insanity had their roots in theories of criminal 
psychiatry,  whose  scientific  assessment  of  deviance  also  gave  him  the  hope  to 
conceive of a world without crime.  
The tensions between apocalyptic despair and unbreakable hope we find in 
Kropotkin’s thought are indicative of the ways in which scholars have described the 
modern experience. In his study of the meeting of biomedical science and politics in 
late Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, Daniel Beer argues that ‘science played a 
key role in defining both the optimism and the pessimism of modernity’: 
 
On the one hand it was constantly ‘discovering’ – naming, defining, measuring, 
quantifying, investigating – new problems and threats. On the other hand, and 
on  the  basis  of  such  codification  of  each,  science  was  also  constantly 
‘identifying’  new  solutions  to  those  problems,  new  fields  of  inquiry  and 
expertise and new technologies to contain and resolve them.
557 
 
This diagnostic-remedial tension encapsulates the way in which Kropotkin thought 
about  the  qualities  of  his  scientific  anarchist  project.  His  absorption  of  science 
produced a brand of anarchism that flirted continually, but uneasily, between problem 
and  solution.  The  violent  oscillations  between  progress  and  decline  we  find  in 
Kropotkin’s thought were products of science’s perpetual need to conjure the forces 
against which it could unleash its power.  
Kropotkin experienced his age in other unsettling ways. His writing is stretched 
by competing interpretations of the world. On the one hand, he saw a clear vision of 
rapid progress – technological, scientific – that was easily identifiable and existed in 
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material reality. In ‘The Scientific Basis of Anarchy’, we find one of Kropotkin’s 
quintessential narratives of late nineteenth-century civilisational achievement: 
 
Let us take a civilized country. The forests have been cleared, the swamps 
drained. Thousands of roads and railways intersect it in all directions; the rivers 
have  been  rendered  navigable,  and  the  seaports  are  of  easy  access.  Canals 
connect the seas. The rocks have been pierced by deep shafts; thousands of 
manufactures cover the land. Science has taught men how to use the energy of 
nature for the satisfaction for his needs. Cities have slowly grown in the long 
run of ages, and treasures of science and art are accumulated in these centres of 
civilization.
558  
 
This type of image is a neat example of what Marshall Berman describes as the ‘highly 
developed, differentiated and dynamic new landscape’ of the nineteenth century in 
which  modern  experience  took  place.
559 Kropotkin  was  certainly  in  tune  with  the 
industrial  rhythm  of  the  late  nineteenth  century  and  its  conquests  over  nature.  He 
expressed  optimism  to  his  readers  about  the  rapidly  changing  face  of  the  world’s 
surface.  
On the other hand, however, Kropotkin’s writings convey an experience of an 
age  that  –  in  Berman’s  terms  –  could  ‘provide  everything  except  solidity  and 
stability’.
560 There is an uncertainty to Kropotkin’s outlook, a tendency to peer below 
the  neatly  ordered  face  of  reality.  Underneath  the  surface  of  civilisation,  where 
industry and science made their obvious marks on physical nature, were more murky, 
less distinct features of the nineteenth century that challenged the illuminating light of 
progress. The torch of rationality was lit, but shone in a world of darkness. There were 
spells in this world, cast by wizards and sorcerers who, with ‘the command of all sorts 
of evil powers’, prowl ‘about at night, pursuing [their] wicked designs under the cover 
of darkness’.
561 Modern life involved a struggle against deception, a constant fight to 
see through disguise and identify which elements of reality were façade and which 
genuine. Illusion was a constant challenge. Modernity’s constructive drive, by which 
great cities were built and feats of engineering – bridges, damns, tunnels, railways, 
factories – adorned both urban and rural landscapes, was accompanied by a process of 
subtle erosion: ‘All that was good, great, generous or independent in man, little by 
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little  becomes  moss-grown;  rusts  like  a  disused  knife’.
562 Beneath  the  surface  of 
industrial advancement and progress lurked a realm of duplicity where ‘a lie becomes 
a virtue, a platitude a duty’.
563 Nothing was what it seemed in Kropotkin’s vision of 
the modern environment.  
Even Kropotkin’s view of the universe is characterised by ambivalence. As he 
wrote in Modern Science and Anarchism, his anarchism looked out to the universe 
through the interpretive gaze of the natural sciences: 
 
Anarchism  is  a  conception  of  the  Universe  based  on  the  mechanical 
interpretation of phenomena […]. Its method is that of the natural sciences, and 
every conclusion it comes to must be verified by this method if it pretends to be 
scientific. Its tendency is to work out a synthetic philosophy which will take in 
all facts of Nature.
564 
 
Kropotkin’s basic ontology, a view of what is actually ‘out there’ in the world, owed 
its elaboration to this mechanistic, regularised, and rational scientific outlook. Such a 
framework,  however,  did  not  produce  a  view  of  the  universe  that  was  ordered  or 
coherent, but one of chaos. Speaking of astronomy in ‘Anarchism: Its Philosophy and 
Ideal’, he claimed that modern science had produced a new conception of the universe: 
 
After  having  fixed  all  their  attention  on  the  sun  and  the  large  planets, 
astronomers are beginning to study the infinitely small ones that people the 
universe. And they discover that the interplanetary and interstellar spaces are 
peopled and crossed in all imaginable directions by little swarms of matter, 
invisible, infinitely small […]. These infinitely tiny bodies […] dash through 
space in all directions with such giddy swiftness, […] clash with one another, 
agglomerate,  disintegrate,  everywhere  and  always  […].  Soon  universal 
gravitation  itself  will  be  but  the  result  of  all  the  disordered  and  incoherent 
movement  of  these  infinitely  small  bodies  –  of  oscillations  of  atoms  that 
manifest themselves in all possible directions. Thus the center, the origin of 
force,  formerly  transferred  from  the  earth  to  the  sun,  now  turns  out  to  be 
scattered and disseminated. It is everywhere and nowhere.
565 
 
Leaving  aside  the  anarchist  imagery  of  this  decentralised  reality,  where  force  and 
power are disseminated amongst its constituent parts, Kropotkin’s view of the universe 
is one of perplexing flux. The physical world was not how it appeared to the naked 
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eye,  but  rather  a  place  of  disorder.  It  was  a  theatre  of  imperceptible  clashes,  of 
dizzying speed and velocity. Kropotkin experienced the entanglement of reality, its 
incoherency  and  disconnectedness.  He  felt  its  disintegration  and  thought  of  the 
tumultuous crisscrossing of its parts. Above all, Kropotkin’s scientific gaze on reality 
produced  a  world  of  contradiction:  ‘Harmony  […]  results  from  the  disorderly  and 
incoherent movements of numberless hosts of matter’.
566 The order of the universe is 
explained as a consequence of hidden chaos under the surface. Fragmentation is the 
basis of the world’s unity. 
Kropotkin’s writing represents an experience of the modern age that is caught 
between  certainty  and  doubt.  When  he  contemplated  the  relationship  between 
knowledge and power, this experience was particularly strong. It was a question that 
occupied his mind for over half a century. ‘The Ethical Need of the Present Day’ 
contains his ambivalent conclusion: 
 
Modern Science has thus achieved a double aim. On the one side it has given to 
man a very valuable lesson of modesty. It has taught him to consider himself as 
but an infinitesimally small particle of that immense whole – the universe. It 
has driven him out of his narrow, egotistical seclusion, and has dissipated the 
self-conceit under which he considered himself the centre of the universe and 
the object of a special attention in it […]. But at the same time science has 
taught man how powerful mankind is in its progressive march; and it has given 
him the means to enlist in his service the unlimited energies of Nature.
567 
 
At once humbling and exalting, nineteenth-century scientific knowledge had brought 
about an oscillating experience for human beings. It had reduced them to material 
creatures,  removing  from  their  lives  the  comfort  and  pride  of  divinity,  while 
simultaneously  raising  them  as  the  new  masters  of  the  universe.  Owen  Chadwick 
portrays  this  peculiar  feature  of  the  experience  of  nineteenth-century  science  as  a 
contradiction, one ‘lowering man to the dust by showing him to be nothing but animal, 
while lifting him to the skies and singing his greatness as the ruler of the world’.
568 
This  was  a  contradiction,  but  an  indispensible  contradiction  for  a  man  of 
transformative politics. To realise their ultimate power humans had to be lowered to 
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the ground, and with nature as the object of science, they too had to be turned into 
something natural before being understood, improved, and elevated. 
Through his explorations of this relationship between knowledge and power, 
Kropotkin exposed a further ambivalence in his thought arising from the connection 
between  modern  science  and  politics.  In  designating  human  beings  as  something 
natural,  revealing  what  Kropotkin  called  ‘Man’s  oneness  with  Nature’,
569 scientific 
knowledge had rendered them more powerful than ever, powerful over themselves as 
part  of  nature.  For  Kropotkin  believed  that  it  was  science’s  two  interdependent 
qualities  –  knowledge  and  control  –  which  together  empowered  anarchist  political 
thought with the capacity to regenerate society and improve social health. First of all, 
science was necessary ‘to help [human beings] to know Nature’, that is, to understand 
humanity in all its details and complexity.
570 This epistemological insight allowed for 
the next stage in the process of anarchist political change, ‘to utilize [nature’s] forces’, 
that is, to instrumentalise and to tame it so as to make it subservient to human artistry 
and design.
571 And being one with nature, that is, utterly part of the natural world, 
humanity was subject to its own scientific ambitions to manage, order, and control life. 
Kropotkin’s idea of anarchism revolves around this circular, contradictory pattern of 
mastery and subjection. Science’s connection to anarchism brought into existence a 
humanity that vacillated from a position of command to a state of obedience, a power 
whose  authority  derived  from  knowledge  of  its  own  weakness,  fragility,  and 
malleability. According to Kropotkin, the success of anarchism would be proportional 
to  the  intensity  with  which  humanity  felt  this  contradiction.  The  political  goal  of 
anarchism – ‘increasing […] the welfare of societies’ – was dependent on the extent to 
which ‘concrete scientific knowledge’ could extend ‘the power of man over Nature’.
572 
Anarchism’s realisation required the complete extension of humanity’s power over 
itself. To achieve this, anarchist politics would have to draw on science and science 
would have to be transformed by anarchist politics. 
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